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This thesis presents evidence on the association between the existence and quality of 
the remuneration committee and the narrative voluntary disclosures of executive 
remuneration, the reasons attributed to the internal factors and external factors in the 
remuneration action disclosures, and CEO remuneration. The study uses a sample 
based on the top 200 listed firms in Australia for the period 2007 to 2011, a period 
including three different macroeconomic conditions: before, during and after the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Multivariate regressions are used to analyse the data. 
Agency theory, attribution theory and legitimacy theory are used to explain the 
theoretical underpinnings of the study. The thesis is structured as a series of three 
essays. 
 
The first essay examines whether the existence and quality of a remuneration 
committee influences the decision to narratively disclose executive remuneration 
action, and the extent of any such disclosures, in firm annual reports. The second essay 
investigates the reasons given for remuneration actions in the narrative disclosures and 
whether those reasons are attributed to internal factors or external factors. The third 
and final essay examines the effects of the existence and quality of a remuneration 
committee on CEO remuneration and its components. 
 
There are several primary motivations for the study in terms of its contribution to the 
literature. First, it is evident that Australia managed to avoid much of the negative 
attention given to executive remuneration when compared to the USA during the 
period of the study. The thesis provides additional understanding of the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms in determining CEO remuneration and in disclosing 
xiii 
 
the firm’s action to its stakeholders during the critical macroeconomic period studied. 
Second, very few studies have examined the role of remuneration committee quality 
in the determination of CEO remuneration, the provision of related narrative voluntary 
disclosures, and its attribution of remuneration actions to internal or external factors. 
Finally, the existing literature that has examined attribution in terms of external or 
internal factors has been in the context of organisational performance. The thesis 
contributes to the literature by examining attribution in terms of executive 
remuneration action in an Australian environment. 
 
The investigation of data in the first essay suggests the existence and quality of the 
remuneration committee affect the decision to provide, and the extent of, narrative 
voluntary disclosures of remuneration action in annual reports. The results also show 
that the significance varies based on the type of executive remuneration action and on 
macroeconomic conditions. The second essay finds that attribution to external and 
internal factors varies with the type of actions and with macroeconomic conditions. 
However, the results show that the existence and quality of the remuneration 
committee do not have a significant impact, although certain remuneration committee 
characteristics are significant. The third and final essay finds that CEO remuneration 
is influenced by the existence and quality of the remuneration committee. The further 
analyses reveal that results vary based on components of remuneration and the 
macroeconomic period used in this study. 
 
Overall, the findings of the thesis suggest that the existence and quality of the 
remuneration committee play an important role in the determination of CEO 
remuneration and the narrative voluntary disclosure of executive remuneration action. 
xiv 
 
This thesis uses different theories to justify each essay. There are also practical 
implications, where the findings suggest that regulators and the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) should include diligence (meetings) and financial expertise in formal 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
Executive remuneration has received increased attention internationally in recent years 
due to the global financial crisis (GFC) with the collapse of large financial institutions, 
such as Lehman Brothers in late September 2008. In Australia, corporate collapses 
stemming from the GFC included Babcock and Brown, Timbercorp Securities, Great 
Southern Managers Australia and ABC Learning (Ferran, Moloney, Hill and Coffee 
Jr. 2012). This thesis focuses on remuneration committees’ role in executive 
remuneration and its narrative disclosure, including the explanations given in the 
disclosure of Australian-listed companies. The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
recommends a listed entity has a formal and transparent process for developing its 
remuneration policy and for setting the remuneration packages of directors and senior 
executives. Furthermore, the ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends listed 
entities have a separate remuneration committee. These committees can be seen as an 
efficient and effective mechanism to bring transparency, focus and independent 
judgement to executive remuneration decisions. Although the board is responsible for 
determining the remuneration of the CEO (and other senior executives) as per the 
Corporations Act, this role is usually delegated to the remuneration committee. In 
Australia, having a remuneration committee is a voluntary requirement. This is in stark 
contrast to the US environment where the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
listing rules require all listed firms to have an independent compensation committee. 
 
Prior literature has documented the importance of remuneration committees. For 
example, Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) argue that high quality remuneration 
committees are capable of designing and implementing remuneration arrangements. A 
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remuneration committee can help determine the appropriate design of reward 
structures for management and align the interests of management and shareholders 
(Conyon and Gregg 1995; Main and Johnston 1993). However, to date only limited 
research has been conducted on the impact of remuneration committees on narrative 
disclosure and explanations given in such disclosures about executive remuneration 
(Conyon and Peck 1998; Newman and Mozes 1999). Therefore, further research is 
warranted on this important area of corporate governance, executive remuneration and 
narrative disclosure. 
 
1.2  Issues Addressed in this Thesis 
Corporate boards can either conduct their work through the board of directors or 
delegate their authority to a sub-committee reporting to the boards (Brown, Beekes 
and Verhoeven 2011). These board sub-committees meet separately from the board, 
and are composed of subsets of board members. It is well-acknowledged and 
evidenced in the literature that sub-committees play an important role in enhancing a 
firm’s corporate governance (Spira and Bender 2004). Having a remuneration 
committee is consistent with agency theory, which suggests that management should 
be separated from control (Fama and Jensen 1983). Remuneration committees are 
responsible for reviewing and determining the remuneration for senior management 
(Klein 1998). This thesis addresses the important issue of remuneration committee 
existence and quality in determining executive remuneration, narrative voluntary 
disclosure of executive remuneration action and its attribution. 
 
Understanding the factors that determine the quality of a remuneration committee is 
necessary to achieve effective operation of a remuneration committee in board 
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disclosure of compensation practices (Laksmana 2008). In the extant literature, the 
quality1 of remuneration committees is investigated in isolation by considering the 
individual characteristics of the committee (Conyon and Peck 1998; Cybinski and 
Windsor 2013). However, only a small number of studies have examined the quality 
of the remuneration committee by developing an index to capture the effect of 
interdependencies among remuneration committee variables (Sun and Cahan 2009; 
Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009). Furthermore, none of these studies has explored the 
impact of remuneration committee existence and quality on voluntary disclosures, 
attribution and CEO remuneration. Therefore, the quality of a remuneration committee 
is used as a main test variable in this thesis to investigate its influence on narrative 
voluntary action disclosure, its attribution and CEO remuneration, in top 200 ASX 
listed firms from 2007 to 2011. Since the study period of this thesis includes the GFC, 
this study further investigates the impact of remuneration committees on narrative 
voluntary executive remuneration action disclosure, its attribution and CEO 
remuneration during different macroeconomic conditions. Overall, the critical issues 
addressed in this study provide insight into the complex nature of the effective 
operation of remuneration committees in Australia. 
 
1.3  Objectives and Motivation for the Research 
The success of an organisation depends on its capacity to attract skilful executives 
through, among other factors, its compensation policy (Jensen and Murphy 1990). An 
extensive body of literature has developed around the influence of specific 
                                                 
1 This study uses a composite measure to calculate remuneration committee quality by incorporating 
the size of the remuneration committee (RCS), the independence of remuneration committee members 
(RCIND), the independence of the remuneration committee chairperson (RCCHAIRIND), the diligence 
(frequency of meetings) of the remuneration committee (RCMEET), and the financial expertise of the 
remuneration committee members (RCEXP). 
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characteristics of remuneration committees on executive remuneration (Cybinski and 
Windsor 2013). This study shows firm size is an influential factor in the total 
remuneration of CEOs. The effect of remuneration committee independence on CEO 
remuneration varies with the size of the firm. In terms of specific disclosures, such as 
for options/stock, Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) found remuneration committee 
independence and effectiveness contribute to improved Executive Stock Option (ESO) 
disclosure. None of these prior studies though, has examined the voluntary narrative 
disclosure or the reasons given in the annual report for changes in executive 
remuneration. In the light of the gaps in the literature, the first objective of this thesis is 
to assess the impact of the existence and quality of a remuneration committee on the 
voluntary disclosure of executive remuneration in a narrative format in the annual 
reports of the top 200 listed firms in Australia. 
 
Previous studies suggest that management uses attribution to provide disclosures about 
organisational performance (Aerts 1994; Aerts 2001; Osma and Guillamon-Saorin 
2011). One of the motivations of this thesis is to enable an improved understanding of 
the different attribution strategies adopted in the narrative disclosures of the top 200 
Australian listed firms during the different macroeconomic conditions from 2007 to 
2011. For example, Aerts (1994) found that the reasoning pattern in corporate 
accounting narratives tends to be biased, based on whether it is a positive performance 
(cause/effect) or negative performance (more technical). Osma and Guillamon-Saorin 
(2011) provided evidence that strong corporate governance minimises impression 
management in annual press releases. However, none of the studies has examined the 
use of attribution strategy in narrative disclosure of executive remuneration. Therefore, 
the second objective of this thesis is to examine the reasons given in the annual report 
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about executive remuneration changes and whether these reasons are attributed to the 
external factors or the internal factors of the organisation. It further examines whether 
the existence and quality of a remuneration committee influence the attribution. 
 
Several prior studies have investigated corporate governance quality by considering one 
or two of the remuneration committee characteristics (see, e.g., Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon 2006; Conyon and Peck 1998; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton 1998; 
Newman and Mozes 1999) on the association between CEO compensation, firm 
performance and disclosure. However, the evidence is mixed and highlights the need 
for further investigation in this context by including different macroeconomic 
conditions. Moreover, prior research on remuneration committee existence and quality 
on CEO compensation is limited in Australia, with the exception of Clarkson, Van 
Bueren and Walker (2006). They examined CEO remuneration disclosure in Australia 
from 1998 to 2004 for a randomly-selected sample of 124 firms. They found firm size, 
corporate governance,2 auditor quality, cross-listing status and public scrutiny were 
significant explanations of remuneration disclosure quality. None of the previous 
Australian studies has examined the quality of the remuneration committee as measured 
by a single quality index. Therefore, the third and final objective of this thesis is to 
investigate the influence of the existence and quality of a remuneration committee on 
executive total remuneration and its components by including different macroeconomic 
conditions during the study period. 
 
                                                 
2 Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker (2006) estimated corporate governance using a factor analysis based on four 
corporate governance measures: the proportion of independent directors, independent audit committee members, 
independent remuneration committee members and whether the CEO is also a chairman of the board.  
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1.4 Research Questions 
1.4.1 General Research Question 
The GFC has put executive remuneration under the spotlight all around the world, with 
many questioning the manner in which executives are rewarded. This scrutiny began 
when it was established that well-paid senior executives of failed companies had 
received billions of dollars from the US government (Baily 2010). A review of the 
causes of the crisis has shown that many financial institutions paid their employees in a 
way that encouraged them to take inappropriate risks. Some of the incentive structures 
encourage executives to take short-term risks at the expense of long-term outcomes 
(Corkery and Medarevic 2013). Even though the Australian framework is sound in terms 
of executive remuneration disclosure, the Australian government has believed that some 
aspects of the framework require further strengthening and moderating. As a result of 
this view, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA)3 was asked by the 
federal government in October 2008 to examine how to avoid excessive risk-taking in 
Australian financial institutions. In November 2009 it developed a prudential practice 
guide for APRA-regulated firms. In 2009, the Productivity Commission undertook an 
inquiry into the Australian regulatory framework on directors and executive 
remuneration practices, and provided seventeen recommendations in January 2010. 
 
A remuneration committee has been described as “an efficient mechanism for focusing 
the company on appropriate remuneration policy” (ASX Corporate Governance Council 
2007, p. 35). The 2007 ASX Corporate Governance Principles (Recommendation 9.2)4 
                                                 
3 Australia operates under a ‘twin peaks’ model of financial regulation. According to this model APRA 
is responsible for prudential regulation of financial institutions. It supervises deposit takings, general 
insurance, life insurance and superannuation institutions. The other agency, the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC), has the responsibility for business conduct and consumer 
protection (Hill 2012). 
4 The ASX amended the original recommendations of 2003, in 2007 and in 2010. 
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made three formal recommendations: that a board should establish a remuneration 
committee with a minimum of three members; a majority of these members should be 
independent; and the remuneration committee should be chaired by an independent 
director. These three recommendations constitute the current framework. It is important 
to note that the recommendations for the composition of the remuneration committee 
are suggestions only, hence, the usual requirements of ‘if not, why not’ do not apply.5  
 
The remuneration committee is an important board sub-committee. While prior studies 
have examined the effectiveness of boards and various sub-committees, empirical 
evidence is scant on the impact of remuneration committees on executive remuneration 
voluntary disclosure practices and CEO remuneration. Prior archival studies relating 
to remuneration committee characteristics have investigated a number of 
remuneration-related outcomes such as remuneration disclosure and CEO/executive 
remuneration (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer 2010; 
Collins, Gong and Li 2009; Conyon and Lerong 2004; Laksmana 2008). Remuneration 
committee quality is measured by an index in the literature (Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 
2009; Sun and Cahan 2009). However, neither of these studies investigated the critical 
issue of voluntary narrative disclosure of executive remuneration action and the extent 
of such disclosures. The paucity of literature in this area is evident, with Balachandran 
                                                 
5 Some of the relevant Australian disclosure requirements pertaining to executive remuneration are as 
follows:  
• Section 300(A)(1) was introduced to the Corporations Law in 1998 and required disclosure of the 
board policy for determining the nature and amount of emoluments for board members and senior 
executives and discussion of the relationship between the remuneration policy and company 
performance. 
• The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Guidelines were initially released 
in 2003 and suggested that disclosures should be provided in relation to management remuneration 
policies. 
• The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
(CLERP 9 Act) introduced the requirement for a non-binding vote by shareholders in relation to their 
acceptance or non-acceptance of proposed management remuneration. 
• AASB 124 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ was released in 2004 (the equivalent of IAS 24) but only 
requires limited disclosures in relation to executive remuneration. 
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and Faff (2015) further highlighting the need to research the linkages between 
corporate governance and executive remuneration more extensively. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be argued that it is important to have proper 
corporate governance practices to monitor CEO remuneration and relevant 
disclosures. The overarching research issue that leads to the general investigative 
research question is stated as follows: 
 
What are the effects of the remuneration committee on directors’ remuneration 
and its narrative disclosure of remuneration changes?  
 
1.4.2 Specific Research Questions 
According to agency theory, effective corporate governance mechanisms (such as 
board sub-committees) can mitigate information asymmetry and related agency costs 
through increased disclosures. For example, board sub-committees work to monitor 
managers to act in the best interests of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). An 
important board sub-committee is the remuneration committee whose role is to support 
and advise the board on matters relating to remuneration. This would include, for 
example, the level and composition of remuneration, disclosure of remuneration 
policies, and the process for setting remuneration and assessing performance (Singh 
and Harianto 1989; Main and Johnston 1993; Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010). 
 
Given the monitoring role of corporate governance, it could be argued that 
remuneration committee quality would improve firms’ narrative disclosures. Annual 
reports are primary sources of information for investors, creditors, employees and 
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government agencies. Disclosures in annual reports provide organisations with an 
effective method of managing external impressions (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 
1998). The communication of remuneration decisions and actions to shareholders is 
important in demonstrating the alignment between shareholders’ interests, entity 
performance and remuneration. Furthermore, a recent opinion survey by PWC (2014) 
highlights an increasing expectation that directors take greater responsibility in 
communicating to shareholders on matters pertaining to governance issues, thus 
indicating calls for greater information transparency. Prior archival studies relating to 
remuneration committee characteristics have investigated a number of remuneration-
related outcomes such as remuneration disclosure and CEO/executive remuneration 
(e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer 2010; Collins, Gong 
and Li 2009; Conyon and Lerong 2004; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton 1998; 
Laksmana 2008; Sapp 2008; Sun and Cahan 2009; Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009). 
However, none of these studies has investigated the critical issue of narrative 
disclosure of executive remuneration change on a voluntary basis. Thus, this thesis 
argues that remuneration action voluntary disclosures and the extent of such 
disclosures are contingent on the existence and quality of the remuneration committee 
as a key corporate governance mechanism established by the board. The first study of 
this thesis, therefore, addresses two key research questions which are outlined in 
Chapter 4: 
 
RQ1a: Does remuneration committee existence (RCX) have a significant 
association with the decision and extent of narrative voluntary disclosure of 




RQ1b: Does the quality of the remuneration committee (RCQ) have a 
significant impact on the decision and extent of VDER? 
 
The second study of this thesis begins in Chapter 5. It focuses on the reasons given for 
remuneration change in the top 200 listed company annual reports in the Australian 
environment from 2007 to 2011. This study uses attribution theory to explain the 
reasons. 
 
Attribution is an impression management strategy adopted from social psychology 
(Heider 1958; Kelly 1967). The impression management perspective propounds that 
discretionary disclosures can be used opportunistically by management to create 
favourable impressions of either the firm or of the management itself. In a reporting 
context, it entails managers attributing positive organisational outcomes to internal 
factors and negative organisational outcomes to external factors (Aerts 1994; Aerts 
2001; Clatworthy and Jones 2003). 
 
As evident in the Productivity Commission (2009) report, a number of companies 
revised some elements (especially the incentive component) of their executive 
remuneration payments. This study argues that managers will adopt an attribution 
strategy to explain the reasons for a change in executive remuneration. The 
remuneration committee, being a sub-committee of the board, will play an important 
role in the actions undertaken to revise executive remuneration arrangements, and in 
the communication of these actions with attributions and reasons to the shareholders, 




On the other hand, legitimacy theory argues, given a growth in community awareness 
and concern, that firms will take measures to ensure their activities and performance 
are acceptable to the community and will use the annual report as a tool to legitimise 
the ongoing operations of the firm (Brown and Deegan 1998). If firms are unable to 
show they have remained within the acceptable boundaries, the members of the 
community may express dissatisfaction in a number of ways, as either individuals or 
as a group of individuals, or through the elected representatives of the community 
(Wilmshurst and Frost 2000). The annual report may therefore be used to reinforce 
community perceptions of specific issues of concern (Deegan and Rankin 1996; Patten 
1992). 
 
Chapter 5 argues that in order to manage the public scrutiny of executive remuneration 
in the crisis period and to legitimise their actions, companies will be more likely to 
adopt more attributional behaviour based on impression management. Resulting from 
this discussion, the two specific research questions addressed in Chapter 5 are: 
 
RQ2a: Do the reasons given for executive remuneration change and its extent 
vary based on attribution (internal vs external) in the different macroeconomic 
periods (pre-GFC, during and post-GFC)? 
 
RQ2b: Do remuneration committee characteristics play any moderating role 
in the type and extent of attribution? 
 
The study’s final research question is discussed in Chapter 6. Research on corporate 
governance, including studies on compensation, is predominantly based on agency 
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theory (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Gomez-
Mejia 1994). Agency theory assumes that managers behave in a self-serving manner 
that could be detrimental to the owners. In the agency framework it is argued that 
effective corporate governance practices mitigate agency cost by providing executive 
remuneration incentives (Gillan 2006; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ward, Brown and 
Rodriguez 2009). Corporate governance practices are introduced to reduce agency 
problems and to ensure managers act in the best interest of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
 
Remuneration committees, being part of internal corporate governance mechanisms 
play an important role in the determination of executive compensation by making 
recommendations to the main board. CEO compensation is influenced by the existence 
and the quality of the remuneration committees as a key corporate governance 
mechanism established by the board. Therefore, the two key research questions 
addressed in Chapter 6 are: 
 
RQ3a: Does the remuneration committee existence (RCX) have a significant 
association with total CEO compensation? 
 
RQ3b: Does the quality of the remuneration committee (RCQ) have a 
significant impact on the CEO compensation? 
 
 
1.5 Research Method 
The initial sample of this thesis is constructed from the top 200 ASX-listed firms based 
on market capitalisation for each of the years from 2007 to 2011 (Chalmers, Koh and 
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Stapledon 2006). Top 200 ASX companies were chosen as these firms have a large 
concentration of economic power (Child and Rodrigues 2003) and are also likely to 
attract more media coverage (Miller 2006). Data were collected from Connect4, 
DatAnalysis and corporate websites. The annual reports were downloaded from the 
Connect4 database. The information related to remuneration committee characteristics 
was hand-collected from company annual reports. From the initial sample, a number 
of observations were deleted due to: (a) annual reports being presented in a foreign 
currency, thus reducing comparability (Rankin 2010); and (b) missing annual reports 
and the non-availability of data from the various sources used in the data collection 
process. The screening process led to a final sample of 673 observations during the 
study period for the first research question. For the second research question, the 
sample size was reduced to 240 as this question focuses on the reasons given in the 
voluntary disclosures about executive remuneration. In addition to reports presented 
in foreign currencies or missing annual reports, the final research questions also 
eliminated firms with an executive chairman, as well as firms with negative 
compensation. This resulted in a final sample of 561 firm-year observations. 
 
This study uses different regression techniques for different research questions. For 
example, for the two main research questions addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, the study 
uses logit and OLS regressions, while OLS regression is adopted for the third and final 
research question addressed in Chapter 6. Consistent with previous literature to address 
endogeneity and reverse causality (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991), this study develops 
instrumental variable regression. The first lagged observations of the endogenous 
variables are used as instruments. Fixed effects are used to control for unobserved 
differences between firms. 
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1.6 Summary of Findings 
The various data analyses lead to a number of important findings in this thesis. The 
first essay examines whether remuneration committee existence and the quality of the 
remuneration committee have significant impacts on the decision and extent of VDER. 
The findings show a significant positive association between remuneration committee 
existence and the decision and extent of VDER. This study also finds that remuneration 
committee quality is positively associated with the decision and extent of voluntary 
disclosure of executive remuneration. 
 
Overall, the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that in order to strengthen the remuneration 
committee role in narrative voluntary executive remuneration disclosure practices (as 
discussed above in Section 1.4.1, the General Research Question), ASX policymakers 
should consider including diligence (the number of remuneration committee meetings) 
and the financial expertise of the members of the remuneration committee. This would 
mean expanding the existing three voluntary recommendations to five. 
 
The primary objective of Chapter 5 is to ascertain the type and extent of attribution, 
measured by an attribution index, in annual reports for voluntary remuneration 
disclosure and whether they are influenced by the remuneration committee 
characteristics from 2007 to 2011 for the top 200 listed firms in Australia. Results 
show that companies attributed the remuneration change to external factors during the 
GFC. However, in the pre-crisis period, internal factors were attributed to 
remuneration change decisions. In particular, the attribution index shows that when 
companies attribute external factors to remuneration changes in accounting narratives, 
firms tend to disclose less. However, during the pre-crisis period when they attribute 
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internal factors, they tend to disclose more. Although there is no regulation to monitor 
the voluntary narrative disclosure, this study finds that managers tend to disclose more 
when they attribute internal factors to justify the remuneration change decision to the 
users of financial information. Additionally, remuneration committee characteristics, 
such as remuneration committee independence and the number of remuneration 
committee meetings, play different roles in the attribution strategy and the extent of 
attribution disclosure based on the remuneration action (increase or freeze). 
Furthermore, remuneration committee existence and quality fail to show any 
significant results on the type and extent of attribution in the period of study. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the influence of the existence and quality of a remuneration 
committee on total CEO compensation and its components in the Australian setting 
during 2007 to 2011. These two questions are examined and the results also provide 
evidence of remuneration committee existence having a positive effect on total CEO 
compensation. The remuneration committee’s quality is also highly significant for the 
whole sample period and in relation to different components of total CEO 
compensation (salaries, bonus and short-term employment benefits). During the GFC, 
RCQ positively influences total CEO compensation. Further analysis suggests the 
diligence of remuneration committees and the financial expertise of remuneration 
committees are the driving forces behind remuneration committee quality. In terms of 
the existence of a remuneration committee, the study did not find any significant result 
in the main analysis; however, additional analysis reveals that, during the GFC, 
support was found for RCX influencing CEO remuneration. RCX also influences the 




1.7 Contribution to Knowledge 
The findings of the research have theoretical and practical implications that will 
contribute to enhancement of the understanding of remuneration committees and their 
role in executive remuneration and its narrative disclosure. 
 
1.7.1 Theoretical Implications 
The findings from this research have theoretical implications. First, the thesis uses the 
agency theory’s opportunistic perspective to argue that managers will voluntarily 
provide additional narrative disclosure on executive remuneration actions to avoid any 
adverse reactions from shareholders, regulators and potential investors, and that such 
disclosures are contingent on the characteristics of the remuneration committee. This 
is examined in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
 
Second, almost all the prior studies examined the different impression management 
practices adopted by the firms in different states of organisational performance. 
However, the recent study by Osma and Guillamon-Saorin (2011) researched narrative 
disclosure in annual result press releases during 2005 and 2006 in publicly-listed 
Spanish companies, and found strong governance lowers the incidence of both 
qualitative and quantitative impression management. This study examines the 
narrative disclosure of directors’ remuneration change in company annual reports, and 
the adoption of the attribution strategy by firms to justify their decision on 
remuneration change. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Finally, the application of a methodology to calculate the quality of a remuneration 
committee by including the ASX recommendation principles and two other additional 
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components based on the literature (Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009) is a novel 
application in the area of measuring the quality of the remuneration committee in the 
context of corporate governance. This procedure is mainly applied in Chapters 4 and 
6 of the thesis.  
 
1.7.2 Policy Implications 
The findings from the research also have several practical implications for 
practitioners and policymakers. First, given the importance of the GFC and the 
substantial lack of empirical evidence on its impact on remuneration, this study will 
address an important issue in relation to executive remuneration using Australian data. 
The findings of this study provide critical information on executive remuneration and 
whether remuneration committee existence and quality play an important role in 
executive remuneration, disclosures of executive remuneration change decision and its 
attribution strategy across a unique macroeconomic setting from 2007 to 2011. 
Overall, the main findings of this thesis suggest including diligence (the number of 
remuneration committee meetings) and financial expertise, in addition to the existing 
corporate governance recommendations, to strengthen the remuneration committee’s 
operation in the Australian environment. 
 
 
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
Following the introduction of the research in this chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the 
Australian regulatory and institutional framework. This chapter mainly discusses the 
role of regulatory bodies and corporate governance practices for listed companies in 
Australia. Chapter 3 reviews the three important theories (agency theory, legitimacy 
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theory and attribution theory) that underpin the three main research questions 
addressed in this thesis.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the first research question relating to whether the existence of a 
remuneration committee and its quality influence the voluntary disclosure of 
remuneration disclosure (increase, freeze) in narrative format under different 
macroeconomic conditions. Chapter 5 presents the second research question that 
examines whether the reasons given for executive remuneration change, based on 
attribution theory, vary in the pre-, during and post-GFC periods, and whether 
remuneration committee characteristics play any moderating role. Chapter 6 presents 
the third and final research question which investigates the influence of RCX and RCQ 
on the total remuneration of the CEO, and the remuneration components, under 
different macroeconomic conditions. These three chapters examining the research 
questions are structured in a consistent manner. The first section of each chapter 
reviews the background and motivation of the research question. The second section 
sets out a literature review and hypothesis development. This is followed by a 
discussion of the methodology and the results. The final sections of each of the three 
chapters present a chapter summary. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides an overall summary of the three research questions 
undertaken in this thesis, including findings. It also discusses the contribution of each 
of the empirical studies. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of study 





Chapter 2: The Australian Regulatory and Institutional 
Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents a brief outline of 
the regulatory framework in Australia, and is followed by an outline of the corporate 
governance environment in Australia. 
 
All companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) are legally required 
to supply financial information to their stakeholders (shareholders and other affected 
parties) in order to allow them to effectively evaluate the company’s past performance 
and to make future decisions. The basis of this process is the preparation and 
distribution of financial statements (also known as financial reports). The aim in this 
section is to provide a background to the Australian and institutional framework for 
the preparation and presentation of mandatory company financial statements, and to 
the introduction of changes in corporate governance practices in Australia. 
 
This section explores the requirements and the aims of the Corporations Act 2001 and 
Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) standards in guiding company 
financial reporting, and discusses the roles played by the major accounting regulatory 
bodies such as the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC), and the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Finally, it discusses the 




2.2 Source of Authority and Guidance 
2.2.1 Corporations Act 
The general requirements for financial reports and audits are specified in Chapter 2M 
(Financial Reports and Audit) of the Corporations Act 2001. Sections 286 to 291 of 
the Corporations Act 2001 prescribe requirements for financial records. Section 286 
requires a company to keep written financial records. 
 
The Corporations Act 2001 requires the accounts of a company to convey a true and 
fair view. In particular, Section 297 requires that financial statements and notes for the 
financial year give a true and fair view of the entity’s financial position and 
performance. Also, if a company’s financial statements, despite being prepared in 
accordance with applicable regulations and accounting standards, would not otherwise 
give a true and fair view, Section 295(3)(c) requires any additional information 
necessary to give such a view to be included in the notes to the financial statements. 
Auditors are required to report whether or not, in their opinion, the annual financial 
statements give a true and fair view and comply with accounting standards (Section 
308). 
 
The term ‘true and fair’ is not defined in the Corporations Act 2001 or elsewhere in 
legislation or regulation, and its exact meaning has been subject to much debate. While 
there has been considerable debate and controversy on the exact nature of the term, in 
normal accounting practice a true and fair view requires the compliance of the accounts 




The accounting policies adopted should be appropriate to the company’s business, and 
the accounts taken as a whole should provide adequate disclosure of all material 
matters, including any additional information required to give a true and fair view. 
Various requirements and recommendations in the accounting standards and concepts 
statements are persuasive in considering whether the accounts convey a true and fair 
view. Truth and fairness also presumably involve the financial information being 
useful to users for decision-making purposes, as specified in the Statement of 
Accounting Concepts 2 (SAC 2). With respect to annual reporting to members, the 
Corporations Act 2001 permits companies to send a concise financial report to 
shareholders rather than the complete annual report (Section 314[1]). 
 
A public company or a large proprietary company will generally be required to prepare 
general-purpose financial reports and have them audited and lodged with ASIC. If a 
company is classified as a disclosing entity, there are additional disclosure 
requirements (Section 674) 
 
A small proprietary company will not necessarily be required to prepare general 
purpose financial reports for external reporting purposes. But small proprietary 
companies must still keep proper accounting records and registers and will obviously 
need to prepare accounts for internal management purposes and to satisfy taxation 
requirements. However, these accounts will not have to comply with the Corporations 
Act 2001 and accounting standards requirements (Section 296). 
 
The Australian regulatory requirement for executive pay is more strict and transparent. 




• Section 300(A)(1) was introduced to the Corporations Law in 1998 and 
required disclosure of the board policy for determining the nature and 
amount of emoluments of board members and senior executives and 
discussion of the relationship between the remuneration policy and 
company performance. 
• The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Guidelines were initially released in 2003 and they suggested that 
disclosures should be provided in relation to management remuneration 
policies. This was updated in 2007 and 2010. These codes are to be 
followed on a voluntary basis and, if companies do not follow these 
recommendations, an explanation must be given. This arrangement is also 
known as ‘if not, why not’. 
• The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9 Act) introduced the requirement 
for a non-binding vote by shareholders in relation to their acceptance or 
non-acceptance of proposed management remuneration. 
 
After public outrage at excessive corporate executive compensation, the 
government requested the Australian Productivity Commission to undertake an 
enquiry into the existing regulatory framework of remuneration of directors 
and executives (Australian Financial Review, 23 November 2011). The 
commission found that the executive remuneration structure is company and 
context-specific in Australia and made 17 recommendations, including issues 
such as: election of directors, voting rights, remuneration committee, 
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remuneration reports and disclosure, and the adoption of the ‘two strikes’ rule 
to engage shareholders in executive remuneration. On 16 April 2010, the 
government formally responded to the Productivity Commission’s report and 
on 20 December 2010 the federal treasurer released the remuneration 
amendment bill for public consultation. The senate approved it in June 2011 
and the new legislation became effective from 1 July 2011 (Australian 
Financial Review, 10 December 2012). Because this thesis investigates the 
period from 2007 to 2011, this issue is not addressed in detail. However, the 
two strikes rule is the most significant corporate governance reform that 
corporate Australia has seen since the ASX corporate governance principles 
were first implemented in 2003 (Monem and Ng 2013). 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is the statutory body 
constituted to administer the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001, and is the body responsible for administration of the Corporations Act 2001 and 
related regulations. It also has ultimate responsibility for the registration, regulation 
and oversight of Australian company auditors. ASIC also administers certain 
consumer protection laws. Its main role, however, is to act as a corporate watchdog 
promoting honesty and fairness in securities markets and in company affairs. It will 
initiate legal proceedings in the Federal Court when breaches of the Corporations Act 
2001 occur (Section 593). 
 
2.2.2 Accounting Standards 
Section 296 of the Corporations Act 2001 requires company financial statements to 
comply with accounting standards. Accordingly, these standards establish the 
24 
 
principles and detailed rules that must be observed by companies and other entities 
that are required to prepare and lodge with ASIC annual financial statements and 
accompanying notes. The purpose of accounting standards, in essence, is to provide 
authoritative guidelines for the measurement, valuation and disclosure of items in 
financial statements and to provide a basis for the auditor to determine the truth and 
fairness of an entity’s financial statements. In circumstances where it is considered that 
compliance with an applicable AASB accounting standard does not result in the 
presentation of a true and fair view, that standard’s provisions must still be applied. 
However, as noted earlier in this chapter, directors are required in such circumstances 
to present such additional information and explanations as are necessary to give a true 
and fair view (Section 295[3][c]). 
 
Accounting standard AASB 124 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ (before 2005, AASB 
1046) requires companies to disclose executive remuneration in a systematic and 
segmented manner in the annual report (www.aasb.gov.au). 
 
In summary, the Corporations Act 2001 provides relatively general guidance as to the 
required form and content of the accounts. The accounting standards issued by the 
AASB aim to provide more detailed guidance, mainly by prescribing allowable 
accounting policies and requiring the disclosure of certain details of various 
transactions and balances (www.aasb.gov.au). 
 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is a statutory body that was originally 
established on 1 January 2000 under Section 225 of the ASIC Act for the purpose of 
overseeing Australia’s accounting standard setting process (FRC 2007a). In addition 
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to its original accounting standard setting oversight function, the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
(CLERP 9, Commonwealth of Australia 2004) extended the responsibility of the FRC 
to that of providing broad oversight of the processes for the setting of Australian 
auditing standards (Section 225(1)(b)). This specifically involves overseeing the 
auditing standard setting body, the AUASB, appointing its members (other than the 
chair), determining its broad strategic direction, and giving it direction, advice or 
feedback on matters of general policy and procedures (Section 225(2A)). 
 
The FRC’s responsibilities were also expanded from 1 July 2004 to include oversight 
of the Australian auditing and Assurance Standard Board (AUASB) and Australian 
auditing standards. The Ramsay Report (2001) considered an independent supervisory 
board to be “an essential instrument in addressing the challenge of implementing new 
auditor independence requirements in Australia” and that it would “play a vital role in 
ensuring public confidence in the independence of auditors by monitoring 
implementation of the new regime, compliance with it, and important international 
developments in the area of auditor independence” (p. 75). 
 
The other main functions of the FRC include: the appointment of AASB members 
(other than the chairperson); the approval and monitoring of the AASB’s priorities, 
business plans, budget and staffing arrangements; the determination of the AASB’s 
broad strategic direction, and giving the AASB directions, advice or feedback on 
matters of general policy and procedures; the monitoring of the development of 
international accounting standards and the accounting standards that apply in major 
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international financial centers; and the advancement and promotion of the objectives 
of standard setting, as specified in the Corporations Act( ASIC Act 2001, Section 225). 
 
Following the direction given by the FRC in 2002, the AASB adopted the standards 
issued by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) as from 1 January 
2005. Hence, the financial statements prepared by Australian companies are 
comparable with those prepared by entities in other countries which also have adopted 
IASB standards. This should allow for greater understanding of financial statements 
worldwide, and lead to a more efficient flow of capital across national boundaries 
(Policy Statement 4 ‘International Harmonization and Convergence Policy’, paragraph 
4). 
 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) is an independent body 
responsible for developing a single set of high-quality, understandable accounting 
standards that require transparent and comparable information in the general-purpose 
financial reports. According to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001, Section 227(3), the AASB has the power to establish committees, advisory 
panels and consultative groups, and to do anything necessary for the performance of 
its functions. The functions of AASB include: the development of a conceptual 
framework (not having the force of an accounting standard) for the purpose of 
evaluating proposed accounting standards and international standards; the setting of 
accounting standards for the purpose of the Corporations Act; the formulation of 
accounting standards for other purposes, e.g., for non-companies, the public sector and 
the not-for-profit sector; and participating in and contributing to the development of a 
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single set of accounting standards for worldwide use to advance and promote the main 
objectives of developing accounting standards ( ASIC Act 2001, Section 227(1)). 
 
In formulating accounting standards, the Act specifies that the AASB may issue the 
text of international accounting standards, modified if necessary to take account of the 
Australian legal and institutional environment (Section 227(4)). In performing its 
functions, the AASB is required to follow the broad strategic directions determined by 
the FRC and to follow the general policy directions, advice and feedback given by the 
FRC (Section 232). Each accounting standard issued by the AASB contains a 
statement outlining the entities required to comply with that standard. 
 
2.2.3 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Listing Requirements 
Companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) must comply with the 
securities exchange listing rules. Major requirements are for the continuous disclosure 
of price-sensitive financial information and half-yearly reporting. These were 
specified in the ASX’s listing requirements prior to the disclosing entity provisions of 
the Corporations Act 2001. A further major requirement is for companies to provide, 
in their annual reports, a statement of the main corporate governance practices that the 
company had in place during the reporting period (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, Good Corporate Principles and Recommendations, ASX, Sydney, 2010). 
 
The listing rules also specify certain disclosure requirements for financial reports 
additional to those required by the Corporations Act 2001 and the accounting 
standards. These include details of substantial shareholders, the distribution of 
shareholders (by number of shares), voting rights, the 20 largest shareholders and the 
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percentage of the company’s shares held by these shareholders, the principal registered 
office, share registries, and the stock exchange or exchanges on which the company’s 
shares are listed. The Australian Productivity Commission (2009) proposed the 
introduction of mandatory requirements for the formation and composition of the 
remuneration committee. As a result of this recommendation, effective from 1 July 
2011, the ASX listing rules 12.8 were amended to require ASX 300 companies to form 
a remuneration committee consisting of exclusively non-executive directors. (See 
Appendix A for changing corporate governance requirements in Australia). 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance deals with “the control of corporations and the system of 
accountability by those in control” (Farrar 2001, p. 3). Taking a broad perspective, 
Gillan and Starks (2000) define corporate governance as a system of laws, rules, and 
factors that control operations at a company. The following definition is provided in 
the corporate governance principles and recommendations of the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX): 
Corporate governance is “the framework of rules, relationship, systems and 
process within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in 
corporations”. It encompasses the mechanism by which companies and those 
in control are held to account. Corporate governance influences how 
objectives of the companies are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and 
assessed, and how performance is optimised. 
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) discuss several mechanisms (such as debt, appointment 
of independent directors) to address the issue of agency problems. In a detailed 
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analysis, Gillan (2006) classified the corporate governance mechanisms into two 
groups: internal and external governance. According to Gillan (2006), internal 
governance consists of the board of directors, managerial incentives, capital structure, 
by-law and charter provisions and the internal control system. External governance 
includes laws and regulations, as well as markets for corporate control, product 
markets, labour markets, markets that emphasise providers of capital market 
information (credit, equity and governance analysts), markets that focus on 
accounting, financial and legal services from parties external to the firm, and private 
sources of external oversight such as the media. In this thesis focus is given only to the 
internal control mechanisms. 
 
Williamson (1983) argues the firm’s board of directors safeguards invested capital, so 
it is an important element of internal corporate governance. Jensen (1993, p. 862) noted 
that “the job of the board is to hire and fire and compensate the CEO and to provide 
high-level counsel”. The accounting literature mainly focuses on two key issues: the 
size of the board of directors, and its composition and independence. One of the major 
roles of the board is its control function (Pound 1995). In order to control the agency 
problem, agency theory argues for the employment of independent non-executive 
directors to monitor the internal management’s actions in the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). The recommendation to employ a majority of independent directors 
on the board mostly arises from the need to separate the two important management 
functions of decision-making and control (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) found that the 
larger the proportion of independent directors on the board, the more effective it could 
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be in monitoring  managerial opportunism, and that companies could also be expected 
to provide more voluntary disclosures. According to Australian common law, 
independent directors are expected to provide the same standard of care as inside 
directors. As a result of this requirement both inside directors and independent 
directors face the same level of legal risk. However, independent directors have limited 
involvement in the day-to-day operations of the company, as they are not full-time 
employees, but they face the same level of legal exposure so they tend to provide more 
voluntary disclosure (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). Muslu (2010) found that 
independent directors are at risk of receiving misleading information from inside 
directors, who have the personal incentives to conflict with the shareholder interest. 
As a result of this, independent directors will tend to provide more voluntary 
information to minimise the exposure to risk arising from poor management and 
misleading information. Independent directors have motivation to disclose more 
voluntary information to protect their reputation. Their value is dependent on their 
reputation as experts in decision control (Fama and Jensen 1983). As monitoring 
agents, independent directors will provide more voluntary information to signal to the 
market that they are fulfilling their duties. In summary, independent directors tend to 
provide more voluntary information to minimise litigation risk and to protect their 
reputation. 
 
Jensen (1993) proposes that boards in healthy organisations will be relatively inactive 
and have few conflicts. In these types of firms the board will simply perform the 
routine board tasks. But the role of the corporate board will be more complex during a 
crisis period, where the board will try to protect the shareholder interest. As 
performance declines the board will become more active to cope with the crisis and to 
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increase the performance of the firm. Vafeas (1999) argues that the frequency of board 
meetings is an important board attribute that can have significant implications for firm 
value. 
 
The size of the board may also influence voluntary disclosure. Strategic decisions such 
as voluntary disclosure will be influenced by the board of directors. John and Senbet 
(1998) suggest the board monitoring capacities increase as the number of members on 
the board increases. As a top-level management body, the board of directors will 
formulate policies and strategies to be followed by managers (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, 
Hossain and Lee 2009). Birnbaum (1984) finds that uncertainty and lack of 
information may be minimised by a larger board. This view was supported by Chen 
and Jaggi (2000) who argue that a greater number of directors on the board may reduce 
the likelihood of information asymmetry. However, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) suggest that large boards are less effective due to coordination and 
processing problems and may actually have diminished monitoring capabilities. The 
size of the board is believed to affect the ability of the board to monitor and evaluate 
management and a small board encourages faster information processing (Zahra, 
Neubaum and Huse 2000). 
 
Boards can either conduct their work through the full board or delegate their authority 
to a standing committee reporting to the board. Board committees meet separately 
from the board and are composed of subsets of board members. The Corporate 
Governance Code recommends that the majority of remuneration committee members 
be independent and include at least three members and be chaired by an independent 
director. The presence of non-executive directors on the remuneration committee can 
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be used as a monitoring mechanism that prevents excessive remuneration for executive 
directors. Having a remuneration committee is consistent with agency theory, which 
suggests that management should be separated from control (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
By having transparent compensation packages, a compensation committee composed 
of a majority of independent directors can better align the interests of top managers 
and shareholders (Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007). 
 
Deliberation about and the determination of top management pay, though, is often 
delegated to a subgroup of the main board; that is, a remuneration or compensation 
committee. The theoretical importance of a remuneration committee is clear in its 
absence, because there is an opportunity for senior executives to award themselves pay 
rises that are not congruent with the shareholder interest (Conyon and Peck 1998). 
 
The role of the remuneration committee is not simply to reduce the pay of self-serving 
management. More generally, economic and agency theories would suggest that they 
are the forums within which directors determine the appropriate design of reward 
structures for management and align management and shareholder interest (Conyon 
and Gregg 1995; Ezzamel and Watson 1997; Main and Johnston 1993). 
 
To date in the accounting literature, there has been little agreement on the impact of 
different governance factors on executive compensation, since the compensation 
committee plays an important role in determining CEO compensation. Newman and 
Mozes (1999) examined the relationship between the compensation committee inside 
directors and CEO compensation and found no evidence to support the claim that CEO 
compensation is higher when there are more inside directors on the compensation 
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committee. This result is similar to the findings of Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton 
(1998). Conyon and Peck (1998) also investigated the link between compensation 
committee composition and top management compensation for 94 UK firms between 
1991 and 1994, but interestingly their results indicate that the fraction of outside 
directors in the compensation committee is positively related to top management pay. 
O'Reilly III, Main and Crystal (1988) investigated compensation committee members 
who are executives in other firms and reported that CEO pay is positively related to 
executive pay at the committee members’ firms. Main, O'Reilly III and Wade (1995) 
find that CEO compensation is higher when a CEO’s tenure is longer than that of a 
chair of a compensation committee. In a similar study, Newman and Mozes (1999) 
reveal that the level of CEO pay is significantly higher, and the pay/performance 
relationship significantly lower, when the compensation committee contains at least 
one insider. Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998) examine the relationship 
between the composition of the compensation committee and the CEO’s compensation 
and find no evidence of changes in compensation when the compensation board 
composition varies in the firm. A study by Anderson and Bizjak (2003) finds little 
evidence to support the claim that CEO participation in the compensation committee 
is detrimental to the shareholders of 50 firms from 1985 to 1994. 
 
In summary, having a remuneration committee is consistent with agency theory, which 
proposes that management should be separated from control (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
But to date there has been only limited research into the characteristics and activity of 




Following a spate of corporate collapses in Australia, the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council was formed in August 2002 and was chaired by the ASX group (ASX). The 
council issued its principles of good corporate governance and best practice 
recommendations in March 2003. It is worth noting, however, that corporate 
governance is a dynamic force that keeps evolving. The council’s challenge is to 
ensure that the principles and recommendations remain relevant to the Australian 
business and investment communities. The revised principles and recommendations 
are part of that process. In August 2007 the ASX Corporate Governance Council issued 
revised corporate governance principles and recommendations, which were effective 
from January 2008. The ASX noted that there was no drastic change to the corporate 
governance principles issued in 2003. The phrase ‘best practices’ had been removed 
from the title and the document to eliminate any perception that the principles are 
prescriptive and so as not to discourage companies from adopting alternative practices 
and “if not, why not” where appropriate (ASX media release on 2 August 2007). 
 
In dealing with executive remuneration, Principle 8 of the ASX recommendations 
(2007) states that the existence of the remuneration committee is an efficient 
mechanism for focusing the company on appropriate remuneration policies, but the 
ultimate responsibility for a company’s remuneration policy rests with the full board, 
whether or not a separate remuneration committee exists. The responsibilities of the 
remuneration committee include the review and recommendation of the following to 
the board: (a) the company’s remuneration, recruitment, retention and termination 
policies and procedures for senior executives; (b) senior executives’ remuneration and 
incentives; (c) superannuation arrangements; (d) the remuneration framework for 
directors; (e) remuneration by gender. The remuneration committee should consist of 
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a majority of independent directors, chaired by an independent director and with at 
least three members, to discharge its responsibility effectively. 
 
The principles provide guidance to companies and investors on best practice corporate 
governance and increase the transparency of a listed company’s corporate governance 
practices. According to listing rule 4.10.3, listed companies need to provide a 
statement disclosing the extent to which the entity has followed the recommendations 
set by the ASX Corporate Governance Council during the reporting period. If an entity 
has not followed all of the recommendations, the entity must identify those 
recommendations that have not been followed and give reasons for not following them. 
If a recommendation has been followed for only a part of the period, the entity must 
state the period during which it had been followed. 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief description of the Australian corporate reporting 
institutional framework. The formal framework in Australia currently comprises the 
Corporations Act and ASX listing rules. Corporate governance practices are voluntary 
in nature and changes have taken place over time in the recommendations to improve 
governance practice.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the theories which are relevant to the research 
documented in this thesis. This chapter discusses the important theories used in the 
next three chapters on narrative voluntary disclosure, impression management and the 
reasons attributed to changes in remuneration actions and levels of CEO remuneration. 
This chapter briefly discuss agency theory, legitimacy theory and attribution theory. 
Section 3.2 introduces agency theory and managing the agency problem through 
disclosure, attribution and levels of remuneration. Section 3.3 outlines impression 
management theory in general and attribution theory in particular. Section 3.4 
discusses legitimacy theory, and the final section summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
The agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one or more persons 
(principal/s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). They further mention that if both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximisers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interest of the principal. Agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of 
owners and managers (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
and is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interests of a 
firm’s owner and its management (Fama and Jensen 1983). In most agency 
relationships the principal and agent will incur positive monitoring expenditures, such 
as the cost of employing auditors and the costs of preparing reliable accounting 
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information. Executive compensation contracts are incurred to monitor the acts of the 
agents, and bonding costs, such as the cost of preparing financial and other reports are 
incurred in bonding the agents to act in ways consistent with the interests of the 
principals (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary). In addition, there may be some 
divergence between the agent’s decision and what that decision looks like from the 
principal’s point of view. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced 
by the principal due to this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship and is 









Figure 3.1: Types of Agency Costs 
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
 
If both principal and agent are utility maximisers there is good reason to believe that 
the agent will not always act in the interests of the principal, or that the agent may act 
only partially in the best interests of the principal. There can be many dimensions to 
this including: the agent misusing his power for pecuniary or other advantage, and the 
agent not taking appropriate risks in pursuing the principal’s interest because the agent 
views those risks as being inappropriate. There is also the problem of information 



















information. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring a monitoring cost designed to 
limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In certain situations, the principal will pay the 
agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he or she will not take a 
particular action which would harm the principal, or to ensure that the principal will 
be compensated if such action is taken (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This view was 
supported by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who argue there is a shareholder/manager 
conflict, as corporate managers have many goals and ambitions, only one of which is 
to get rich. The way they run their companies reflects these personal goals. 
Shareholders, in contrast, who are deprived of the pleasures of running the company, 
only care about getting rich from the stock they own. Hence, if managers ignore profits 
to maintain traditional kinds of business, conflicts are bound to arise. 
 
The relationship between the shareholders and managers of a corporation fit the 
definition of an agency relationship. It should be no surprise to discover that the issues 
associated with ‘separation of ownership and control’ in a modern diffused ownership 
corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Healy and Palepu (2001) discuss the agency problem, and suggest 
that it can be solved by having an optimal contract between principals and agents in 
the form of compensation contracts which align the interests of agents with those of 
external shareholders. These contracts require agents to provide relevant information 
to ensure they have used the resources in the best interests of principals, rather than in 
their own interest. As a result, the need for financial reporting and disclosure arises to 
address agency conflict and information asymmetry. They further discuss the role of 
the board of directors and information intermediaries (financial analysts and rating 
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agencies) in solving the agency problem by monitoring and taking disciplinary actions 
on behalf of shareholders and producing private information to disclose managerial 
expropriation. 
 
Literature investigating disclosure and corporate governance is based on the principles 
of agency theory. In relation to agency theory, there are two major alternate views: 
opportunistic and efficiency perspectives. The opportunistic perspective argues that 
managers provide additional voluntary disclosures to avoid adverse effects on their 
remuneration. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) take the view that managers 
lobby for accounting standards so as to maximise their own utility, where a manager’s 
utility is affected by the firm’s stock price and the manager’s compensation. 
Holthausen (1990) argues that the accounting method chosen by the managers is driven 
by how the choice affects the existing contract rather than how it affects future 
contracts. Eisenhardt (1989) identified that agency theory makes two specific 
contributions to the organisation: (a) it treats information as a commodity which has a 
cost and can be purchased, which results in organisations investing in information 
systems in order to control agent opportunism; (b) it identifies risk implications, in the 
sense that organisations are assumed to have uncertain futures. Agency theory extends 
organisational thinking by pushing the ramifications of outcome uncertainty to their 
implications for creating risk. This enables contracts between principal and agent to 
be made by including the implications of outcome uncertainty and differences in 
willingness to accept the risk. From the efficiency perspective, managers might 
provide additional voluntary disclosures to ensure, for example, that they can enter 
into contracts (e.g., borrowing contracts) on the best possible terms (i.e., counter-




From an agency perspective, boards can be used as monitoring devices for shareholder 
interests (Fama and Jensen 1983). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that when the board 
provides richer information, executive compensation is less likely to be based on firm 
performance but is based on knowledge of executive behaviours. When boards provide 
richer information, top executives are more likely to engage in behaviours that are 
consistent with stakeholders’ interests. 
 
In the agency framework it is argued that effective corporate governance practices 
mitigate agency costs by decreasing information asymmetry through increased 
disclosure. Corporate governance attributes are expected to reduce agency problems 
associated with inadequate disclosure and to ensure managers act in the best interests 
of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Board composition is one of the 
mechanisms expected to influence corporate performance, and agency theory suggests 
that a greater proportion of independent directors would be able to monitor any self-
interested action by managers. As a result of monitoring, there would be less 
opportunity for managers to pursue self-interest at the expense of owners. The agency 
model is widely accepted in the business community and emphasises the need for 
independent directors to monitor the activities of the board (Bosch 1995). 
 
Agency theory is used in impression management studies. It views managerial 
voluntary disclosure strategies as opportunistic and regards information provided by 
management as driven by self-interest (Aerts 2005; Brennan and Merkl-Davies 2014). 
This opportunistic behaviour tends to give rise to the obfuscation hypothesis (Courtis 
1998) which states that managers are not neutral when presenting accounting 
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narratives (Sydserff and Weetman 1999). Managers tend to hide failures and 
emphasise success (Adelberg 1979). Corporate narrative reports are considered to be 
an impression management vehicle, which can be used to represent a self-interested 
view of corporate performance (Clatworthy and Jones 2003). 
 
3.2.1 Levels of CEO Remuneration and the Agency Problem 
Research on corporate governance, including studies on compensation, are 
predominantly based on agency theory (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Core, Holthausen 
and Larcker 1999; Gomez-Mejia 1994). It is assumed in agency theory that managers 
behave in a self-serving manner that could be detrimental to the owners. In the agency 
framework it is argued that effective corporate governance practices mitigate agency 
cost by providing executive remuneration incentives (Gillan 2006; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez 2009). Corporate governance practices 
are introduced to reduce agency problems and to ensure managers act in the best 
interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, Hart (1995) argues it 
is impossible to address all possible actions and outcomes through remuneration 
contracts. Williamson (1983) argues that without appropriate corporate governance, 
CEOs would appear to write their contracts with one hand and sign them with the 
other. 
 
Lambert (2001) provides four reasons for conflicts of interest between the principal 
and agents: (a) effort aversion by the agent; (b) the agent can divert resources for 
private consumption or use; (c) different time horizons, such that the agent is less 
concerned about the future period effect of current period actions, but is more 
concerned about how his actions will affect others’ assessment of his skill which will 
42 
 
affect the compensation; and (d) differential risk aversion will occur on the part of 
agent and principal. Agent compensation is associated with the risk profile of the firm. 
This will motivate the agent to minimise the risk of the firm (McColgan 2001), 
whereas the owners will expect the agent to invest in high-risk portfolios so they can 
maximise their return. 
 
It is assumed that the managers would prefer higher compensation, so the owners 
would enter into compensation contracts that minimise the agent’s ability to undertake 
any activity that is detrimental to the owners. Lambert and Larcker (1987) show the 
existence of a positive relationship between compensation and accounting 
performance. 
 
3.3 Attribution of Narrative Voluntary Disclosure 
Accounting Standards (AASB 101 ‘Presentation of Financial Statements’, p. 6) define 
the general purpose financial report as “general purpose financial statements (referred 
to as ‘financial statements’) are those intended to meet the needs of users who are not 
in a position to require an entity to prepare reports tailored to their particular 
information needs”. Financial reporting regulations (Accounting Standards and 
Corporations Act) prescribe only the minimum disclosure requirements. Information 
provided in excess of these minimum disclosure requirements is voluntary disclosure. 
Attribution theory falls under impression management and can be explained in the 
context of economic, social psychology, sociology and critical perspectives. 
 
The economic perspective looks at the interaction between managers and investors 
solely in terms of market exchange (Mouch 1995). Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2014) 
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argued, under agency theory, that investors can take for granted that managers act in 
self-interest, rationally responding to incentives shaped by compensation contracts, the 
market for corporate control and other corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
The social psychology perspective sees corporate narrative reporting as a function of 
social relations. Prior research on discretionary disclosure assumes either that it 
contributes to useful decision-making by overcoming information asymmetries 
between managers and users, or that it constitutes opportunistic behaviour whereby 
managers exploit information asymmetries between them and the users by adopting 
impression management strategies (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). Impression 
management serves as the basic psychological human need of self-presentation 
(Schlenker 1980). Hooghiemstra (2000, p. 60) defines impression management as a “a 
field of study within social psychology studying how individuals present themselves 
to others to be perceived favourably by others”. Impression management occurs when 
management selects the information to be displayed and presents that information in a 
manner that may distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Mather and 
Ramsay 2007). In a corporate world, managers are presumed to use corporate reports 
as impression management vehicles to control and manipulate the impression 
conveyed to users of accounting information (Clatworthy and Jones 2003). Managers, 
by adopting impression management in corporate reporting, can contribute to a firm’s 
reputation and can also effectively handle legitimacy threats (Hooghiemstra 2000). 
 
Impression management can take many forms, verbally and non-verbally. Although 
people are not always aware of the impression they convey, a certain strategic 
behaviour can be assumed. It is the theory of individuals but it has been extensively 
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applied to organisations to explain the reactions of firms facing legitimacy threats 
(Elsbach 1994). It is also used by firms to explain the reasons for different levels of 
organisational performances through annual reports (Aerts 1994). 
 
Managers are presumed to engage in one of two types of behaviour: concealment, 
which involves obfuscating negative outcomes (bad news) and emphasising positive 
outcomes (good news); and attribution, which is a defensive framing tactic that shifts 
the blame for negative outcomes away from themselves. The origin of this theory 
comes from social psychology, which suggests that there is a tendency to claim more 
responsibility for success than failure. 
 
Six strategies are used for concealment. Two of these obfuscate bad news by 
manipulating verbal information by either making it difficult to read and/or to 
understand (reading ease manipulation) or by the use of rhetorical manipulation 
(using persuasive language). Four of these strategies emphasise good news: thematic 
manipulation emphasises positive words and themes, or positive financial 
performance; visual and structural manipulation refers to the way in which 
information is presented; performance comparisons involve choosing benchmarks that 
portray the current financial performance in the best possible light; and the choice of 
earning number involves selecting one of a number of earning amounts for disclosure 
to portray the current financial performance favourably. 
 
The other main type of behaviour that managers are presumed to display is 
performance attribution, which focuses on performance explanation. Managers are 
assumed to act in a self-serving manner, attributing positive organisational outcomes 
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to internal factors and negative organisational outcomes to external factors. These 
discretionary disclosure strategies are concerned with earnings: managers perceive 
earnings to be the focal point for investors. 
 
Prior studies on the nature and extent of discretionary disclosure have generally 
adopted one of two major perspectives: (a) impression management; or (b) incremental 
information perspectives. The impression management perspective propounds that 
discretionary disclosures can be used opportunistically by management to create 
favourable impressions of either the firm or of management itself. By contrast, studies 
based on incremental information contend that discretionary disclosures can be used 
by firms to overcome information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, and 
that managers tend to have economic incentives to engage in unbiased reporting in 
order to enhance their reputation and compensation (Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough 
2004). However, it is argued that the use of discretionary disclosures merely for 
impression management is likely to undermine the quality of financial reporting and, 
potentially, mislead stakeholders making decisions about the underlying economic 
performance of the firm (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). 
Given the unprecedented levels of global economic uncertainty caused by the 2008 
financial market crisis, it is arguable that firms are likely to face escalating pressures 
to adopt more opportunistic, impression management strategies in order to influence 
shareholder perceptions favourably and to gain or retain their confidence. 
 
The literature review also indicates that the attributional viewpoint within the 
impression management perspective predicts that such strategies will be more 
predominant in poorly performing organisations. Aerts (2005), for instance, argues 
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that positive organisational outcomes are generally perceived to be a powerful signal 
of managerial competence and hence do not require such ‘cosmetic narrations’ to 
uphold the managerial image. By contrast, where organisational outcomes are negative 
(e.g., poor accounting outcomes), managers are more likely to manipulate outsiders’ 
perceptions by lengthy explanations (via a defensive framing tactic) in order to 
legitimise and shift the blame for the outcome to others, or to external factors such as 
the business climate, inflation or government policy (Aerts 2005). In short, as put by 
Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007, p. 151), “managers tend to attribute positive 
organisational outcomes to internal factors (entitlements) and negative organisational 
outcomes to external factors (excuses)”. However, diligent corporate governance 
mechanisms (e.g., the quality of the board and audit committee) are likely to moderate 
the use of such strategies. 
 
3.3.1 Attribution Theory 
Prior research has focused on the self-serving attribution bias; usually managers 
attribute positive outcomes to one’s own actions and negative outcomes to external 
events or other factors. From an impression management point of view, attributional 
behaviour in an organisational context emphasises the role that managers play in 
monitoring changes that may impinge on the public image of the organisation, and 
modify their presentational behaviour to match those changes (Bozeman and Kacmar 
1997). This perspective suggests that firms change their presentational strategies and 
tactics immediately to reflect changing conditions in the relevant internal and external 




Aerts (2001) stated that the attributional content of corporate annual reports is assumed 
to be responsive to changes in company performance and accountability claims, but, 
at the same time, reflects presentational tendencies to cope with these events. She also 
mentions that attributional coping behaviour can be reflected in the amount of 
attributional behaviour in its evaluative content (the positive or negative character of 
the explained effect or organisational outcome) and in the presence of attributional 
biases. Fiol (1995) provided some of the first direct evidence of the presentational 
influences on the content of annual reports. She directly compares executives’ public 
and private statements to explore whether, and along what dimensions, public 
statements reflect internal company communications. Comparisons of internal and 
external documents generated by the forest products industry over ten years revealed 
no significant correlations in the two sets of documents between executives’ positive 
or negative evaluations of events and situations. However, the correlations between 
their perceptions of control were positive and significant. 
 
The egocentric attributional biases were assumed to be managed in the annual reports 
to a certain degree on several occasions (Clapham and Schwenk 1991; Wagner III and 
Gooding 1997). Aerts (2005) argues that there is a general tendency to attribute 
positive effect or outcomes to the company’s own actions or corporate origins 
(company strategy, decisions, know-how, human resources potential, etc.) and the 
negative outcomes to external events or chance factors (business climate, inflation, 
market prices, government policy, weather). She further mentions that this explanation 
pattern is considered to be self-serving as it leads to the defining of situations to the 
company’s own advantage. This self-serving explanation pattern can be decomposed 
into an assertive component (stressing the importance, relevance and scope of positive 
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outcomes and actions) and more defensive characteristics (downplaying the 
significance of negatively evaluated events). 
 
The sociology perspective regards corporate narrative reporting as determined by the 
structural constraints exerted by different community groups or society at large. 
 
The critical perspective on impression management argues that impression 
management arises from the desire to be seen to conform to the rules and norms of 
society and to forestall the interference of external agencies in the operations of an 
organisation (Hines 1989). Managers establish and maintain unequal power 
relationships in society in the way that they represent things and position people, as 
well as how they use corporate narratives in documents (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
2011). Finally, the critical perspective indicates that organisation performance can be 










       Agency theory           Attribution theory         Legitimacy theory 
Figure 3.2: A Conceptual Framework of Impression Management: New Insights from 
Economic, Psychological, Sociological and Critical Perspectives. 
Source: Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2011) 













3.4 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations continually seek to ensure that they are 
perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies, and 
that they attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as being 
“legitimate” (Deegan 2002, p. 323). In legitimacy theory, legitimacy is considered to 
be a resource on which an organisation is dependent for survival and argues that an 
organisation can only continue to exist if the society in which it operates perceives that 
the organisation is operating within the bounds of a value system acceptable to that 
society (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; O’Donovan 2002). The view embodied within 
legitimacy theory is that an organisation will be penalised if it does not operate in a 
manner consistent with community expectation. However, unlike many other 
resources, it is a resource that organisations are considered to be able to affect or 
manipulate through various disclosure-related strategies (Woodward, Edwards and 
Birkin 1996). The studies of Patten (1992), Wilmshurst and Frost (2000), Deegan 
(2002) and Ogden and Clarke (2005) identify a range of strategies employed by 
managers to manage shareholder perceptions. In particular, an important tactic is to 
increase voluntary disclosure in the annual report of a company in response to or in 
anticipation of threats from stakeholders or the general public to the legitimacy of a 
company (Brown and Deegan 1998; Patten 1992). Lindblom (1994) suggested four 
forms of legitimation tactics that firms could adopt to manage legitimacy. These are: 
(a) seeking to educate its shareholders about the company’s intention; (b) seeking to 
change stakeholder perception of issues/events; (c) distracting or manipulating 
attention away from the issue/event of concern; (d) seeking to change external 




Lindblom (1994) mentioned that to manage legitimacy, proper communication about 
the tactic chosen is needed with the stakeholders of an organisation. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the various theories that may potentially explain the narrative 
voluntary disclosure about executive remuneration, the reasons given for change in 
executive remuneration and levels of CEO remuneration. Corporate governance 
mechanisms, in particular, the existence of a remuneration committee and the 
characteristics of remuneration committees such as independence, size, diligence, 
financial expertise and independence of the remuneration committee chairman, can be 
used to manage the agency problem and minimise the agency cost.  
 
This chapter gives an outline of the theoretical aspects relating to voluntary disclosure, 
the reasons attached to the disclosure and the level of CEO remuneration. The 
following chapter, Chapter 4, presents the first research question relating to this thesis 
on whether corporate governance mechanisms influence the narrative voluntary 




Chapter 4: Impact of Remuneration Committee on 
Narrative Remuneration Disclosure 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first research question of this thesis and investigates the 
influence of the remuneration committee on narrative voluntary executive 
remuneration disclosure. 
 
Agency theory argues that effective corporate governance mechanisms (such as board 
sub-committees) must be present to minimise information asymmetry and related 
agency costs through increased disclosure. For example, board sub-committees work 
to monitor managers to act in the best interests of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). One important board sub-committee is the remuneration committee, whose role 
is to support and advise the board on matters relating to remuneration (e.g., the level 
and composition of remuneration, disclosure of remuneration policies, and the process 
for setting remuneration and assessing performance). As part of its role, the committee 
periodically makes recommendations to the board on any specific decisions or actions 
and disclosures that the board should consider in relation to director remuneration. 
Thus, the communication of remuneration decisions and actions to shareholders is 
important in demonstrating the alignment among shareholders’ interests, performance 
and remuneration. Furthermore, a recent opinion survey by PWC (2014) highlights an 
increasing expectation that directors take greater responsibility in communicating to 
shareholders on matters pertaining to governance issues, thus calling for greater 
information transparency. This essay examines how corporate boards, via the 
remuneration committee, respond to investor demand for enhanced communication 
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about remuneration matters. Specifically, this essay examines the association between 
remuneration committee effectiveness/quality (remuneration committee existence and 
certain remuneration committee characteristics) and the voluntary disclosure of 
information, in narrative format, relating to executive remuneration actions. 
 
Examining the reporting of executive remuneration matters provides a natural setting 
to examine the effectiveness of remuneration committee practices. Section 300A of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act) provides a list of remuneration-
related items that listed firms are required to publish annually in the ‘remuneration 
report’ section of the annual report (i.e., within the directors’ report). One item that the 
report does not require is information about decisions relating to remuneration change 
actions (increase/decrease/freeze), making such disclosures voluntary6 in nature. 
Furthermore, narrative voluntary disclosure in annual reports shapes the way investors 
and shareholders “know/feel” about the firm (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 1998), thus 
assisting in reducing information asymmetry and related agency costs. The disclosure 
of remuneration change actions is arguably important, as such disclosure explicitly 
informs investors and shareholders about a firm’s seriousness in aligning performance 
(and risk) with its remuneration strategies. For example, during periods of financial 
crisis, a firm faces considerable uncertainty about its future cash flows, thus reducing 
investor confidence regarding financial risk. Committed boards (and their sub-
committees) that address and voluntarily disclose such financial risk issues (e.g., by 
reducing or freezing remuneration) are seen positively and, in turn, are expected to 
                                                 
6 In general, voluntary disclosure refers to the voluntary release of financial and non-financial 
information that is over and above the mandatory requirements with respect to company law, 
professional accounting standards or other relevant regulatory requirements (Barako, Hancock and Izan 




improve investor confidence (e.g., Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003).7 Hence, this 
study utilises such voluntary remuneration change actions disclosure as an outcome of 
effective remuneration committee practices. 
 
The remuneration committee is an important board sub-committee. While prior studies 
have examined the effectiveness of boards and various sub-committees, empirical 
evidence is scant on the impact of remuneration committees on executive remuneration 
voluntary disclosure practices. Although prior archival studies relating to 
remuneration committee characteristics have investigated a number of remuneration-
related outcomes, such as remuneration disclosure, CEO/executive remuneration and 
stock options (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer 2010; 
Collins, Gong and Li 2009; Conyon and Lerong 2004; Daily Johnson, Ellstrand and 
Dalton 1998; Laksmana 2008; Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010; Sapp 2008; Sun and 
Cahan 2009; Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009), none of these studies has investigated 
the critical issue of voluntary narrative disclosure of executive remuneration action 
and the extent of such disclosures. While regulated disclosures are said to facilitate 
reduced information asymmetry, it is also argued that it may be inadequate to render 
such a mechanism to be effective as executives, being insiders, are always in the 
position of having superior information compared to outsiders (Sheu, Chung and Liu 
2010; Chen, Chen and Wei 2004).  Thus, any information above mandatory disclosure 
provides an additional governance mechanism (Healy and Palepu, 2001).   
 
                                                 
7 In a similar vein, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) develop a model of managers’ equilibrium 
strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about their firm’s risk. They demonstrate that a firm 
that discloses risk has a higher share price than one that does not; however, relative to a voluntary 




The paucity of literature in this area has been pointed out by Balachandran and Faff 
(2015), who highlight the need to more extensively research the linkages between 
corporate governance and executive remuneration. 
 
This essay is further motivated by the attention focused on executive remuneration 
during the recent global financial crisis (GFC) and the development of the Australian 
Securities Exchange’s (ASX) code of corporate governance, the latter of which 
provides guidance and recommendations relating to both boards of directors and 
remuneration committees. The unprecedented level of global economic uncertainty 
during the GFC and reduced firm profits due to the financial crisis resulted in concerns 
from various parties about excessive payment to executives. In addressing these 
concerns, firms (via their boards) are likely to adopt and communicate their 
remuneration realignment strategies (which may or may not be opportunistic) to 
influence shareholder perceptions favourably and to gain or retain their confidence. 
 
The Australian corporate system offers a unique environment to assess the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the role of remuneration committees and on 
executive remuneration disclosures. Australian firms have board structures that are 
similar to those of the United States and the United Kingdom, and in contrast to those 
of German and Japanese boards. However, in contrast to the US and the UK, the 
Australian market for corporate control is not as active and its effectiveness in inducing 
boards to be strict monitors and to take corrective actions in case of failure may not be 
comparable to the US and UK corporate environments (Pham, Suchard and Zein 
2011). Accordingly, useful insights can be gained by examining the existence and 
quality of remuneration committees as well as voluntary narrative executive 
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remuneration disclosures within the Australian corporate environment. Although in 
the US, the SEC listing rules require all listed firms to have an independent 
compensation committee, such is not the case in the Australian environment. The 2007 
ASX Corporate Governance Recommendation 9.2 formally recommends that boards 
establish a remuneration committee. However, under the Corporations Act, although 
the board is responsible for determining the remuneration of the CEO (and other senior 
executives), this role is usually delegated to the remuneration committee. A 
remuneration committee is said to be “an efficient mechanism for focusing the 
company on appropriate remuneration policy” (ASX Corporate Governance Council 
2007, p. 35; and 2010). 
 
It is important to note that the remuneration committee composition specified in the 
ASX recommendations is only a suggestion; hence, the requirements of ‘if not, why 
not’ do not apply. This essay argues that improved disclosures on remuneration (such 
as any change in the remuneration arrangement) are affected by the existence of a 
remuneration committee as well as by the quality of such a committee. The rationale 
for this argument is that a firm’s good corporate governance practice is reflected in the 
quality of the remuneration committee. Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009, p. 1507) argue 
that high-quality remuneration committees “are capable of designing and 
implementing remuneration arrangements that will lead to stronger incentives for 
subsequent performance, and reduce the capacity of CEOs to extract rents”. 
 
Drawing on the ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2007, 2010), this study argues that for remuneration committees 
to be effective, they must at least exhibit three characteristics. First, the majority of the 
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members should be independent non-executive directors. Second, a minimum of three 
remuneration committee members is required for the remuneration committee to 
function effectively. Third, the remuneration committee chair should be an 
independent director. Based on the recent literature (Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa 
2011),8 this study includes two more characteristics: first, the number of remuneration 
committee meetings held in a year (diligence) and, second, the requirement that 
membership of the committee must include at least one director with relevant financial 
expertise. This study combines these five variables to form a composite construct 
called RCQ (remuneration committee quality). 
 
A remuneration committee can be a more efficient mechanism than a full board for 
focusing the company on appropriate remuneration policies designed to meet the needs 
of the company in enhancing corporate and individual performance. The existence of 
a remuneration committee should not be seen as implying a fragmentation or 
diminution of the responsibilities of the board as a whole (Corporate Governance 
Recommendation 8, ASX Corporate Governance Council 2010). Thus, in this chapter, 
this study argues that voluntary remuneration action disclosures, and the extent of such 
disclosures, are contingent on the effectiveness of the remuneration committee as a 
key corporate governance mechanism established by the board. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it investigates the 
relationship between the remuneration committee (existence and quality) and 
                                                 
8 They examined the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE) as a proxy for governance 
quality on audit fees and non-audit fees. The audit committee effectiveness is a composite measure 
comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. They believed the interactions 
of these variables are likely to have the most impact on audit quality. They found that an effective audit 
committee results in higher audit fees and, for larger clients, there is a positive and significant 
association between ACE and non-audit service fees. 
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voluntary narrative executive remuneration disclosure (VDER) decision and the extent 
of such disclosure in Australia, which is characterised by a less regulated corporate 
governance environment. Although prior archival studies relating to remuneration 
committee characteristics have investigated remuneration-related outcomes, none of 
these studies has investigated the critical issues of the voluntary narrative disclosure 
of executive remuneration action and the extent of such disclosures. Second, most of 
the prior research on remuneration committee quality variables has been tested in 
isolation with reference to firm performance or to a specific remuneration disclosure 
(see, Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary 2007; Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010). 
However, this study examines remuneration committee quality based on a composite 
measure of five characteristics of remuneration committees. The composite measure 
has been developed based on corporate governance guidelines and prior research (e.g., 
Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa 2011). Finally, this study also pays attention to disclosure 
behaviour during the recent economic crisis. In particular, this study explores the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the hypothesised relationship between the 
remuneration committee (existence and quality) and voluntary narrative remuneration 
disclosures. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and outlines development of the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the study’s 
sample collection and model development, while Section 4 analyzes the results. 
Finally, in Section 5, conclusions are drawn and the implications and limitations of the 





4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Remuneration Committee Existence (RCX) and Voluntary Narrative 
Executive Remuneration Disclosure 
Boards can either conduct their work through the full board or delegate their authority 
to a sub-committee reporting to the board (Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven 2011). The 
board sub-committees meet separately from the board, and are composed of subsets of 
board members. The literature provides evidence that sub-committees play an 
important role in enhancing a firm’s corporate governance (Spira and Bender 2004). 
Sub-committees are usually formed to undertake specific tasks and detailed reviews of 
operational matters and are typically comprised of members who have greater mastery 
of complex information. Having a remuneration committee is consistent with agency 
theory, which suggests that management should be separated from control (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). 
 
Jensen (1993) noted that the “job of the board is to hire and fire and compensate the 
CEO and to provide high-level counsel”. Deliberation and determination of top 
management pay, though, is often delegated to a sub-committee of the board such as 
the remuneration or compensation committee. Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) 
provided evidence that the existence of a compensation committee influenced 
Executive Stock Option (ESO) disclosure. Singh and Harianto (1989) emphasised that 
the most important means of facilitating the decision-making process of the board is 
the creation of various committees, such as an executive compensation committee. 
Conyon and Gregg (1995) and Main and Johnston (1993) state that the role of the 
remuneration committee is not simply to reduce the pay of supposedly self-serving 
management. More generally, economic and agency theories would suggest that they 
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are the forums within which directors determine the appropriate design of reward 
structures for management, and align management and shareholder interests. The 
theoretical importance of a remuneration committee is clear; without one, the 
opportunity exists for senior executives to award themselves pay rises that are not 
congruent with shareholder interests (Conyon and Peck 1998). Hence, this study 
argues that, potentially, the existence of a remuneration committee plays an important 
positive role in the exercise of board control, and will influence the decision on 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure and the extent of such 
disclosure in the annual report. Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the existence of a 
remuneration committee (RCX) and (a) the decision to provide, and (b) the extent of 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
4.2.2 Remuneration Committee Quality (RCQ) and Voluntary Narrative 
Executive Remuneration Disclosure 
Empirical findings to date show little agreement on the effect of different governance 
factors on executive compensation. For example, Newman and Mozes (1999) 
examined the relationship between the compensation committee, inside directors and 
CEO compensation, and found no evidence to support the claim that CEO 
compensation is high when more inside directors are on the compensation committee. 
Similar findings were found by Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998). Conyon 
and Peck (1998) also investigated the link between compensation committee 
composition and top management compensation for 94 UK firms from 1991 to 1994. 
Interestingly, their results indicate that the percentage of outside directors on the 
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compensation committee is positively related to top management pay. O’Reilly III, 
Main and Crystal (1988) examined 105 Fortune 500 firms and found a positive 
association between CEO remuneration and the remuneration levels of outside 
directors serving on the remuneration committee. In a similar study, Newman and 
Mozes (1999) found that the level of CEO pay is significantly higher, and the pay-
performance relationships significantly lower, when the compensation committee 
contains at least one insider. Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998) examined 
the relationship between the composition of the compensation committee and the 
CEO’s compensation, and found no evidence of changes in compensation when the 
compensation board composition varies in the firm. Main, O’Reilly III and Wade 
(1995) found that CEO compensation is higher when a CEO’s tenure is greater than 
that of the chair of the compensation committee. Anderson and Bizjak (2003), on the 
other hand, found little evidence to support the claim that CEO participation on the 
compensation committee is detrimental to the shareholders of fifty firms with CEO 
participation in the compensation committee, and without CEO participation on the 
compensation committee, from 1985 to 1994. 
 
The discussion so far indicates that different features of remuneration committees may 
contribute to their effectiveness in remuneration disclosure. These studies, in general, 
used single or multiple remuneration characteristics, which may not completely 
capture the quality of the remuneration committee. Although a few recent studies in 
the corporate governance literature have attempted to measure corporate governance 
quality by developing an index, only two related US studies (Sun and Cahan 2009; 
Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009) have attempted to measure remuneration committee 
governance quality. The first study by Sun and Cahan (2009) examined the association 
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between remuneration committee quality, CEO cash remuneration and company 
performance in 812 US firms. The authors found that the association between 
remuneration committee quality and pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO cash 
remuneration varies between firms. The two key findings were that: (a) for firms with 
a high quality remuneration committee, the cash remuneration awarded to the CEO 
reflects stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity; and (b) conversely, in high-growth 
firms and loss-making firms, remuneration committee quality is associated with 
weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity in cash remuneration. 
 
Subsequently, Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) extended their earlier study by 
examining whether the association between future firm performance and CEO stock 
option grants is affected by the quality of the remuneration committee. Similar to the 
earlier study, their findings show that as the quality of the remuneration committee 
increases, the firm’s future performance is related positively to stock option grants. 
Both these studies used six remuneration committee attributes (namely, the proportion 
of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO; the proportion of 
directors with at least ten years’ board service; the proportion of directors who are 
CEOs at other companies; the aggregate shareholding of directors on the remuneration 
committee; the proportion of directors with three or more additional board seats; and 
the size of the committee) to measure the quality of the remuneration committee. Using 
a similar argument, a composite measure is used in this study to calculate remuneration 
committee quality by incorporating the size of the remuneration committee (RCS), the 
independence of remuneration committee members (RCIND), the independence of the 
remuneration committee chairperson (RCCHAIRIND), the diligence (frequency of 
meetings) of the remuneration committee (RCMEET), and the financial expertise of 
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the remuneration committee members (RCEXP). In addition, “use of an index” is 
important in reducing the endogeneity problem, which exists in virtually every board. 
It also improves the degrees of freedom and reduces the impact of multicollinearity on 
the coefficients in the statistical analysis (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
 
A remuneration committee with high governance quality can be expected to mitigate 
agency problems and thus align the incentives of the managers to the owners of the 
firm. Because remuneration committee quality will result in better design of executive 
remuneration arrangements and, ultimately, lead to better firm performance, in 
discharging their responsibilities the committee will communicate their actions to 
shareholders, investors and other stakeholders at large. Thus, this study expects firms 
that voluntarily disclose changes in their remuneration plans (such as an ‘increase’, a 
‘freeze’ or a ‘decrease’) will be associated with remuneration committee quality. 
Hence, the second main hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration committee 
quality (RCQ) and (a) the decision to provide, and (b) the extent of voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
4.2.2.1 Remuneration committee size (RCS) and voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosure 
 
A line of literature argues that larger boards provide better monitoring (e.g., Anderson, 
Mansi and Reeb 2004; Pfeffer 1972). For example, larger firms tend to be complex 
thus, in such situations, having larger boards can overcome the difficulty of the 
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monitoring tasks (see, Baker and Gompers 2003; Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2008). 
Likewise, Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004) argue that larger boards have the 
advantage of more advisors to monitor the management. In the context of a 
remuneration committee, it is possible for the remuneration committee to exert 
influence on the board about the voluntary narrative executive remuneration disclosure 
in the annual report. A larger remuneration committee has more resources to construct, 
evaluate, and monitor the compensation and ensure its alignment with the goals of the 
shareholders and the performance of the company (Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010). 
Thus, it is expected that a larger remuneration committee is more likely to exert 
influence on the board about the extent of remuneration-related disclosure. Based on 
this argument, the following hypothesis is stated as: 
 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the remuneration 
committee size (RCS) and (a) the decision to provide, and (b) the extent of voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
4.2.2.2 Remuneration committee independence (RCIND) and voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration disclosure 
 
Prior literature suggests that independent directors are more effective in reducing 
agency problems and managerial opportunism as the risk of collusion with top 
management is reduced (Fama and Jensen 1983; Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman 
1981). Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found that involvement of independent directors 
on a board-appointed committee, rather than representation on a board, led to a better 
corporate governance system. The theoretical importance of a remuneration committee 
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is clear; in its absence, the opportunity exists for senior executives to award themselves 
pay rises that are not congruent with shareholder interests (Conyon and Peck 1998). 
Abeysekera (2012) found that independent directors on a remuneration committee 
have a positive influence on narrative human capital disclosure in the Sri Lankan 
context. Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) argued, and provided evidence in the 
Australian context, that compensation committee independence and compensation 
committee quality (size and meetings) contribute to improved ESO disclosure. They 
argued that having more independent members on the committee will make it less 
aligned to management and, hence, likely to encourage more transparent disclosures. 
In addition, a more active compensation committee is better able to monitor the 
appropriateness of the remuneration packages more frequently; and a larger 
compensation committee has more resources to construct, evaluate and monitor the 
compensation packages of senior management and ensure alignment with the goals of 
the shareholders and the performance of the company. 
 
This study argues that best practice also requires a remuneration committee to make 
recommendations to the board on the content to be included in the annual report in 
relation to remuneration decisions. Greater involvement of independent directors on 
the remuneration committee increases the influence of the board about remuneration 
disclosure. Therefore, this study hypothesises this relationship as follows: 
 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration committee 
independence (RCIND) and (a) the decision to provide, and (b) the extent of voluntary 




4.2.2.3 Remuneration committee independent chairman (RCCHAIRIND) and 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration disclosure 
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends, in Principle 8.2, that an 
independent director chairs the remuneration committee. This approach is also 
consistent with those in the UK and the USA. Board independence (i.e., an 
independent chairperson and a majority of independent directors on the board) is 
almost universally viewed as a desirable corporate governance practice (Nelson, 
Gallery and Percy 2010). Hence, it is believed a remuneration committee chaired by 
an independent director will influence the board on the voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosure in the annual report. Thus, this study hypothesises the 
following: 
 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between a remuneration 
committee chaired by an independent director (RCCHAIRIND) and (a) the decision to 
provide, and (b) the extent of voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure (VDER). 
 
4.2.2.4 Remuneration committee financial expertise (RCEXP) and voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration disclosure 
 
For a remuneration committee to be effective, the membership needs to include at least 
one member with relevant financial expertise. Financial knowledge is important for 
the members’ oversight roles in relation to financial reporting (Davidson III, Biao and 
Weihong 2004). Sapp (2008) argues that a decrease in the level of financial expertise 
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may decrease the committee’s ability to assess compensation packages. It is expected 
that a remuneration committee which has at least one member with financial expertise 
would be more concerned about the voluntary narrative disclosure of remuneration 
action in the annual report and would influence the board. Hence, the hypothesis is: 
 
H2d: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration committee 
financial expertise (RCEXP) and (a) the decision to provide, and (b) the extent of 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
4.2.2.5 Remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET) and voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration disclosure 
 
Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) argued, and provided evidence in the Australian 
context, that the frequency of remuneration committee meetings contributed to 
improved ESO disclosure. Vafeas (1999) found board activity, measured by board 
meeting frequency, is an important dimension of board operations. This study believes 
active remuneration committees are more likely to exert a positive influence on the 
board about the voluntary narrative disclosure on remuneration change decisions in 
the annual report. Therefore, this study hypothesises this relationship as follows: 
 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between frequency of 
remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET) and (a) the decision to provide, and (b) 





4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
The initial sample is constructed from the Top 200 Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) listed firms, based on market capitalisation for each of the years from 2007 to 
2011 (Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon 2006). It is also noted that recent prior corporate 
governance studies in the Australian environment examine the Top 200 companies 
(Henry 2011; Pham, Suchard and Zein 2011).9 The period 2007 to 2011 was chosen 
as it covers a period comprising different macroeconomic conditions (i.e., pre-GFC, 
GFC and post-GFC). Data were collected from the Connect4, Boardroom, DatAnalysis 
and corporate websites. The annual reports were downloaded from the Connect4 
database. Using the search facility in the Connect4 database, a search on each annual 
report is performed using words that suggest a change in executive remuneration. 
Examples of such words are ‘freeze,’ ‘decrease’ and ‘increase’; once that word is 
identified the extent index is coded and cross-checked. This technique has been used 
by Collett and Hrasky (2005). All remuneration committee governance variables are 
hand-collected from directors and corporate governance reports, which form part of 
the annual reports. Finally, the financial-related variables are extracted from the 
DatAnalysis database. 
 
From the initial sample, a number of observations were deleted due to: (a) annual 
reports being presented in a foreign currency, thus reducing comparability (Rankin 
2010); and (b) missing annual reports and the non-availability of data from the various 
                                                 
9 Henry (2011) argues that the reason for focusing on a random sample of 120 companies out of the 
largest 300 companies is due to the largest firms being more likely to attract institutional and corporate 
shareholders when he examined the existence of ownership-based dividend clienteles in the Australian 
environment from 1992 to 2008. Pham, Suchard and Zein (2011) used a sample of Australian top 150 
firms by market capitalisation from 1994 to 2003 when they studied the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance. 
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sources used in the data-collection process. The screening process led to a final sample 
consisting of 673 observations during the sample period. Table 4.1, Panel A, shows 
the distribution of the sample for each year in the sample period, while Panel B outlines 
the final sample by industry sectors. The financial sector represents 24.96% of the 
sample, followed by materials (17.53%), and consumer discretionary (13.37%). The 
smallest sectors include telecommunication services (1.19%) and information 
technology (1.78%). All other sectors range from 4% to 12%. 
 
Table 4.1: Sample Description 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Starting sample 200 200 200 200 200 1000 
Less:       
Annual reports in foreign 
currency 
37 43 47 51 47 225 
Missing records in Connect4 
or corporate website 
33 17 17 7 10 84 
Other missing values in 
control variables 
7 4 0 3 4 18 
Final sample 123 136 136 139 139 673 
Panel B: Industry Sector Classification 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Freq. Percent 
Consumer Discretionary 13 16 19 22 20 90 13.37 
Consumer Staples 8 9 7 7 8 39 5.79 
Energy 12 20 19 16 15 82 12.18 
Financials 38 33 33 32 32 168 24.96 
Health Care 8 8 8 8 7 39 5.79 
Industrials 13 17 16 20 21 87 12.93 
Information Technology 2 2 3 2 3 12 1.78 




Service 1 0 2 3 2 8 1.19 
Utilities 6 6 6 6 6 30 4.46 




4.3.2 Model Specification and Variables Description 
The main hypotheses on the associations between remuneration committee (existence 
and quality) and the decision on voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure (VDER) are tested by utilising the following specified logit regression 
models (Model 1 and Model 2). The associations between remuneration committee 
(existence and quality) and the extent of disclosure are tested using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression models. Both sets of regression are subject to possible 
endogeneity bias which is discussed in Section 4.7.3. 
 
Model 1 – VDER and Remuneration Committee Existence 
VDER = α + β1RCX + β2PBIND + β3ROA + β4LTA + β5DEBT + β6PBOOK + 
β7TOP20 + β8INDUSTRY + β9YEAR + ε 
 
Model 2 – VDER and Remuneration Committee Quality 
VDER = α + β1RCQ + β2PBIND + β3ROA + β4LTA + β5DEBT + β6PBOOK + 
β7TOP20 + β8INDUSTRY + β9YEAR + ε 








Table 4.2: Variable Description and Measurement 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Dependent variable(s) 
VDER Voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration 
action disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure on narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure and is 
measured in two ways: (1) Dummy variable 
(DVER) and takes a value of 1 if the firm 
has provided a narrative disclosure on their 
“action” on executive remuneration in their 
annual report (i.e., remuneration increase, 
decrease or freeze), and 0 otherwise; (2) The 
extent index (EVDER) is made up of four 
(4) remuneration action disclosure (VDER) 
items: (a) remuneration action reasons and is 
given a value of 1 if the reason is related to 
external factors, 2 if the reason is related to 
internal organisational factors (such as 
retain the current executives, increased 
responsibility, 3 if the reason includes both 
internal and external factors; and 0 
otherwise; (b) future remuneration action 
and a value of 1 is given if future 
remuneration action is disclosed. and 0 
otherwise; (c) remuneration-related 
accounting ratios and a value of 1 is given if 
remuneration action is explained by 
including some form of 
performance/accounting measures, 
otherwise 0; and (d) remuneration action 
quantification and a value of 1 is given if the 
disclosure includes amount and percentage 
of change in executive remuneration, 
otherwise 0. 
VDERI Voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration 
increase disclosure 
Dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the 
firm has provided a narrative disclosure on 
‘increase’ in executive remuneration in their 
annual report (i.e., remuneration increase), 
and 0 otherwise. 
VDERF Voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration 
freeze disclosure 
Dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the 
firm has provided a narrative disclosure on 
‘freeze’ in executive remuneration in their 
annual report (i.e., remuneration increase), 
and 0 otherwise. 





Dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if a 




Remuneration committee quality, a 
composite score measuring the quality of the 
remuneration committee ranging between 0 
and 5, with 0 indicating lowest quality and 5 
indicating highest quality. The score is 
formed by aggregating the composite scores 
obtained from five characteristics of a 
remuneration committee, RCS, RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND, RCEXP and RCMEET. 
RCS Remuneration 
committee size 
Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if 
the number of members in the committee is 
greater than the median value, 0 otherwise. 
RCIND Remuneration 
committee independence 
Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if 
the proportion of independent members in 
the committee is greater than the median 




Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if 
the chairperson of the remuneration 




Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if 




Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if 
the number of board meetings is greater than 
the median value, 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables 
PBIND Proportion of 
independent directors on 
the board 
Number of independent directors on the 
board divided by board size. 
LTA Size Log of total assets. 
DEBT Debt Total liabilities to total assets. 
ROA Performance Return on assets measured as net income 
divided by total assets. 
PBOOK Price-to-Book  Price-to-book ratio is measured as share’s 
market value divided by its book value. 
TOP20 Top 20 shareholders Total ownership of the top 20 shareholders. 
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PREGFCD Pre-GFC period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period 
between 1 July 2006 and 30 June 2008, 0 
otherwise. 
GFCD GFC period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period 
between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, 0 
otherwise. 
POSTGFCD Post-GFC period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period 
between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2011, 0 
otherwise. 
 
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in both models is voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure (VDER) and is measured in two ways: (a) the decision 
to provide voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (DVDER), 
measured as a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the firm discloses and 
discusses the type of change in their executive remuneration arrangement in the annual 
report (e.g., firms where executives experience a freeze, decrease or increase in their 
remuneration), and 0 otherwise; and (b) the extent of voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure (EVDER) which is measured using a disclosure index. 
The index is made up of four remuneration action disclosure (VDER) items. These 
are: (a) remuneration action reasons, which are given a value of 1 if the reason is 
related to external factors (e.g., market practice, benchmarking), 2 if the reason is 
related to internal organisational factors (such as retain the current executives, 
increased responsibility), 3 if the reason includes both internal and external factors; 
and 0 otherwise; (b) future remuneration actions, which are given a value of 1 if future 
remuneration action is disclosed and 0 otherwise; (c) remuneration-related accounting 
ratios, which are given a value of 1 if remuneration action explained by including some 
form of performance/accounting measures (financial performance in general, Earnings 
Before Interest and Tax (EBIT)), and 0 otherwise; and (d) remuneration action 
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quantification, which is given a value of 1 if the disclosure includes amount and 
percentage of change in executive remuneration, and 0 otherwise (Belal 2001). 
 
4.3.2.2 Independent Variables: Test Variables 
The first test variable of interest is the existence of a remuneration committee (RCX), 
which is a dichotomous variable, and takes a value of 1 if denoting the existence of a 
remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise. It is important to note that although the 2007 
ASX Corporate Governance Council formally recommends that boards establish a 
remuneration committee, it is somewhat voluntary for the sample period.10 Thus, it is 
interesting to note that more than 90% of the sample of Top 200 ASX firms have a 
remuneration committee either as a stand-alone sub-committee or combined with 
another sub-committee. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the existence of remuneration 
committees (RCX) has increased over the sample period (pre-crisis 89%; crisis period 
91%; and post-crisis 92%). 
 
The second main variable of interest in this study, RCQ (remuneration committee 
quality), is a composite measure composed of five characteristics of a remuneration 
committee. It consists of (a) the size of the remuneration committee (RCS); (b) the 
majority of the remuneration committee members are independent (RCIND); (c) the 
independence of the remuneration committee chairman (RCCHAIRIND); (d) the 
number of remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET); and (e) at least one member 
in the remuneration committee has financial expertise (RCEXP). In the selection and 
construction of these five RCQ constructs, this study utilised the ASX Corporate 
Governance Remuneration Principle (RCS, RCIND, RCCHAIRIND) and, for the two 
                                                 
10 As of 1 July 2011, ASX Listing Rule 12.8 requires all listed companies in the ASX 300 to have, at 
the beginning of their financial year, a remuneration committee that is comprised solely of non-
executive directors for the entire year. 
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new variables, the prior literature for RCMEET (Gillan 2006) and RCEXP 
(Hermanson, Tompkins, Veliyath and Ye 2012). The size of the remuneration 
committee (RCS) is a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the number of members 
in the remuneration committee is greater than the variable’s sample median, and 0 
otherwise. The sample’s remuneration committee size mean (and median) is three 
members. The variable remuneration committee independence (RCIND) is a dummy 
variable and takes a value of 1 if the proportion of independent members is greater 
than the sample’s median. On average, 76% of remuneration committee members are 
independent, while 50% of the remuneration committees have 100% independent 
members. The dummy variable remuneration committee chairperson independence, 
RCCHAIRIND, is coded 1 if the remuneration committee chairperson is independent. 
It is interesting to note that more than 80% of the sample’s remuneration committee 
chairpersons are independent. In terms of frequency of meetings, on average (the 
median) remuneration committees met four times annually, thus the variable 
RCMEET takes a value of 1 if the number of remuneration committee meetings is 
greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. The fifth variable is remuneration committee 
financial expertise, RCEXP, which is a dichotomous variable and takes a value of 1 if 
the remuneration committee consists of at least one financial expert, and 0 otherwise. 
About 66% of the sample has at least one financial expert on their remuneration 
committee, and their presence has increased over the sample period (61% pre-crisis; 
70% post-crisis). 
 
Finally, to obtain the overall RCQ score, the scores for each of the five constructs 
(RCS, RCIND, RCCHAIRIND, RCMEET and RCEXP) are added together (Bertrand 
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and Mullainathan 2001; Prawitt, Smith and Wood 2009). The values for RCQ range 
from 0 to 5 and have a mean and a median of 2.73 and 3, respectively. 
 
4.3.2.3 Control Variables 
In testing the hypotheses, five control variables are included in the regressions which 
can affect voluntary firm disclosures. The first control variable relates to board 
independence (PBIND), which is the proportion of non-executive independent 
directors on the board. Independent directors are employed as a monitoring mechanism 
to reduce agency conflicts between owners and managers (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Thus, these variables provide incentives to make voluntary disclosures in order to 
minimise legal exposure to risks related to poor management and managerial 
opportunism (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). Given that the value of having 
independent directors is dependent on their reputation as experts (Fama and Jensen 
1983), such directors are more likely to insist on more voluntary disclosure as such 
acts are seen by other stakeholders as being transparent and signalling to the market 
that they are fulfilling their responsibilities and duties (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 
2007). 
 
Similar to most prior studies (see Abeysekera 2012; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Gul 
and Leung 2004; Ho and Wong 2001), the next control variable, firm size, is measured 
as the natural log of total assets (LTA). There are three reasons for this: (a) larger firms 
are expected to voluntarily disclose more information than smaller firms in order to 
reduce information asymmetry which becomes more prevalent when firms grow larger 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976); (b) larger firms are usually more sensitive to political 
costs and thus will disclose more information to alleviate public criticism; and (c) 
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larger firms are expected to disclose more information as the amount of damage arising 
from litigation is dependent on the size of the firm (Skinner 1994). 
 
Several studies use ratio of profit to total assets (ROA) in predicting voluntary 
disclosure (Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Ho and Wong 2001; Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). In line with these studies, this study includes 
ROA in the model, as better performing firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
information. 
 
In line with prior studies (Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; 
Ho and Wong 2001; Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995), 
debt ratio (DEBT), price-to-book ratio (PBOOK) and top 20 shareholders (TOP20) are 
included as control variables. DEBT ratio is measured as total liabilities to total assets, 
and it is expected that firms with a higher debt ratio are more likely to voluntarily 
disclose more information in order to reduce potential legal risk. Price-to-book ratio is 
measured as a share’s market value divided by its book value. TOP20 is the ratio of 
top 20 shareholders’ shareholdings to total shares, and it is expected that firms with 
higher outside ownership will have more board representation which will lead to less 
voluntary disclosure (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). 
 
Finally, like most prior studies (e.g., Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Ferguson, Lam 






4.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
From the descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.3, 41% of the total sample provides 
some form of narrative disclosure on actions with respect to executive remuneration. 
In other words, almost half the sample firms disclosed in their annual reports if the 
executives had an increase, a decrease or a freeze in remuneration.11 In terms of the 
direction of the change in remuneration, from the sample, 23% reported an increase 
(VDERI), 18% reported a freeze (VDERF), while only 2% reported a decrease in their 
executive remuneration package. The study further investigated remuneration change 
actions by economic periods. As expected, during the pre-crisis period (2007-2008) 
the most prevalent remuneration action is an increase in remuneration package (31% 
of the sample had an increase). Similar observations are found during the post-crisis 
period (2010-2011), with 26% of the sample receiving an increase in their executive 
remuneration package. Although it is expected that firms would suffer a decrease in 
their executive remuneration during the crisis period (2009), this was not the case, as 
only 2% of the firms provided such narrative disclosure. However, the most prevalent 
action during the crisis period was disclosure of a freeze in executive remuneration, 
with 38% of the sample firms reporting such an action. The mean of the extent index 
is 1.14, with the minimum score of zero for those companies who do not voluntarily 
disclose executive remuneration action, and with a maximum score of 5. 
 
The mean related to the frequency of remuneration committee meetings has increased 
from 3.58 in the pre-crisis period to 3.84 in the post-crisis period. This suggests that 
                                                 
11 Please note, since all firms will have a disclosure on the total and specific remuneration values of 
their executives and on specific remuneration of their directors and top management, this study did not 
take such required monetary disclosures into account. 
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remuneration committees became more active during the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
The means for the other four remuneration committee characteristics (remuneration 
committee size, number of independent directors on the remuneration committee, 
whether the chairman of the remuneration committee is independent, and the financial 
expertise of the remuneration committees) have increased from the pre-crisis period to 
the post crisis-period, which underlines the importance of corporate governance 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.4 presents the Spearman correlation matrix with voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure, governance attributes and control variables. There is 
no multicollinearity problem with other independent variables as correlations are all 
below 0.8 (Hill, Griffiths and Judge 2001). All the remuneration committee 
characteristics show a positive significant correlation with VDER. The proportion of 
independent directors also shows a positive significant correlation with VDER. The 
size variable (LTA) has a significant and positive correlation with VDER, which 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.3 Multivariate Results 
Table 4.5 presents the main findings from a total of eight estimations. Estimation a 
relates to logit regressions using DVDER as the dependent variable, while Estimation 
b relates to OLS regressions using EVDER as the dependent variable. The first two 
estimations (1a and 1b) were carried out to test H1, with RCX being the variable of 
interest. Estimations 2a and 2b test H2 and the variable of interest is RCQ. Finally, the 
last two estimations (3a and 3b, and 4a and 4b) test H2a to H2e jointly with test 
variables being the five individual dimensions of RCQ (size, independence, 
chairperson independence, financial expertise and diligence). The log likelihood and 
F-statistics for each of the estimations is significant at the 1% level, and the Pseudo R2 
(and adjusted R2) for each of the eight estimations ranges from 10% to 12%. Although 
R2 appears rather low it is quite comparable to prior voluntary disclosure studies (e.g., 
Laksmana 2008; Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010). 
 
Remuneration Committee Existence (RCX) 
Estimations 1a and 1b in Table 4.5 show the results for the first hypothesis, which 
examines the association between remuneration committee existence and VDER. The 
results show that the coefficient for the variable of interest, RCX, is positive and 
strongly significant at the p<0.01 level, which implies that firms with a remuneration 
committee are more likely to provide information relating to voluntary narrative 
disclosures on executive remuneration actions (for both existence and extent of 
disclosure). This finding is consistent with the findings of Nelson, Gallery and Percy 
(2010), which showed evidence that the existence of a remuneration committee has an 
influence on ESO disclosure. In summary, the results imply that the existence of a 
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remuneration committee has a positive influence on the VDER and, thus, supports 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Remuneration Committee Quality (RCQ) 
Hypothesis 2 uses Model 2, which captures the effect of the remuneration committee 
quality (a composite measure) on VDER and the extent of disclosure index. 
Specifically, the significance of this effect is shown in Table 4.5, Estimations 2a and 
2b. The variable of interest, RCQ, is positive and significantly associated with the 
decision to disclose voluntary narrative executive remuneration actions and the extent 
of such disclosure (at the p<0.01 level), thus providing support to the second 
hypothesis. The results suggest that firms with increasing remuneration committee 
quality tend to make voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosures, 
and also provide greater detailed explanation about the firms’ actions to the users of 
the financial statements. Collectively, the implications are that remuneration 
committee composition plays a significant role in making decisions and the extent to 
which a firm decides to provide additional information relating to remuneration actions 
such as an increase, freeze or decrease in executive remuneration. 
 
Remuneration Committee Components 
The sub-hypotheses of Hypothesis 2 uses Model 2 to test the effects of each of the 
remuneration committee variables (size (RCS), independence (RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND), expertise (RCEXP) and diligence (RCMEET)), which were used to 
derive the composite measure RCQ on decision and extent to disclose. The results 
reported in Estimations 3a and 3b (each of the remuneration committee variables is an 
indicator variable) and 4a and 4b (RCS, RCIND and RCMEET are continuous 
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variables, while RCCHAIRIND and RCEXP are indicator variables) show that only 
two of the five remuneration committee variables are significant. Specifically, for 
Estimations 3a, 3b and 4a, 4b, the results shows that RCIND and RCMEET are 
positive and significant at the 1% to 10% level. Thus, H2b and H2e are supported, but 
not H2a, H2c and H2d, although the coefficients for those variables were in the 
predicted direction. The results imply that as remuneration committee independence 
and diligence increase, firms are more likely to disclose voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration actions and explain those actions. 
 
In most estimations, the firm-related control variables, firm size (LTA) and price-to-
book (PBOOK), are significantly related to voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure at the 1% and 10% levels in the predicted direction. 
This finding is similar to Abeysekera’s (2012) study that found that firm size is 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.5 Further Analysis 
4.5.1 Type of Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Remuneration 
Several additional tests are carried out to check the robustness of the primary results. 
The first test relates to the dependent variable measure, VDER. Specifically, both 
models are re-estimated by substituting the broad dependent variable, voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER), with a finer dependent 
variable, which is based on the type of executive remuneration action undertaken (i.e., 
whether the disclosure relates to an increase (VDERI) or a freeze (VDERF) in the 
executive remuneration plan). Estimations for decrease disclosures of executive 
remuneration were not carried out due to the low frequency of such disclosed actions 
(only 15 observations). From Table 4.6, Estimations 1a and 1b show that the variable, 
remuneration committee existence (RCX), is positive and significant (p<0.01) in the 
decision on voluntary disclosure executive remuneration increase (VDERI) estimation 
and extent of disclosure, but not in the estimation relating to a freeze in executive 
remuneration (VDERF). Next, Estimation 2 shows that RCQ is positive and significant 
in regressions relating to VDERI and VDERF on decisions on executive remuneration 
action and extent of disclosure. In terms of testing the effects of each of the 
remuneration committee variables - size (RCS), independence (RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND), expertise (RCEXP) and diligence (RCMEET), which were used to 
derive the composite measure RCQ, it is worth noting that the results differ slightly 
from the main findings. In the estimations relating to voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration increase disclosure, this additional analysis finds weak evidence for two 
of the five variables, namely, remuneration committee chairperson independence 
(RCCHAIRIND) and remuneration committee financial expertise (RCEXP). 
However, in the estimations relating to a freeze in executive remuneration disclosure, 
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the variables (remuneration committee independence and diligence) are positive and 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.5.2 Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions 
The second additional test examines whether the association between remuneration 
committee existence, quality and decision on VDER and extent differs between 
economic conditions. As discussed earlier in the introduction, the GFC attracted huge 
debate and scrutiny of top executives and their remuneration plans, which, in turn, was 
expected to increase investment and reputational risk, not only at the investor level but 
also at the firm and the individual level (top executives). Thus, firms and their top 
management were motivated to reduce their associated risks by increasing their VDER 
during the GFC (2009) and after the financial crisis (2010 and 2011). In performing 
this test, the additional variables PREGFC, GFC and POSTGFC are included in the 
four main models. The findings reported in Table 7 (1a) show that remuneration 
committee existence (RCX) significantly influences the decision to disclose in all three 
periods (DVDER), but remuneration committee existence (p<0.01) marginally 
influences the extent of disclosure during the pre-crisis period (1b). However, 
remuneration committee quality shows significant influence (2a) on the decision to 
disclose in all three periods but remains insignificant (2b) for the extent of disclosure. 
 
Next, Models 1 and 2 are re-estimated by economic period, and the results are shown 
in Table 4.7, Estimations 3 to 8. The results differ slightly from the main findings in 
relation to the decision to disclose executive remuneration action, the variable 
existence of remuneration committee is significant in the pre- and post-crisis periods 
and not in the financial crisis period. However, the quality of remuneration committees 
remain significant in all three periods. In terms of extent, when a remuneration 
committee is in existence the companies tend to disclose more in the pre- and post-
crisis periods but less in the GFC period. This could be due to the actions taken by the 
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companies, for example, in the pre-crisis period when there is an increase in executive 
remuneration, companies tend to disclose more about the reasons for an increase, but 
in the GFC period actions are mainly attributed to external market conditions. It is 
interesting to note that the remuneration committee quality significantly influences the 
extent of disclosure (p<0.01) during the crisis period, and remains insignificant in the 
pre- and post-crisis periods. In summary, the results suggest that remuneration 
committee existence and its quality play an important role in the decision to provide 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.5.3 Endogeneity in Remuneration Committee Characteristics 
Almost all the variables in governance studies including board structure are 
endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Thus, the remuneration committee 
quality analysis (RCQ) may also suffer from an endogeneity problem. Endogeneity 
arises when the explanatory variable itself is a function of other variables. As a result 
of this issue, the explanatory variable will be correlated with the error terms and hence 
causes bias in the OLS estimates. To address this issue, this study uses two approaches 
to control for the fact that remuneration committee characteristics are endogenous to 
the firm’s decision on narrative disclosure and its extent. The first strategy is to lag all 
remuneration committee characteristics by one year (Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian 
2008). This lag allows for the effect of any change in remuneration committee 
governance structure to show up in a firm’s disclosure decision and its extent of 
disclosure. 
 
The results are reported in Table 4.8 which show that the remuneration committee 
existence and quality play a significant role (at the 1% level) in the decision and extent 
of narrative disclosure of director remuneration. This is consistent with the main 
findings. In terms of remuneration committee characteristics, the remuneration 
committee meeting is significant at the 10% level for decision and extent of narrative 
disclosure of director remuneration. The remuneration committee independence, when 
it is measured as a continuous variable, shows significant influence on the extent of 
director remuneration disclosure. The remuneration committee size shows a negative 
significant influence on the extent of narrative disclosure of director remuneration but 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The second strategy to control for endogeneity is addressed by using instrumental 
variable two-stage least-squares regression (IV2SLS). In this test the instrumental 
variables for remuneration committee characteristics are the first lagged value (Boone, 
Casares Field, Karpoff and Raheja 2007). The results are reported in Table 4.9. 
 
The remuneration committee existence and quality remain highly significant at the 1% 
level in the decision to disclose the narrative director remuneration and the extent of 
such disclosure. Consistent with the main findings, the influence of remuneration 
committee meeting and remuneration committee independence on the decision and 
extent of director remuneration disclosure remain significant. The only exception is 
that the influence of remuneration committee size (continuous variable) negatively 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, this study uses a fixed-effect model to address the possible relationship 
between dependent and independent variables due to unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
The remuneration committee existence and quality remain highly significant at the 1% 
level in the decision to disclose the narrative director remuneration and the extent of 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter examines the existence of remuneration committees and their quality on 
narrative voluntary executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER) and its extent. 
The findings show that remuneration committees serve as an important corporate 
governance mechanism. In addition, the potential risks to their own reputation and the 
risks of litigation faced by remuneration committee members make them work 
effectively to influence the preparation of annual reports to voluntarily disclose their 
actions on executive remuneration. It is expected that the existence of a remuneration 
committee would influence boards to voluntarily disclose more information, and that 
effective remuneration committees are more likely to be influential than ineffective 
remuneration committees. This study examines these two propositions in this chapter 
and finds they are supported. 
 
The results also provide evidence of remuneration committee existence (RCX) having 
a positive effect on narrative voluntary executive remuneration disclosure. The 
remuneration committee’s quality is also highly significant across different economic 
conditions and in relation to different types of voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosures. Further analysis suggests that remuneration committee 
independence and the diligence of remuneration committees are the driving forces 
behind remuneration committee quality. The proportion of board independence is 
significant, except in the voluntary disclosure of an increase in executive 
remuneration. It is also interesting to note that one of the control variables (board 
independence) shows a significant effect on the voluntary narrative executive 




This essay extends the limited research on remuneration committee quality. While 
prior US studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Vafeas 2003) focus on 
compensation committee quality and CEO pay, Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) focus 
on the relationship between future firm performance and CEO stock option grants. 
Compensation committee quality is measured by using six committee characteristics; 
future firm performance was found to be more positively associated with stock option 
grants as the compensation committee quality increases. In Australia, Beekes and 
Brown (2006) found better governed firms make more informative disclosures; they 
measure corporate governance quality with reference to the higher ratings, while they 
employ six indicators of informativeness. Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) found 
board independence, compensation committee independence and quality, and audit 
committee independence contributed to compliance with ESO disclosures. However, 
this chapter extends the current literature on narrative executive remuneration 
voluntary disclosure and found that the existence of a remuneration committee has a 
significant association with voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure; and remuneration committee quality has a positive association with 
narrative voluntary executive remuneration disclosure in the annual report. Further, 
this study finds that the proportion of remuneration committee independence, the 
number of remuneration committee meetings, the proportion of independent directors 
and firm sizes are all positively associated with narrative voluntary executive 
remuneration action disclosure. 
 
The findings of this study provide critical information on remuneration committee 
existence and quality, and on organisational voluntary reporting behaviour, from a 
unique macroeconomic setting before, during and after the GFC. This understanding, 
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in turn, has implications for various stakeholders, including auditors, the standards-
setters and regulatory bodies for their decision-making in relation to policymaking and 
implementation. 
 
The findings of this study have limitations. First, this study only examines firms in the 
Top 200 listed firms in Australia; therefore, these findings may not be applicable to all 
listed firms or non-listed firms. The analysis is based on annual reports; integration of 
other disclosure documents may provide more comprehensive information. Second, 
this study uses a dichotomous measure of financial expertise, coded 1 if at least one 
member of the remuneration committee has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise. 
Future research could consider the proportion of financial expertise included on the 
remuneration committee as an improved measure. This would challenge the 
researcher, however, as some companies will not provide detailed information about 
all of the directors’ qualifications and expertise. 
 
Finally, although this study identifies five remuneration committee characteristics 
based on the Corporate Governance Council’s recommendations and on the literature, 
the question of whether these five remuneration committee characteristics can reflect 
the corporate governance quality of remuneration committees is still open. Future 
research could focus on the complementary roles of other sub-committees on voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration disclosures, and extend the investigation to 




Chapter 5: Narrative Voluntary Executive Remuneration 
Disclosure and Attribution Strategy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Accounting narratives are an increasingly important medium of communication and 
play an important role in the annual reports of companies (Clatworthy and Jones 2003). 
Providing explanations for organisational events and performance outcomes is an 
important part of top management’s sense-making activities, and narrative disclosure 
in annual reports reflects such explanatory activities (Gioia and Sims Jr 1986; Pfeffer 
1981). Annual report narratives offering explanations can be conceptualised based on 
argumentation patterns adopted by management in order to manage the company’s 
public image, reputation and legitimation of its activities (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 
1998; Pfeffer 1981). Attributional explanations are generally expected in the annual 
accounting narratives, but they are to a large extent discretionary (Aerts 2005). 
 
The primary objective of this study is to ascertain whether the type of attribution and 
extent of attribution that is measured by an attribution index in the annual report for 
executive remuneration change is different from 2007 to 2011 for the top 200 listed 
firms in Australia. Disclosures in annual reports provide organisations with an 
effective method of managing external impressions (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 
1998). Annual reports are a primary information source for investors, creditors, 
employees and government. Although firms utilise a variety of textually mediated 
communication media such as brochures and advertising in an attempt to, inter alia, 
sustain legitimacy, the annual report appears to be the preferred method for 
communicating with relevant stakeholders (Zeghal and Ahmed 1990; Marx 1992). 
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From an impression management point of view, attributional behaviour in an 
organisational context emphasises the role that managers play in monitoring changes 
that may impinge on the public image of the organisation, modifying their 
presentational behaviour to match those changes (Bozeman and Kacmar 1997). This 
perspective suggests that firms change their presentational strategies and tactics 
immediately to reflect changing conditions in the relevant internal and external 
reporting environment (Aerts 2001). 
 
 In the extant literature, only one paper has looked at the impact of corporate 
governance on impression management in the Australian context. Mather and Ramsay 
(2007) found evidence of lower impression management in the presence of a stronger 
board when they researched the association between board independence and 
disclosure practices in Australia. Based on this evidence the secondary objective is to 
examine the moderating effect of remuneration committee characteristics, as a 
corporate governance mechanism, on the attribution strategy adopted in annual reports 
about narrative disclosure of the executive remuneration actions by firms during 
different economic periods. 
 
There is evidence in the current literature on increased voluntary disclosure (Lim, 
Matolcsy and Chow 2007) and the role of corporate governance mechanisms, in 
particular, emphasising the role of the board of directors and sub-committees (Conyon 
and Peck 1998) in facilitating and improving control over senior managers, and 
ensuring they act in the best interest of investors. There is  consensus that governance 
mechanisms influence accounting information quality but there is limited evidence on 
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its influence on impression management practices in narrative disclosure (Osma and 
Guillamón-Saorín 2011). 
 
The theory and practice of impression management is well-documented in accounting 
research. Impression management has its origin in the social psychology literature 
(Tetlock and Manstead 1985) and attribution is also an impression management 
strategy adopted from social psychology (Heider 1958; Kelly 1967). Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan (2011) put forward four explanations for discretionary narrative disclosure. 
The first explanation is based on an economic perspective. The economic perspective 
states that discretionary disclosures can be used opportunistically by management to 
create favourable impressions of either the firm or of management itself. In a reporting 
context it entails managers attributing positive organisational outcomes to internal 
factors and negative organisational outcomes to external factors (Aerts 1994; Aerts 
2001; Clatworthy and Jones 2003). Osma and Guillamón-Saorín (2011) provided 
evidence that strong internal corporate governance limits impression management in 
press releases, consistent with governance monitoring, effectively reducing self-
serving disclosure by management in Spanish firms. 
 
The second explanation is based on the social psychology perspective, which indicates 
that impression management may be motivated by the social presence of others whose 
behaviour management is trying to anticipate (Allport 1954, p. 5). Managers may be 
prompted to engage in impression management anticipating that shareholders and 




The third explanation is the sociology perspective which sees impression management 
as adhering to the substantiative rationality concerns of external parties. Managers may 
engage in impression management as a means of legitimising an action in order to 
justify their action and deflect criticisms or to prevent influence from external parties. 
Impression management in this context is regarded as an attempt to affect the public’s 
perception of the company (Aerts and Cormier 2009; Hooghiemstra 2000) or 
reactively responding to stakeholder concerns, increased scrutiny by the media or 
public pressure in the wake of a corporate scandal or environmental disaster 
(Hooghiemstra 2000; O'Keefe and Conway 2008). 
 
 The fourth and final explanation of impression management is the critical perspective, 
where corporate reporting decisions are assumed not to be primarily driven by self-
interest utility maximisation, but are ideological in the sense that corporate narrative 
documents use privilege and thought rooted in managerial capitalism (Craig and 
Amernic 2004, p. 814), while marginalising the perspective of stakeholders and the 
public. 
 
This study uses the sociology perspective of impression management by adopting 
legitimacy theory. It argues that firms engage in impression management as a means 
of legitimising executive remuneration action through narrative voluntary disclosure 
in the annual report. Firms will inform shareholders and other stakeholders of their 
actions on executive remuneration to justify their actions. 
 
This study is different from other studies for the following reasons. All previous 
studies have examined the different impression management practices adopted by 
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firms in different states of organisational performance with only one exception, that of 
Osma and Guillamón-Saorín (2011), who researched narrative disclosure in annual 
result press releases. They found strong governance lowers the incidence of both 
qualitative and quantitative impression management. This study also provides a unique 
context by using annual reports taken from 2007 to 2011 in Australian conditions 
during different macroeconomic periods. 
 
This chapter examines the narrative disclosure of directors’ remuneration change in 
annual reports and the adoption of the attribution strategy by firms to justify their 
decision on remuneration change. The disclosure information on attribution was 
manually collected using keywords in annual reports (Collett and Hrasky 2005) to 
create an index to measure the extent of attribution. Aerts (1994) study was modified 
to suit remuneration action disclosure. The attribution index is a composite measure 
developed by considering the reason given for the remuneration change in the annual 
report (external or internal), whether it includes an accounting measure (technical 
accounting terminology) in the disclosure and whether the cause – effect is expressed 
in accounting terms in the discussion (Aerts 1994). 
 
Finally, this study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, mainly 
remuneration committee characteristics, on the attribution strategy adopted by 
companies in different economic conditions as stated in their annual report. The result 
shows that companies attributed external factors for the remuneration change during 
the GFC but, in the pre-crisis period, the internal factors were attributed to 
remuneration change decisions. In particular, the attribution index shows that when 
the companies attribute remuneration change to external factors in accounting 
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narratives, they tend to disclose less. However, during the pre-crisis period managers 
tend to attribute more remuneration actions to internal factors. 
 
Additionally, the results show that remuneration committee characteristics (such as 
independence and number of meetings) play different roles in the attribution strategy 
and the extent of attribution disclosure based on the remuneration action (increase or 
freeze). 
 
This research adds to the existing literature on impression management techniques in 
narrative disclosure and corporate governance. There is no prior work concerning the 
attribution of executive remuneration change disclosure in accounting narratives in 
Australia. In addition, this study provides evidence on the role of remuneration 
committee characteristics on attribution and the extent of attribution during different 
economic conditions in Australia. 
 
The defining event of the GFC was the collapse of large financial institutions (such as 
Lehman Brothers) in late September 2008, resulting in a substantial loss of shareholder 
confidence throughout the world. Although interest in executive pay has been in 
evidence for quite some time, the financial crisis of 2008-09 further intensified this 
interest (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). Subsequent to the GFC, a number of 
governments considered limiting the magnitude and/or the type of executive 
remuneration (Matolcsy and Wright 2011). As a result of the crisis, public attention to 
the compensation levels of top executives appeared to be at an all-time high. In 2009 
the Productivity Commission undertook an inquiry into the Australian regulatory 
framework on directors and executive remuneration practices, and made the following 
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recommendations: (a) processes to be improved for the appointment and use of 
remuneration consultants and associated disclosures; (b) the composition of a 
remuneration committee to be solely non-executive directors, the majority of whom 
are independent; (c) directors and executives to be prohibited from voting on their own 
shares on remuneration reports. 
 
In attempting to gain and maintain shareholders’ confidence, organisations may 
closely monitor top executive remuneration and disclose the reasons for their decisions 
to shareholders and regulators in order to avoid more scrutiny and to satisfy their 
expectations by taking action on executive remuneration. The best platform on which 
to make disclosures on such decisions and explain the reasons is in the company’s 
annual report, as this document is publicly available and easily accessible to any 
stakeholder. 
 
The chapter discusses the literature review and hypotheses development in the 
following section. Research methodology is described next, followed by results and 
analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary and a discussion of 
limitations. 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Voluntary disclosures are one means by which an organisation can describe its 
performance and activities, which in turn potentially affects shareholder perceptions 
and decisions. Prior studies on the nature and extent of voluntary disclosure have 
generally adopted one of two major perspectives, either: (a) incremental information 
or (b) impression management perspectives. Impression management literature 
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examines whether firms attempt to show a more favourable view of their financial 
performance than is warranted (Guillamon-Saorin, Osma and Jones 2012). Advocates 
of impression management argue that managers are presumed to adopt two types of 
behaviour when preparing reports on the entity. The first behaviour is concealment 
and the other behaviour is attribution. This study examines the attribution behaviour 
of managers from 2007 to 2011 (pre-GFC, during and post-GFC). 
 
Attribution is an impression management strategy adopted from social psychology 
(Heider 1958; Kelly 1967). The impression management perspective propounds that 
discretionary disclosures can be used opportunistically by management to create 
favourable impressions of either the firm or of management itself. In a reporting 
context it entails managers attributing positive organisational outcomes to internal 
factors and negative organisational outcomes to external factors (Aerts 1994; Aerts 
2001; Clatworthy and Jones 2003).  
 
This study focuses on the reasons given for remuneration change from 2007 to 2011 
in the Australian environment. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argued managers of firms 
with improving or declining performance attribute positive organisational outcomes to 
internal factors and negative organisational outcomes to external circumstances. By 
contrast, studies based on incremental information contend that discretionary 
disclosures can be used by firms to overcome information asymmetries between 
insiders and outsiders, and that managers tend to have economic incentives to engage 
in unbiased reporting in order to enhance their reputation and compensation (Baginski 
and Hassell 2000). Given the unprecedented levels of global economic uncertainty 
during the 2008 financial market crisis, reduced firm profits and also the concern from 
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various parties about excessive payments to executives, it is likely that firms will adopt 
remuneration realignment strategies and explanations (which may or may not be 
opportunistic) to influence shareholder perceptions by using attribution strategy to 
gain or retain their confidence. As evident in the Productivity Commission (2009) 
report, a number of companies undertook a revision in some elements (especially the 
incentive component) of their executive remuneration payment. This study argues that 
managers will adopt an attribution strategy to explain the reasons for executive 
remuneration change. In addition, remuneration committees (being a sub-committee 
of the board) will play an important role in the actions undertaken to revise executive 
remuneration arrangements as well as in the communication of these actions, with 
attributions and reasons, to the shareholders, investors and other stakeholders. 
 
In an agency framework it is argued that effective corporate governance practices 
mitigate agency cost by decreasing information asymmetry through increased 
disclosure. Corporate governance practices are introduced to reduce agency problems 
associated with inadequate disclosure and to ensure that managers act in the best 
interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue 
that compensation levels are higher when governance is weaker. The interest in 
executive remuneration has been high for quite some time; but the financial crisis of 
2008-09 further intensified this interest. Public attention to the compensation levels of 
top officials appears to be at an all-time high (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). 
 
In order to manage the public scrutiny of executive remuneration in the crisis period 
and to legitimise their actions, companies will adopt more attributional behaviour, 
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based on impression management, than in other periods. The hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
 
H1: The extent of external attribution behaviour will be higher in the crisis period than 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, and the type of attribution strategies adopted by 
the companies will differ during these periods. 
 
There are many definitions of corporate governance in the literature. In addition to the 
definition of corporate governance (ASX, 2003; Gillan and Starks 1998) discussed in 
Chapter 4, this chapter provides an additional discussion on corporate governance and 
its impact on disclosure practices and attribution. Corporate governance is about 
governance of firms. Sloan (2001, p. 335) defines corporate governance as “the 
mechanisms that have evolved to mitigate incentives problems created by the 
separation of management and financing of business entities”. Corporate governance 
encompasses all the provisions and mechanisms aimed at ensuring that the assets of 
the firm are managed efficiently and in the interests of the providers of finance, thereby 
mitigating agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
 
The prior literature examines whether various governance mechanisms are effective in 
controlling the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Beasley 1996). The results from 
these studies highlight the importance of corporate boards and, in particular, the 
importance of independent directors in ensuring that managers act in the best interest 
of investors. Williamson (1983) argues the firm’s board of directors safeguards 
invested capital, so it is an important element of internal corporate governance. Jensen 
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(1993, p. 862) noted that “the job of the board is to hire and fire and compensate the 
CEO and to provide high-level counsel”. 
 
This study will also focus on remuneration committee characteristics and attributions 
for executive remuneration change during different macroeconomic periods, using 
attribution strategy based on impression management. 
 
Remuneration committees 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends that 
listed entities should have a separate remuneration committee, as it can be an efficient 
and effective mechanism to bring transparency, focus and independent judgement to 
remuneration decisions. It recommends that listed entities have a formal and 
transparent process for developing remuneration policy and for fixing the 
remuneration packages of directors and senior executives. This study expects that 
remuneration committees will influence the form of attribution used in companies’ 
annual reports for their remuneration actions. 
 
Board sub-committees are there to assist the main board in performing their duties 
effectively in a firm (Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven 2011). A remuneration committee 
is a sub-committee of the board and is responsible for the remuneration package as 
well as providing information to stakeholders to reduce agency-related problems 
(Williamson 1983). In the absence of a remuneration committee, there is a greater 
likelihood that executives will write their own employment contract. Therefore, we 
argue that the presence of an effective remuneration committee could serve as an 
effective internal corporate governance mechanism to determine remuneration 
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policies, and to provide more transparent information in the form of disclosure to 
shareholders (Conyon and Peck 1998). 
 
This chapter argues that better disclosures on remuneration change reasons (such as a 
change in the remuneration compensation arrangement) are affected by remuneration 
committee characteristics. The rationale for this argument is that a firm’s good 
corporate governance practice is reflected in the quality of the remuneration 
committee. Earlier literature has also documented the importance of a remuneration 
committee in corporate governance practice. Dechow, Huson and Solan (1994) find 
that remuneration committees adjust CEO compensation to minimise opportunistic 
behaviour. Osma and Noguer (2007) provide evidence that remuneration committees 
improve the efficiency of the board and audit committees in constraining manipulation 
practices in Spain. In a recent study, Osma and Guillamón-Saorín (2011) found that 
there is a significant negative relationship between the existence of a remuneration 
committee and impression management in press releases on annual results. 
 
This study expects the independent directors on the board to have a duty to ensure that 
proper reports are given to stockholders despite having only limited access to firm-
specific information. Prior studies found that independent directors affect firm 
decisions (Byrd and Hickman 1992) and satisfy their monitoring role, limiting both 
the incidence of fraudulent (Beasely 1996) and aggressive reporting (Peasnell, Pope 
and Young 2005). A study by Osma and Guillamón-Saorín (2011) provided evidence 
that a proportion of independent directors influenced the annual results press releases 
of publicly-listed Spanish companies during 2005 and 2006. It is also argued that 
inside directors are, by definition, part of a senior management team, therefore, the 
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monitoring role is likely to be the responsibility of independent directors (Mather and 
Ramsay 2007). The economics of the managerial labour market theory also provide 
incentives for independent directors to be effective monitors as, to do otherwise, would 
result in reputation losses that diminish the value of the human capital (Fama 1983). 
Based on this argument, this study expects that the independent directors on the 
remuneration committee will influence the disclosure practices in the annual report by 
making recommendations to the main board. 
 
The extant literature provides mixed evidence in terms of board size. Jensen (1993) 
argues that large boards are less effective because co-ordination and process problems 
outweigh the advantage of having access to wider expertise and skills. Xie, Davidson 
III and DaDalt (2003) found that a larger board is associated with a lower level of 
earnings management because it is more likely to have independent directors with 
financial expertise and, hence, it is likely to prevent earnings management. Yermack 
(1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) provide evidence that smaller 
boards are associated with stronger financial performance. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
find evidence in Australia that large boards do not necessarily detract from good 
performance. 
 
The prior studies used frequency of committee meeting as an indicator of measuring 
the diligence of committee performance (Lipton and Lorsch 1992). In the literature the 
evidence of meeting frequency is mixed. There are two opposing views on this 
proposition: (a) a greater number of meetings may indicate diligence, or (b) it may 
signal a problem or crisis in that particular firm. Vafeas (1999) argues that frequent 
meetings are beneficial to the shareholders as they help to improve effective decision-
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making and can be used as a way of measuring the activity of the board. Naiker and 
Navissi (2005) provided evidence that integrity of financial reporting is more likely to 
have a positive correlation by having a more active audit committee. On the other hand, 
Menon and Williams (1994) argued that frequency of meeting does not indicate that 
all tasks were completed in those meetings, and provided evidence that the number of 
committee meetings increases as the firm becomes larger. This study expects 
remuneration committees that meet more frequently to be more effective in influencing 
the main board about the disclosure decisions in the annual report. 
Based on the above argument, the following three hypotheses are tested in this study: 
 
H2a: The proportion of independent members in the remuneration committee will have 
a moderating effect on the attribution strategy of firms in the different reporting 
periods (pre-GFC, during and post-GFC). 
H2b: The size of the remuneration committee will have a moderating effect on the 
attribution strategy of firms in the different reporting periods (pre-GFC, during and 
post-GFC). 
H2c: The number of remuneration committee meetings will have a moderating effect 
on the attribution strategy of firms in the different reporting periods (pre-GFC, during 
and post-GFC). 
 
5.3 Research Methodology 
5.3.1 Data Collection 
The process of collecting data was described above in Section 4.3.1. Using the search 
facility in the Connect4 database, a search on each annual report was performed using 
words that suggest a change in executive remuneration. Examples of such words are 
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‘freeze,’ ‘decrease’ and ‘increase’. This technique has been used by Collett and Hrasky 
(2005). Content analysis was used to document the attributional behaviour (Clatworthy 
and Jones 2003; Aerts 1994). Content analysis consists of dividing the text into 
meaningful entities according to well-defined rules (Aerts 2005). An attributional 
statement is defined as “a phrase or sentence in which a corporate event or performance 
outcome is linked with the reason or a cause for the event or outcome” (Aerts 2001, p. 
13). 
 
The following are examples of external attribution statements that appeared in a firm’s 
annual report during the period of study. They are all exact quotes from the annual 
reports: 
 
“In light of the present difficult economic environment for shareholders and 
the community in general Directors have implemented a freeze on any increase 
in Directors’ fees for the next 12 months.” 
 
“Given the environment, the 2009 staff and executive salary reviews and short-
term incentive payments for the 2009 financial year were cancelled and 
Directors’ fees were frozen for the 2010 financial year.” 
 
“In light of the difficult general economic trading conditions, the Company has 
implemented a salary freeze for all executives for the 2010 financial year.” 
 





“The financial performance multiplier provides executives with an increased 
incentive to focus on EBIT performance as STI payable increases as EBIT 
performance improves.” 
 
“The CEOs total remuneration for the year decreased from $5.8m to $3.4m, 
which primarily reflects reductions in both short- and long-term incentives as 
a consequence of the financial results for the year.” 
 
“The Board, on the advice of the Remuneration and Nominations Committee 
has increased the Managing Director’s fixed annual remuneration to 
$1,090,000 (including $65,000 Directors fees paid from DKN Financial Group 
Ltd) for the year to 30 June 2012. The Managing Director’s Short Term 
Incentive (STI) opportunity for the year to 30 June 2012 has also been 
increased to 80% of base remuneration from $680,000 to $870,000. The STI 
terms will be the same as for the 2010/11 year, with specific performance 
hurdles.” 
 
All remuneration committee governance variables are hand-collected from the 
directors’ and corporate governance reports which form part of the annual reports. 
Finally, the control variables are extracted from the DatAnalysis database. From the 
initial sample, a number of observations were deleted due to: (a) annual reports being 
presented in a foreign currency, thus reducing comparability (Osma and Guillamón-
Saorín (2011); and (b) missing annual reports and the non-availability of data from the 
various sources used in the data collection process. The screening process led to a final 
117 
 
sample of 673 observations in the sample period; this study identifies 240 observations 
of companies which have explained their actions and attributed them either to internal 
or external factors. The figure of 240 observation of companies is slightly different 
from the 278 observation of companies identified in Chapter 4, because 38 companies 
used both internal and external attribution, and were thus excluded. Table 5.1 shows 
the distribution of the sample for each year in the sample period. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample Description 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Starting sample 200 200 200 200 200 1000 
Less:       
Annual reports in foreign currency 37 43 47 51 47 225 
Missing records in Connect4 or 
corporate website 
33 17 17 7 10 85 
Other missing values in control 
variables 
7 4 0 3 4 690 
Final sample 123 136 136 139 139 673 
Number of companies which 
voluntarily disclosed executive 
remuneration change and used 
attribution in their explanation. 
56 38 50 52 44 240 
 
 
5.3.2 Model Specification and Variables Description 
The main hypotheses of type of attribution and the extent of attribution are tested by 
using logit regression and ordinary least square regression models, respectively. 
 
Model 1: Voluntary disclosure of attribution for executive remuneration change = α + 
β1 Remuneration committee characteristics × pre-crisis/during/post-
crisis + β2PBIND + β3ROA + β4LTA + β5DEBT + β6PBOOK + β7TOP20 




where the variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Variable Description and Measurement 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Dependent variable(s) 
ATRD Attribution decision Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 if the firm has provided a narrative 
disclosure on their “action” on executive 
remuneration in their annual report (i.e., 
remuneration increase, decrease or 
freeze) and attributed the reason to 
external factors, and 0 otherwise 
(internal factors). 
ATRINX Attribution index Attribution index, a composite score 
measuring the extent of attribution 
ranging between 1 and 4, with 1 
indicating the external attribution and 4 
indicating internal attribution including 
financial (indicators) and non-financial 
(quantitative other than financial) 
information. 
Test Variables   
RCS Remuneration 
committee size 
Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 if the number of members in the 
committee is greater than the median 




Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 if the proportion of independent 
members in the committee is greater 




Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 if the chairperson of the remuneration 




Dummy variable, which takes a value of 




Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 if the number of board meetings is 
greater than the median value, 0 
otherwise. 
Control Variables 
PBIND Proportion of 
independent directors 
on the board 
Number of independent directors on the 
board divided by board size. 
LTA Size Log of total assets. 
ROA Performance Return on assets measured as net income 
divided by total assets. 
PBOOK Price-to-Book  Price-to-book ratio is measured as 




TOP20 Top 20 shareholders Total ownership of the top 20 
shareholders. 
PREGFCD Pre-global financial 
crisis period 
Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 for period between 1 July 2006 to 30 
June 2008, 0 otherwise. 
GFCD Global financial crisis 
period 
Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 for period between 1 July 2008 to 30 
June 2009, 0 otherwise. 
POSTGFCD Post-global financial 
crisis period 
Dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 for period between 1 July 2009 to 30 
June 2011, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
5.3.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the model is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 
1 if the firm voluntarily disclosed the narrative executive remuneration change and 
attributed that to external factors, and is 0 otherwise (internal factors). From the 
descriptive statistics reported in Table 5.3, 43% of the total sample attributes internal 
factors for the actions with respect to executive remuneration; the remaining 57% 
attributes external factors for the actions of executive remuneration change. 
 
In the second model the attribution index is used as a dependent variable. This index 
is developed based on Aerts (1994). It is a continuous variable and is calculated by 
including the following three elements: (a) locus of causality (which takes a value of 
2 for internal and 1 for external; in other words, whether the causal factor is associated 
with corporate management’s action or responsibility, or with the events or agents 
outside the company); (b) nature of explanation, whether the explanation of events 
and performance is based on technical accounting terminology (1), or not (0); (c) 
expression of cause/effect, whether the cause or effect is expressed in accounting terms 




This chapter argues that developing an attribution index captures the extent of 
attribution used in the annual report for remuneration change disclosure. 
 
5.3.2.2 Independent variables: test variables 
The main variables of interest in this study are the different macroeconomic 
conditions: the pre-GFC period, the GFC period and post-GFC period, and the use of 
different attributions in the voluntary narrative disclosure of executive remuneration. 
 
The second main variables of interest in this study in relation to remuneration 
committee characteristics are: (a) the size of the remuneration committee (RCS); (b) 
the proportion of independent remuneration committee members; and (c) the number 
of remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET). 
 
5.3.2.3 Control variables 
In testing the hypotheses, and similar to other essays, this essay also includes five 
control variables in the regressions which can affect voluntary firm disclosures. The 
first control variable relates to board independence (PBIND), which is the proportion 
of non-executive independent directors on the board. Independent directors are 
employed as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between owners and 
managers (Fama and Jensen 1983). Thus, these variables provide incentives to make 
voluntary disclosures in order to minimise legal exposure to risks related to poor 
management and managerial opportunism (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). Given 
that the value of having independent directors is dependent on their reputation as 
experts (Fama and Jensen 1983), such directors are more likely to insist on greater 
voluntary disclosure, as such acts are seen by other stakeholders as being transparent 
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and signalling to the market that they are fulfilling their responsibilities and duties 
(Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, with reference to most prior studies (see, e.g., Ferguson, 
Lam and Lee 2002; Gul and Leung 2004; Ho and Wong 2001), this essay includes firm 
size, which is measured as the natural log of total assets (LTA). There are three reasons 
for this: (a) larger firms are expected to voluntarily disclose more information than 
smaller firms in order to reduce information asymmetry which becomes more 
prevalent when firms grow larger (Jensen and Meckling 1976); (b) larger firms are 
usually more sensitive to political costs and thus will disclose more information to 
alleviate public criticism; and (c) larger firms are expected to disclose more 
information as the amount of damage arising from litigation is dependent on the size 
of the firm (Skinner 1994). It is well-documented in the prior literature that there is a 
positive relationship between company size and the amount or quality of disclosure 
(Cooke 1992; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994). 
 
Several studies use ratio of profit to total assets (ROA) in predicting voluntary 
disclosure (Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Ho and Wong 2001; Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). In line with these studies, ROA is included in 
the model, as better performing firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
information. The prior research indicates a weak relationship between disclosure levels 
and profitability (Ahmed and Courtis 1999); however, it will have a direct impact on 




In line with prior studies (Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; 
Ho and Wong 2001; Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995), 
price-to-book ratio (PBOOK) and top 20 shareholders (TOP20) are control variables. 
Price-to-book ratio is measured as the share’s market value divided by its book 
value.TOP20 is the ratio of top 20 shareholders’ shareholdings to total shares, and it is 
expected that firms with higher outside ownership will have more board representation 
which will lead to less voluntary disclosure (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). 
 
Attribution content is always determined, at least to a certain extent, by the industry in 
which the company belongs. In order to control for difference in attribution behaviour 
between industries, the sample is divided into eight broad industry categories. A 
dummy variable is created for financial and non-financial firms. Like most prior 
studies (Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Meek, Roberts 
and Gray 1995), this study controls for industry and year effects. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.3 provides the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) for the dependent, independent and control variables for the 
whole sample. It is interesting to note that of the sample of 240 observation of 
companies, only nine did not have a remuneration committee. The maximum number 
of remuneration committee members is nine, while the number of remuneration 





Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Total Sample (n=240) 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Dependent variable     
ATRD 0.57 1 0.50 0 1 
ATRINX 2.27 2 0.94 0 1 
Test Variables      
RCX 0.96 1 0.19 0 1 
RCQ(continuous) 4.08 3 1.39 0 5 
RCS(number of members) 3.2 3 1.33 0 9 
RCS(dummy) 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 
RCIND(continuous) 0.76 1 0.32 0 1 
RCIND(dummy) 0.53 1 0.5 0 1 
RCCHAIR 0.83 1 0.37 0 1 
RCEXPERT 0.66 1 0.47 0 1 
RCMEET(number of meetings) 3.73 4 2.5 0 20 
RCMEET(dummy) 0.34 0 0.47 0 1 
Control variables      
PBIND 0.7 0.75 0.24 0 1 
SIZE – total assets ($) 2.52E+10 3.38E+09 9.84E+10 3.54E+07 7.54E+11 
SIZE – natural log 21.97 21.94 1.67 17.38 27.35 
LIABILITY 2.17E+10 1.42E+09 9.30E+10 1.86E+06 7.12E+11 
ROA 7.26 6.34 10.1 -93.07 81.92 
PBOOK 2.84 1.82 7.64 -160.6 53.63 
TOP20 70.46 74.26 16.89 6.73 99.94 
5.4.2 Correlations 
Table 5.4 presents the Spearman correlation matrix with attribution of the 
remuneration decision, governance attributes and control variables. There is no 
multicollinearity problem with other independent variables as correlations are all 
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below 0.8. The proportion of independent directors also shows a negative correlation 
with the attribution coding (ATRC), which explains that independent directors will 
discharge their accountability and take responsibility for their own actions with 
internal attribution rather than external attribution. The profitable variable (ROA) has 
a negative correlation and shows that profitable firms will attribute remuneration 
change disclosure to internal factors. The remuneration committee quality index shows 
a significant positive correlation with ATRD, which demonstrates that the 
remuneration committee have attributed their actions to external factors. But this 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.3 Regression Results 
Table 5.5 presents the findings from the regression of attribution decision (ATRD) on 
remuneration committee characteristics, remuneration committees’ existence (RCX) 
and quality (RCQ), measured by an index including five dimensions of RCQ (size, 
independence, chairperson independence, financial expertise and diligence), as well as 
other company-specific control variables. 
 
Table 5.5, Estimation 1, shows the results for Hypothesis 1, which examines the 
association between different economic conditions, remuneration committee 
characteristics and ATRD. The results show that during the GFC the companies tend 
to attribute remuneration change to external factors on a voluntary basis. The variable 
GFCD is positive and strongly significant at the p<0.01 level. During the pre-crisis 
period, however, companies tend to attribute internal factors as reasons for 
remuneration change, which supports Hypothesis 1. 
 
The main control variable proportion of board independence shows the negative 
coefficient in the entire model, which explains that when there are more independent 
directors on the board they tend to attribute change to internal rather than external 
factors. 
 
Analysis in Table 5.6 replaces the dependent variable ATRD with an attribution index. 
The results show that during the GFC period the firms tend to disclose less, while in 




Estimations show that the firm-related control variable, firm size (LTA), is 
significantly related to ATRD. Thus, larger firms tend to attribute remuneration change 
disclosure to external factors. In all our estimations the results show consistent 
findings. 
 
Table 5.5: Regression Result for Attribution Decision 
Variable Estimation 1  Estimation 2  Estimation 3  Estimation 4  
         
RCSIZE -0.298  -0.271      
 0.199  0.201      
RCIND 0.145  0.023      
 0.208  0.237      
RCMEET 0.111 * 0.090      
 0.066  0.067      
RCCHAIRIND   0.552      
   0.662      
RCEXP   0.411      
   0.337      
RCX     0.378    
     0.695    
RCQ       0.204  
       0.134  
PBIND -1.163 * -1.040  -0.716  -0.973  
 0.698  0.702  0.632  0.658  
LTA 0.252 * 0.265 * 0.289 * 0.258  
 0.131  0.131  0.118  0.121  
ROA 0.025  0.027  0.026  0.028  
 0.023  0.022  0.021  0.022  
PBOOK -0.060  -0.052 * -0.060  -0.056  
 (0.050)  0.049  0.044  0.046  
TOP20 -0.008  -0.009  -0.008  -0.007  
 0.008  0.009  0.008  0.008  
INDUSTRY -0.721 * -0.693  -0.728 * -0.653  
 0.438  0.458  0.426  0.430  
GFCD 1.103 * 1.178 * 1.114 * 1.844 **
 0.397  0.415  0.402  0.415  
PREGFCD -0.364  -0.397  -0.430  -0.387  
 0.340  0.347  0.323  0.327  
_cons -3.641 * -4.455  -5.226 * -4.961 ** 
 2.797  2.790  2.648  2.626  
McFadden R2 0.104  0.113  0.09  0.09  
Log likelihood -144.83  -143.48  -147.09  -145.98  
N 240  240  240  240  
Variables are defined in Table 5.2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.1 using one-tailed 
test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. Reported 
are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
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Table 5.6: Regression Result for Attribution Index 
Variable Estimation 1  Estimation 2  Estimation 3  Estimation 4  
         
RCSIZE -0.012  -0.018      
 (0.085)  (1.018)      
RCIND 0.066  0.098      
 (0.080)  (0.093)      
RCMEET 0.033  0.037      
 (0.024)  (0.025)      
RCCHAIRI   -0.096      
   (0.268)      
RCEXP   -0.175      
   (0.133)      
RCX     0.252    
     (0.216)    
RCQ       0.017  
       (0.050)  
PBIND -0.190  -0.227  0.002  -0.027  
 (0.317)  (0.315)  (0.302)  (0.310)  
LTA -0.080 * -0.088 * -0.053  -0.053  
 (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.046)  
ROA 0.000  0.002  0.000  0.001  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
PBOOK 0.007  0.004  0.006  0.005  
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  
TOP20 4.67E * 2.80E  6.44E * 6.56E  
 (2.44E)  (2.74E)  (1.84E)  (1.83E)  
INDUSTRY 0.109  0.111  0.066  0.061  
 (0.175)  (0.175)  (0.171)  (0.172)  
GFCD -0.459 * -0.484 ** -0.452 * -0.452 **
 (0.153)  (0.156)  (0.153)  (0.153)  
PREGFCD 0.290 * 0.297 ** 0.252 * 0.262  
 (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.145)  (0.146)  
_cons 3.832 * 4.160 ** 3.161 * 3.344 ** 
 (1.009)  (1.018)  (0.962)  (0.973)  
R2 0.10  0.11  0.09  0.09  
F statistic 2.330  2.120  2.600  2.525  
N 240  240  240  240  
Variables are defined in Table 5.2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.1 using one-tailed 
test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. Reported 
are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
 
In Table 5.7, when the remuneration committee characteristics are interacted with 
voluntary narrative increase disclosure in Estimation 1, remuneration committee 
independence is negative and significant (p<0.01). It indicates firms with more 
independent directors on the remuneration committee attribute increased remuneration 
action to internal factors, rather than external factors. However, when remuneration 
characteristics are interacted with remuneration action of freeze, remuneration 




In the next analysis the attribution decision is replaced with an attribution index in 
Estimations 2 and 4. In Estimation 2 when remuneration increase action is interacted 
with remuneration committee characteristics, remuneration committee independence 
and remuneration committee meetings are positively significant in the attribution 
index. It shows that when there is increased remuneration disclosure, remuneration 
committee independence and meetings have a significant influence. However, when 
freeze remuneration action is interacted with remuneration committee characteristics, 
again, the remuneration committee independence shows a significant effect on the 
attribution content. During the GFC period, however, the company’s extent of 
explanation to external attribution is negatively significant. It shows that during the 
GFC the most common action is to freeze remuneration and the extent of attribution is 
less. So, this study concludes that companies tend to explain and justify their increase 























Table 5.7: ATRD and ATRINX Interact with Type of Voluntary Increase Disclosure 
(VDI) and Voluntary Freeze Disclosure (VDF) 
Variable Estimation 1  Estimation 2  Estimation 3  Estimation 4  
 ATRD VDI  ATRINX VDI  ATRD VDF  ATRINX VDF  
RCSIZE*VDI -0.048  0.008  -0.161  -0.122  
 (0.148)  (0.051)  (0.272)  (0.086)  
RCIND*VDI -0.439 * 0.130 * -0.079  0.218 * 
 (0.195)  (0.064)  (0.335)  (0.118)  
RCMEET*VDI 0.011  0.071 * 0.081  -0.025  
 (0.068)  (0.025)  (0.107)  (0.033)  
RCCHAIRIND*VDI 1.009  -0.259  0.187  -0.390  
 (0.705)  (0.283)  (0.924)  (0.386)  
RCEXP*VDI 0.155  -0.302 * 0.643  -2.48  
 (0.416)  (0.168)  (0.503)  (0.190)  
         
PBIND -0.411  -0.270  -0.799  0.055  
 (0.647)  (0.298)  (0.664)  (0.297)  
LTA 0.294  -0.058  0.290 * -0.036  
 (0.125)  (0.068)  (0.119)  (0.043)  
ROA 0.027  0.001  0.027  -0.000  
 (0.023)  (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.007)  
PBOOK -0.059  0.002  -0.064  0.007  
 (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.047)  (0.018)  
TOP20 -0.011  0.000 * -0.007  0.000 *
 (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000)  
INDUSTRY -0.669  0.020  -0.736  0.017  
 (0.442)  (0.165)  (0.4333)  (0.180)  
GFCD 0.979 * -0.342 * 1.105 * -0.290 * 
 (0.41)7  (0.154)  (0.429)  (0.161)  
PREGFCD -0.3734  0.193  -0.379  0.185  
 (0.335)  (0.143)  (0.334)  (0.143)  
_cons -4.849 * 3.828 * -5.017 * 3.195  
 (2.759)  (0.971)  (2.70)  (0.963)  
R2 0.11  0.17  0.10  0.14  
Log likelihood/F -143.65  3.571  -145.46  2.916  
N 240  240  240  240  
Variables are defined in Table 5.2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.1 using one-tailed test. 
Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. Reported are 
the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
 
5.4.3.1 Further analysis 
In order to make the three essays consistent, this study tests the first essay’s variable 
of interest, that is, the existence of a remuneration committee (RCX), which is a 
dichotomous variable and takes a value of 1 denoting the existence of a remuneration 
committee, and 0 otherwise. It is important to note that although the 2007 ASX 
Corporate Governance Council formally recommends that boards establish a 
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remuneration committee, it is voluntary for the sample period. Thus, it is interesting to 
note almost all the companies (96%) in the sample had a remuneration committee. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the second main variable of interest in the first essay, RCQ 
(remuneration committee quality), is also tested in this chapter. It is a composite 
measure consisting of five characteristics of a remuneration committee, namely: (a) 
size of the remuneration committee (RCS); (b) majority of the remuneration committee 
members are independent (RCIND); (c) independence of the remuneration committee 
chairman (RCCHAIRIND); (d) number of remuneration committee meetings 
(RCMEET); and (e) at least one member in the remuneration committee has financial 
expertise (RCEXP). In the selection and construction of these five RCQ constructs, 
this study referred to the ASX Corporate Governance Remuneration Principle (RCS, 
RCIND, RCCHAIRIND) and prior literature (Gillan 2006) for RCMEET; and 
(Hermanson, Tompkins, Veliyath and Ye 2012 for RCEXP).  
 
 From Table 5.3, the sample’s remuneration committee size mean (and median) is three 
members. The size of the remuneration committee (RCS) is a dummy variable and 
takes a value of 1 if the number of members in the remuneration committee is greater 
than the variable’s sample median, and 0 otherwise. The variable remuneration 
committee independence (RCIND) is a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the 
proportion of independent members is greater than the sample’s median. On average, 
76% of remuneration committee members are independent, while 50% of the 
remuneration committees have 100% independent members. The dummy variable 
remuneration committee chairperson independence, RCCHAIRIND, is coded 1 if the 
remuneration committee chairperson is independent. It is interesting to note that more 
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than 80% of the sample’s remuneration committee chairpersons are independent. In 
terms of frequency of meetings, on average (the median) remuneration committees 
met four times annually, thus the variable RCMEET takes a value of 1 if the number 
of remuneration committee meetings is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. The 
fifth variable is remuneration committee financial expertise, RCEXP, which is a 
dichotomous variable and takes a value of 1 if the remuneration committee consists of 
at least one financial expert, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Finally, to obtain the overall RCQ score, the scores for each of the five constructs 
(RCS, RCIND, RCCHAIRIND, RCMEET and RCFINEXP) are added together 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Prawitt, Smith and Wood 2009). 
 
The results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, in Estimations 3 and 4, show that the remuneration 
committee existence and quality show a positive correlation with attribution decisions 
and extent of attributions but it is not statistically significant. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to increase our understanding of executive remuneration 
action disclosures in annual reports. Narrative disclosures in annual reports are 
preferred to other forms of textually mediated communication because they are 
targeted toward the organisation’s relevant audience, as opposed to the general public. 
Further, their proximity to the audited financial statements provides them with a 
measure of credibility not afforded to other forms of organisational communication 
(Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 1998). These features, along with the control the 
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organisation has over the design of the annual report, allow it to design the narrative 
disclosure of executive remuneration actions. 
 
This chapter finds support that the companies attribute their remuneration action to 
external factors more often during the crisis period than in the pre- and post-crisis 
periods. In addition, potential risks to their own reputation and the risk of litigation 
faced by remuneration committee members make them work effectively to influence 
the preparation of annual reports and to voluntarily disclose their attribution of 
executive remuneration. The results support the view embodied in legitimacy theory 
that organisations will be penalised if they do not operate in a manner consistent with 
community expectations. The findings in this chapter support this view. During the 
crisis period, generally, organisations voluntarily disclosed executive remuneration 
freezes which they attributed to external factors. However, during the pre-crisis period, 
organisations attributed remuneration increases to internal factors. The financial 
expertise of remuneration committee members has a significant influence on internal 
attribution. When the financial expertise of the remuneration committee member is 
interacted with remuneration action attribution, the results reveal that remuneration 
committees with at least one member with financial expertise tend to attribute the 
remuneration change internally. In other words, they take responsibility for their own 
actions rather than finding excuses by attributing externally. 
 
However, this study did not find support for the existence of a remuneration committee 
or the quality of a remuneration committee having an effect on attribution. The results 
show remuneration committee existence (RCX) and quality having a positive but 




This chapter extends the limited research on impression management attribution 
strategy in voluntary executive remuneration disclosure. In Australia, Mather and 
Ramsay (2007) found that boards with a higher proportion of independent directors 
appear to be more effective. However, this chapter extends the current literature on 
impression management by including different macroeconomic periods. Furthermore, 
external attribution tends to take place more during the crisis period than in the pre-
GFC period. This tends to continue in the post-crisis period but not significantly. This 
understanding, in turn, has implications for various stakeholders, including auditors, 
the standards-setters and regulatory bodies for their decision-making in relation to 
policymaking and the implementation of executive remuneration action. The results 
show that accounting narratives in the annual report, like other financial accounting 
performance variables, may be subject to impression management (Clatworthy and 
Jones 2006). This is an important issue given the non-audited nature of accounting 
narratives in an annual report. Impression management in the current study refers to 
attempts to shape the impressions of relevant stakeholders through the provision of 
executive remuneration actions, but says nothing about the truth or falsity of these 
disclosures. 
 
As discussed at the end of Chapter 4, the findings of this study have limitations. First, 
this study only examines the top 200 listed firms in Australia; therefore, the findings 
may not be applicable to all listed firms or non-listed firms. Second, the analysis is 
based on annual reports; integration of other disclosures, such as press releases, may 
provide more comprehensive information. Future research could focus on the 
complementary roles of other sub-committees on attribution, and extend the 
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investigation to determine the attribution on the degree of change in total 




Chapter 6: The Influence of Remuneration Committee 
Existence and Quality on CEO Compensation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The issue of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has attracted considerable 
attention from media and governments all over the world, both during and after the 
GFC. The enormous remuneration packages received by some executives raised 
questions about their structure and components. This encouraged the Australian 
Government to appoint a Productivity Commission to examine the gap between 
executive and other employee compensation. Their report recommends that corporate 
governance should be strengthened through: the introduction of an independent 
remuneration committee; measures to promote board accountability; and enhancement 
and increased pay disclosure (Australian Productivity Commission, 2009).12 The rapid 
increase in executive pay over the past thirty years has contributed to an inevitable 
debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argued 
that a high level of executive compensation is the result of powerful managers setting 
their own pay; the competing argument is that high compensation is necessary to 
attract managerial talent in executive positions. The CEO compensation of the top 300 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms reached its maximum level in 2007. 
It then started decreasing and reached its minimum point in 2009. From 2010 onwards 
it has slowly shown a positive trend (Financial Review, Survey, 2013). 
 
                                                 
12 In Australia, the finance industry (banks) came under more scrutiny than other industries as a result 
of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority extending governance requirements for remuneration 
for APRA-regulated firms. 
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Accordingly, this study examines the role of corporate governance in the form of the 
existence and quality of remuneration committees on CEO compensation. This issue 
has already been discussed in Chapter 4, but a brief summary is provided here for the 
reader’s convenience.  
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends that remuneration committees 
have at least three members, the majority of whom are independent, and that the 
committee is chaired by an independent director. The Corporations Act 2001 also 
stipulates that the board is responsible for determining the compensation of the CEO 
and senior executives. However, the board could appoint a remuneration committee as 
it is seen as an efficient mechanism for focusing the company on appropriate 
compensation policy. A remuneration committee can be a more efficient mechanism 
than a full board for focusing a company on appropriate compensation policies, which 
are designed to meet the needs of the company, and to enhance corporate and 
individual performance.  
 
The existence of a remuneration committee should not be seen as implying a 
fragmentation or diminution of the responsibilities of the board as a whole (Corporate 
Governance Recommendation 8, 2010). Thus, this study argues that the remuneration 
committees, by making recommendations about executive compensation to the main 
board, are playing an important role in the determination of executive compensation. 
CEO compensation is influenced by the existence and the quality of the remuneration 
committees as a key corporate governance mechanism established by the board. The 
two key research questions addressed in this study are: (a) Does remuneration 
committee existence (RCX) have a significant association with total CEO 
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compensation? and (b) Does the quality of remuneration committees (RCQ) have a 
significant impact on total CEO compensation?. 
 
RCQ is based on a composite measure of five dimensions/characteristics of the 
remuneration committee, which include the size of the remuneration committee (RCS), 
the independence of remuneration committee members (RCIND), the independence of 
the remuneration committee chairperson (RCCHAIRIND), the diligence (frequency of 
meetings) of the remuneration committee (RCMEET), and the financial expertise of 
the remuneration committee members (RCEXP). 
 
The motivation for this study is two-fold. First, prior international studies have 
investigated corporate governance quality by considering one or two remuneration 
committee characteristics and the association between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. The results are mixed, however, which shows the need for further 
investigation in this area. For example, Newman and Mozes (1999) examined the 
relationship between remuneration committees comprised of what they call ‘inside 
directors’ (as opposed to independent members) and CEO compensation, and found 
no evidence to support the claim that CEO compensation is high when there are more 
inside directors on a remuneration committee. However, they found that the 
relationship between compensation and stock returns is significantly lower for firms 
with at least one ‘insider’ on a remuneration committee than for a remuneration 
committee without an insider, when stock returns are negative. But they failed to find 
similar evidence for firms with positive stock returns. According to their study, 





Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998) examined the relationship between the 
composition of remuneration committees and CEO compensation for 194 Fortune 500 
US firms between 1991 and 1994. They found no evidence of changes in compensation 
when remuneration committee composition varies in the firm. The prior year’s pay 
was a significant factor influencing the current pay, and firm size significantly and 
positively influenced CEO compensation. 
 
Conyon and Peck (1998) also investigated the link between remuneration committee 
composition and top management compensation for 94 UK firms, from 1991 to 1994. 
Interestingly, their results indicate that the percentage of outside directors on the 
remuneration committee is positively related to top management pay. O'Reilly III, 
Main and Crystal (1988) examined 105 Fortune 500 firms and found a positive 
association between CEO compensation and the compensation levels of outside 
directors serving on the remuneration committee. 
 
Main, O'Reilly III and Wade (1995) found that CEO compensation is higher when a 
CEO’s tenure is longer than that of the chair of the remuneration committee. Anderson 
and Bizjak (2003), on the other hand, found little evidence to support the claim that 
CEO participation on the remuneration committee was detrimental to the shareholders 
of fifty firms with CEO participation in the remuneration committee, and without CEO 
participation on the remuneration committee, from 1985 to 1998, in a random sample 
of 110 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Overall, they suggest that 
regulations governing committee structure may not reduce levels of pay or achieve 




In recent studies in the Australian context, Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) 
investigated whether rent extraction or labour demands explain CEO compensation 
levels in Australia from 1999 to 2001 in the top 200 ASX-listed firms. They found 
governance, ownership attributes and economic attributes are significant determinants 
of CEO compensation, and these attributes differently determine the various 
components of CEO compensation. They found that the determination of fixed salary 
and share-based compensation reflects the firm’s demand for a high quality CEO and 
the CEO’s ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly 
for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. 
 
Cybinski and Windsor (2013) studied 143 companies from ASX top 300 companies 
during 2001, and provided evidence that firm size is an important factor in determining 
whether the remuneration committee aligns CEO remuneration with the firm’s 
financial performance. The large firm remuneration committees align both total 
remuneration and CEO bonuses with firm financial performance at all levels of 
remuneration committee independence, although the most effective committees have 
no executive directors. Remuneration committees of smaller firms are ineffective in 
reducing the conflicts of interest in relation to CEO total remuneration and bonuses for 
financial performance, irrespective of their independence. They found mixed results 
for medium-size firms. Remuneration committees with a majority of non-executive 
directors link CEO total remuneration with financial performance, and remuneration 





Schultz, Tian and Twite (2013) studied 8,594 firm-year observations in ASX-listed 
firms, from 2000 to 2010. They highlighted the blockholders’ role in shaping the 
pay/performance association and that their impact varies with their independence and 
magnitude of ownership. They found a strong association between CEO compensation 
and corporate performance. They also provided evidence on the following: monitoring 
shareholders increase the sensitivity of long-term at-risk remuneration to changes in 
shareholders’ wealth; the board size affects the sensitivity of both known pay and long-
term at-risk pay to performance;  and there is a strong relationship between governance 
and sensitivity of cash bonuses to accounting-based performance. 
 
The research on remuneration committee existence and quality on CEO compensation 
in the Australian context is limited. The one exception is Clarkson, Van Bueren and 
Walker (2006), who examined CEO remuneration disclosure in Australia from 1998 
to 2004 for a randomly-selected sample of 124 firms, and found that firm size, 
corporate governance,13 auditor quality, cross-listing status and public scrutiny as 
significant explanations of remuneration disclosure quality when compared with 
international studies (USA: Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Sun and Cahan 2009; Sun, 
Cahan and Emanuel 2009; Vafeas 2003; UK: Main and Johnston 1993). This review 
of prior literature reveals that few studies have directly examined the existence and 
characteristics of remuneration committees on CEO compensation, but no Australian 
studies have examined the quality of remuneration committees as a single quality index 
                                                 
13 Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker (2006) estimated the corporate governance using a factor analysis based on 
four corporate governance measures: the proportion of independent directors, independent audit committee 
members, independent remuneration committee members and whether the CEO is also a chairman of the board.  
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as it is believed that the interaction of remuneration committee characteristics is likely 
to have the most impact on CEO compensation.14 
 
The second motivation of this study is to address this gap in the prior research. It aims 
to contribute to the evolving literature in at least two ways. First, this study investigates 
the relationship between the remuneration committee (existence and quality) and CEO 
total compensation in the Australian setting where the formation of remuneration 
committees is voluntary. 
 
There are two main views about CEO compensation: the labour demand theory argues 
that CEO compensation level is optimal, reflecting a firm’s demand for labour and 
alignment of CEO and shareholders’ interests. The alternative view, the rent extraction 
theory, argues that CEO compensation level is excessive reflecting the CEO’s power 
to extract private benefits in excess of the optimal contract (Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon 2006). Specifically, agency theory is used to argue that compensation 
contracts will be designed to avoid conflicts between managers and owners by 
realigning the incentives of the agents with those of the principal, and by designing an 
optimal contract to reduce the agency cost (Jensen and Murphy 1990). 
 
Second, this chapter also pays particular attention to CEO compensation during the 
recent economic crisis of the GFC. Governments throughout the world announced 
enquiries and sought to further regulate executive compensation practices and 
disclosure obligations. In Australia, two highly visible outcomes of the 2009 economic 
                                                 
14 Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) examined audit committee quality (ACE), a proxy for governance quality on 
audit fees and non-audit service fees and found a significant positive association between audit committee quality 
and audit fees for larger clients. The ACE is a composite measure, which includes audit committee independence, 
expertise, diligence and size. 
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downturn were intense scrutiny by regulators and the prevalence of announcements by 
firms regarding executive pay freezes or reductions from 2009 to 2010 (Productivity 
Commission 2009). However, Australian firms’ CEO remuneration in this critical 
period, and particularly in relation to firm-level governance mechanisms (such as the 
remuneration committee), remains an empirical issue. 
 
This study is based on a sample of 561 firm-year observations over a period of five 
years from 2007 to 2011, drawn from a sample of the Top 200 ASX companies. The 
findings show a significant positive association between RCQ and CEO total 
compensation. Overall, the findings suggest two new measures should be included: 
diligence (the number of remuneration committee meetings) and financial expertise, 
in addition to the existing corporate governance recommendations, to strengthen the 
remuneration committee role in determining CEO compensation. 
 
This chapter extends and contributes to the prior literature in a number of ways. First, 
while studies on executive compensation are plentiful, prior literature on remuneration 
committees is relatively limited (Hermanson, Tompkins, Veliyath and Ye 2012). A 
more in-depth understanding of the impact of remuneration committees on the extent 
of CEO total compensation is critical for identifying how critical board sub-
committees work to affect governance outcomes, such as recommending or 
determining CEO compensation. In addition, although prior archival studies relating 
to remuneration committee characteristics have investigated a number of 
compensation-related outcomes such as compensation disclosure, CEO/executive 
compensation and stock options (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Bebchuk, Grinstein 
and Peyer 2010; Collins, Gong and Li 2009; Conyon and Lerong 2004; Daily, Johnson, 
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Ellstrand and Dalton 1998; Laksmana 2008; Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010; Sapp 
2008; Sun and Cahan 2009; Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009), none of these studies has 
investigated the critical issue of existence and quality of remuneration committees as 
a single index in influencing CEO compensation. In addition, this study is based in a 
less-regulated corporate governance environment (Australia) where the formation of 
remuneration committees over the sample period is voluntary.15 It thus extends the 
research conducted in more regulated environments, such as the USA. Third, with the 
exception of Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009), most of the 
prior research on remuneration committee quality variables has been tested in isolation 
with reference to the firm performance or to a specific compensation disclosure (see, 
Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary 2007; Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010). This essay 
examines remuneration committee quality based on a composite measure of five 
dimensions of remuneration committee characteristics, which are mainly based on 
corporate governance guidelines, as it is believed the interaction of these 
characteristics is likely to have the most impact on remuneration committee quality. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the 
background of the study and Section 6.3 outlines the development of hypotheses. 
Section 6.4 describes the sample collection and model development. Section 6.5 
outlines and analyses the results. Finally, in Section 6.6, conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
                                                 
15 There has been some development towards mandatory requirement for the formation and composition 
of remuneration committees in Australia.  Effective from 1 July 2011, ASX300 firms are required to 
have a remuneration committee consisting solely of non-executive directors (ASX Listing Rule 12.8). 
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6.2 Background: Australian Regulatory and Corporate Governance 
Practices 
In Australia, all listed companies are regulated by the Corporations Act 2001. The 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) is responsible for 
administering the Corporations Act. The Corporations Act has undergone several 
significant reforms from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. Significantly, in 1998 the 
government introduced the Company Law Review Act (CLRA 98), which mandated 
disclosure of compensation packages of all directors and the five highest paid 
executives. In July 2004 the Corporations Act was amended based on the Company 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9). All listed companies are now required 
to disclose directors’ and executive compensation via a separate compensation report 
for a non-binding vote by shareholders, at the annual general meeting, on the 
acceptance or non-acceptance of proposed management compensation. In 2011, the 
Corporations Act was amended by incorporating a two-strike rule to hold directors 
accountable for executive salaries and bonuses. The company board can face an 
election if shareholders disagree about how much executives are being paid. The first 
strike occurs when at least 25% of shareholders cast a ‘no’ vote on the company’s 
compensation report in the annual general meeting. The second strike occurs when a 
subsequent compensation report also receives a ‘no’ vote from at least 25% of 
shareholders in the annual general meeting. When the second strike occurs, 
shareholders vote at the annual general meeting to determine whether all the directors 
of the company should stand for re-election. If this special resolution is passed with at 
least 50% the meeting to re-elect the directors must take place within 90 days. 
However, it is worth noting that this resolution was only introduced in 2011, at the end 
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of the timeframe of this study. As a result, the impact of this resolution is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 
In addition to the Corporations Act requirements there are accounting standards which 
regulate the transparency of executive compensation. AASB 1034 ‘Financial 
Reporting, Presentation and Disclosure’ was released in 1999 and subsequently 
withdrawn in 2004. It required that reporting entities disclose aggregate executive 
compensation with information about shares held by them. In 2004, the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board issued AASB 1046 ‘Directors and Executive Disclosure 
by Disclosing Entities’. It was withdrawn in 2005 and many of the requirements were 
incorporated in AASB 124 ‘Related Party Disclosures’. AASB 1046 detailed further 
requirements about directors’ and executive compensation, including the components 
of compensation. Therefore, in the Australian context, AASB 124 specifically requires 
that Reporting Entities disclose key management personnel compensation in total and 
for each of the following categories: short-term employment benefits; post-employment 
benefits; other long-term benefits; termination benefits and share-based payments. 
Share-based payments are covered by a separate accounting standard: AASB 2 ‘Share-
Based Payments’, which was issued in 2005. 
 
The ASX also plays an important role in suggesting best practice in terms of executive 
compensation. The ASX issued its first corporate principles of good corporate 
governance and best practice recommendations in March 2003. The guidelines contain 
ten essential corporate governance principles and 28 best practice recommendations, 
including the need to remunerate fairly in the light of corporate performance. Since 
corporate governance is a dynamic force that keeps evolving, the council’s challenge 
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is to ensure that its principles and recommendations remain relevant to the Australian 
business and investment communities. The revised principles and recommendations 
are part of this process of keeping up to date with the changing business environment. 
In August 2007 the ASX Corporate Governance Council issued a revised document 
which came into effect in January 2008. The ASX noted that there was no drastic 
change to the corporate governance principles issued in 2003. The phrase ‘best 
practices’ was removed to eliminate any perception that its principles are prescriptive 
and to encourage companies to adopt alternative practices and ‘if not, why not’ where 
appropriate (ASX media release on 2 August 2007). The ASX has since published 
corporate governance principles and recommendations with the 2010 amendments 
(2nd edition), which apply to an entity’s first financial year commencing on or after 1 
January 2011. All these guidelines are presented in Appendix A. 
 
The corporate governance principles provide guidance to companies and investors on 
best practice to increase the transparency of listed companies. According to ASX 
Listing Rule 4.10.3, listed companies need to provide a statement disclosing the extent 
to which the entity has followed the recommendations set by the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council during the reporting period. If an entity has not followed all of 
the recommendations, the entity must identify those recommendations that have not 
been followed and give reasons for not following them. If a recommendation has been 
followed for only a part of the period, the entity must state the period during which it 
had been followed. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
recommends that remuneration committees have at least three members, the majority 
148 
 
of whom are independent, and to be chaired by an independent director. The 
Corporations Act 2001 also stipulates that the board is responsible for determining the 
compensation of the CEO and senior executives. However, the board could appoint 
the remuneration committee as it is seen as an efficient mechanism for focusing the 
company on appropriate compensation policy. 
 
As per the recommended best practices, companies should clearly distinguish the 
structure of non-executive directors’ compensation from that of executive directors 
and senior executives. The accompanying commentary to this recommendation states 
that: “executive directors’ and senior executives’ compensation packages should 
involve a balance between fixed and incentive pay, reflecting short- and long-term 
performance objectives appropriate to the company’s circumstances and goals. This 
recommendation sets out guidelines for executive compensation packages and it 
includes: fixed compensation, performance-based compensation, equity-based 
compensation, termination payments”. Corporate Governance and Recommendation 
with 2010 amendments, 2nd edition, recommendation 8.3 p. 37). 
 
In the agency framework it is argued that effective corporate governance practices 
mitigate agency cost by providing executive compensation incentives (Gillan 2006; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez 2009). Corporate governance 
practices are introduced to reduce agency problems and to ensure that managers act in 
the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, Hart (1995) 
argues that it is impossible to address all possible actions and outcomes through 
compensation contracts. This chapter investigates the role of the remuneration 




6.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
6.3.1 Existence of Remuneration Committee 
As discussed in Chapter 4, boards can either conduct their work through the full board 
or delegate their authority to a standing committee reporting to the board. Board 
committees meet separately from the board and are composed of subsets of board 
members. Having a remuneration committee is consistent with agency theory, which 
suggests that management should be separated from control (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
The remuneration committee’s role in the executive compensation decision process is 
to either determine executive compensation or make recommendations to the full 
board of directors (Newman and Mozes 1999). The importance of the remuneration 
committee in CEO compensation decisions is supported empirically (Main, O'Reilly 
III and Wade 1995). Laux and Laux (2009) argue it is beneficial for the shareholder if 
a committee is formed and the task of setting pay is delegated to a remuneration 
committee and the oversight task to an audit committee. 
 
Jensen (1993) noted that “the job of the board is to hire and fire and compensate the 
CEO and to provide high-level counsel”. Deliberation about and the determination of 
top management pay though is often delegated to a subgroup of the main board, the 
compensation or the remuneration committee. The theoretical importance of a 
remuneration committee is clear; its absence creates an opportunity for senior 
executives to award themselves pay rises that are not congruent with shareholder 
interest (Conyon and Peck 1998). Singh and Harianto (1989) emphasised that the most 
important means of facilitating the decision-making process of the board is the creation 
of various committees such as an executive remuneration committee. Cybinski and 
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Windsor (2013) researched a sample of 123 ASX 300 companies in 2001 and found a 
link between larger firms’ remuneration committees with CEO total compensation and 
bonuses and with the firm’s financial performance. Schultz, Tian and Twite (2013) 
found that the existence of a remuneration committee has a positive impact on total 
CEO compensation. Hence, this chapter argues that the existence of a remuneration 
committee, potentially, has an important positive role in the exercise of board control, 
and will influence the total compensation of senior management, including the CEO, 
to minimise agency conflict. Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the existence of a 
compensation committee (RCX) and total CEO compensation. 
 
6.3.2 Remuneration Committee Quality 
Sun and Cahan (2009) researched a sample of 812 US firms, and found that CEO cash 
compensation is more positively associated with earnings when firms have a high-
quality remuneration committee. Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009), in examining 
whether the association between future firm performance and CEO stock option grants 
is affected by the quality of the remuneration committee, used six remuneration 
committee attributes (the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the 
incumbent CEO; the proportion of directors with at least ten years’ board service; the 
proportion of directors who are CEOs at other companies; the aggregate shareholding 
of directors on the remuneration committee; the proportion of directors with three or 
more additional board seats; and the size of the committee) to measure the quality of 
the remuneration committee. The findings from their study show that as the quality of 
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the remuneration committee improves, the firm’s future performance is related 
positively to stock option grants.  
 
Using a similar argument, a committee with high governance quality can be expected 
to mitigate agency problems and, thus, align the incentives of the managers to the 
owners of the firm. This study measures the effect of remuneration committee quality 
on CEO total compensation and its components, based on the above argument. It uses 
a composite measure for remuneration committee quality; that is, the independence of 
remuneration committee members, the size of the remuneration committee, the 
remuneration committee chairman’s independence, financial expertise, and diligence 
(the number of meetings). Because remuneration committee quality will result in better 
design of executive compensation arrangements and, ultimately, lead to better firm 
performance, Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) argue (p. 1507) that high-quality 
remuneration committees “are capable of designing and implementing compensation 
arrangements that will lead to stronger incentives for subsequent performance, and 
reduce the capacity of CEOs to extract rents”. The rationale for this argument is that a 
firm’s good corporate governance practice is reflected in the quality of its 
remuneration committee which enhances the performance alignment with CEO cash 
compensation. Therefore, this study argues that remuneration committee quality 
potentially has an important positive influence on incentive alignment to minimise the 
agency cost. Thus, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the quality of a 




6.3.2.1 Remuneration Committee Size (RCS) and Total CEO Compensation 
Board size affects the overall behaviour of committees. Bushman, Chen, Engel and 
Smith (2004) argue that larger boards have the advantage of more advisors and can 
monitor the management better, whereas, and smaller remuneration committees may 
experience a shortage of advisors and monitors of management. Larger remuneration 
committees have more resources to construct, evaluate and monitor CEO 
compensation to ensure alignment with the goals of the shareholders and the 
performance of the company (Nelson, Gallery and Percy 2010). Larger groups may 
create more opportunity for dialogue and are more likely to consider minority views 
(Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao and Hinsz 1990). Crystal (1991) argues that the board 
of directors is ineffective in setting an appropriate level of compensation because 
outside directors are hired and fired by the CEO. On the other hand, large group 
dynamic problems may hinder board of directors in reaching a consensus on important 
decisions and may put a barrier on the ability of the board to control management 
(Golden and Zajac, 2001).  Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) find that smaller boards 
perform better than larger boards. 
 
 However, Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) find that board size significantly and 
positively influences total CEO compensation. They argue this could be a reflection of 
monitoring difficulties increasing with the size of the board, or be due to the demand 
for quality CEOs who can manage large and complex businesses (Bushman, Chen, 
Engel and Smith 2004). Thus, this study expects that a larger remuneration committee 




H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the remuneration 
committee size and total CEO compensation. 
 
6.3.2.2 Remuneration Committee Independence (RCIND) and Total CEO 
Compensation 
An important explanatory variable for a managerial power model is the composition 
of the remuneration committee (Gregory-Smith 2012). However, he failed to find any 
statistical relationship between CEO remuneration and the independence of members 
on the remuneration committee. The ASX Corporate Governance Council 
recommends that the remuneration committee should have a majority of independent 
directors. The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2010, p. 16) defines an 
independent director as a “non–executive director who is not a member of management 
and who is free of any business or other relationship that could materially interfere 
with – or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with – the independent 
exercise of their judgement”. But the empirical findings to date show little agreement 
on the impact of different governance factors on executive compensation. For 
example, Newman and Mozes (1999) examined the relationship between the 
remuneration committee inside directors and CEO compensation, and found no 
evidence to support the claim that CEO compensation is high when there are more 
‘inside’ directors on the remuneration committee. Similar findings were made by 
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998). Conyon and Peck (1998) also 
investigated the link between remuneration committee composition and top 
management compensation for 94 UK firms, from 1991 to 1994. Interestingly, their 
results indicate that the fraction of outside directors in the remuneration committee is 
positively related to top management pay. O'Reilly III, Main and Crystal (1988) 
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examined 105 Fortune 500 firms and found a positive association between CEO 
compensation and the compensation level of outside directors serving on the 
remuneration committee. In a similar study, Newman and Mozes (1999) reveal that 
the level of CEO pay is significantly higher, and the pay/performance relationship 
significantly lower, when the remuneration committee contains at least one insider. 
Sapp (2008) found that an increase in the number of independent members of the 
remuneration committee is related to an increase in the level of CEO total 
compensation. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) provide evidence that remuneration 
committee independence does not have a significant influence on the level of CEO 
compensation in the US context. In a recent Australian study, Cybinski and Windsor 
(2013) found that independent remuneration committee association between the 
performance of the firm and total CEO compensation is significant and positive. 
Hence, 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration 
committee independence and total CEO compensation. 
 
6.3.2.3 Remuneration Committee Independent Chairman (RCCHAIRIND) and Total 
CEO Compensation 
The chair of a remuneration committee also plays a major role in dealing with various 
constituencies, both in terms of negotiating with senior management and liaising with 
compensation consultants (Main, Jackson, Pymm and Wright 2008). This makes the 
remuneration committee chairman’s role important in terms of time and also shaping 
the agenda and key recommendations put forward to the main board about executive 
compensation. The ASX Corporate Governance Council also recommends (Principle 
8.2, 2010) that an independent director chair the remuneration committee. This 
155 
 
approach is also consistent with those in the UK and the USA. Board independence 
(i.e., an independent chairperson and a majority of independent directors on the board) 
is almost universally viewed as a desirable corporate governance practice (Nelson, 
Gallery and Percy 2010). Hence, this study asserts a remuneration committee chaired 
by an independent director will influence the board on CEO compensation to minimise 
agency conflict: 
 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the remuneration 
committee independent chairman and total CEO compensation. 
 
6.3.2.4 Remuneration Committee Meeting (RCM) and Total CEO Compensation 
In this chapter the diligence of the remuneration committee is proxied by the number 
of remuneration committee meetings held in a reporting period. As the numbers of 
annual board meetings and sub-committee meetings are unregulated in Australia and 
there is a potential variation among firms, this variation provides an indication of the 
level of engagement required by directors in each firm (Bugeja, Fohn and Matolcsy 
2014). Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary (2007) argued that, in general, the higher the 
meeting frequency the more attentive are the directors, and this may link to moderate 
CEO pay. However, they failed to find a significant effect on CEO pay as a result of 
active remuneration committees in the financial sector in the Australian context. 
Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) argued and provided evidence that the remuneration 
committee meetings contribute to improved executive stock option disclosure in 
Australia. This chapter argues that active remuneration committees are more likely to 
exert a positive influence on the board about total CEO compensation. Therefore, this 




H2d: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration 
committee meetings and total CEO compensation. 
6.3.2.5 Remuneration Committee Financial Expertise (RCEXP) and Total CEO 
Compensation 
Like the number of board meetings, the need for financial expertise of board members 
is not regulated in Australia. As a result, this study argues that for a remuneration 
committee to be effective, its membership needs to include at least one member with 
relevant financial expertise. Financial knowledge is important for the members’ 
oversight roles in relation to financial reporting (Davidson III, Biao and Weihong 
2004). Sapp (2008) argues that a lack of financial expertise may decrease the 
committee’s ability to assess compensation packages. In this case the remuneration 
committee allows for an increase in CEO compensation packages. This study expects 
that a remuneration committee which has at least one member with financial expertise 
would be more concerned about total CEO compensation. This would influence 
remuneration committees in the process of determining the CEO compensation to 
minimise the agency conflict. Hence, the final hypothesis is: 
 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration 








6.4 Research Design 
6.4.1 Data Collection 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the initial sample is constructed from the Top 200 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms, based on market capitalisation, and 
spans the period from 2007 to 2011 (Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon 2006). Data were 
collected from Connect4 Boardroom, DatAnalysis and corporate websites. All 
remuneration committee governance variables and ownership variables are hand-
collected from directors and corporate governance reports, which form part of the 
annual report. Finally, the finance-related variables are extracted from the DatAnalysis 
database. 
From the initial sample, a number of observations were deleted due to: (a) annual 
reports being presented in a foreign currency, thus reducing comparability (Rankin 
2010); (b) negative compensation, as well as firms with an executive chairman 
(Bugeja, Fohn and Matolcsy 2014); and (c) missing annual reports and unavailability 
of data from the various sources used in the data collection process. The screening 
process led to a final sample consisting of 561 firm-year observations. Table 6.1, Panel 
A, shows the distribution of the sample for each year in the sample period, while Panel 
B outlines the final sample by industry sectors. Firm-years in the financial sector 
represent 23.35%, followed by the material sector with 19.43%. The smallest sectors 
include telecommunication (0.89%) and information technology (1.96%). All other 







Table 6.1: Sample Description 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Starting sample 200 200 200 200 200 1000 
Less:       
Annual reports in foreign currency 37 43 47 51 47 225 
Compensation paid by the parent 
company 
6 8 6 10 9 39 
Executive chairman and no CEO 8 6 7 10 6 38 
First year of incorporation no lag 
information 
0 5 1 2 2 10 
Missing records in Connect4 or 
corporate web site 
36 22 20 12 17 107 
Other missing values in control 
variables 
9 4 1 3 4 20 
Final sample 104 112 118 112 115 561 
Panel B: Industry Sector Classification 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Freq. percent 
Consumer Discretionary 11 10 16 17 17 71 12.66 
Consumer Staples 8 9 7 7 7 38 6.77 
Energy 10 16 15 13 11 65 11.59 
Financials 31 25 27 24 24 131 23.35 
Health Care 8 8 8 8 6 38 6.77 
Industrials 12 15 15 16 18 76 13.55 
Information Technology 2 2 3 1 3 11 1.96 
Materials 19 23 21 22 24 109 19.43 
Telecommunication 
Service 1 0 2 1 1 5 0.89 
Utilities 2 4 4 3 4 17 3.03 






6.4.2 Model Specification and Variables Description 
The main hypotheses on the association between remuneration committee (existence 
and quality) and total CEO compensation are tested by utilising the following OLS 
regression models: 
 
Model 1: Remuneration committee existence and total CEO compensation 
Total compensation = α + β1RCXt-1 + β2LTAt-1 + β3PBOOKt + β4ROAt-1 + 
β5STDROAt-1 + β6TLTAt-1 -1 + β7PCEOSHt-1 + β8PINDOSHt-1 + 
β9TOP20t-1 + β10CEOONREMCt-1 + β11CEOTENUREt-1 + 
β12CEOMOVEt-1 + β13BSt-1 + β14BINDt-1 + β15BMt-1 + β16INDUSTRY + 
β17YEAR + ε  
 
Model 2: Remuneration committee quality and total CEO compensation 
Total compensation = α + β1RCQt-1+ β2LTAt-1 + β3PBOOKt + β4ROAt-1 + 
β5STDROAt-1 + β6TLTAt-1 -1 + β7PCEOSHt-1 + β8PINDOSHt-1 + 
β9TOP20t-1 + β10CEOONREMCt-1 + β11CEOTENUREt-1 + 
β12CEOMOVEt-1 + β13BSt-1 + β14BINDt-1 + β15BMt-1 + β16INDUSTRY + 
β17YEAR + ε 




  Table 6.2: Variable Description and Measurement 



















Share based payment  
SEB+LEB+PEB+SBP 
 
Salary + Bonus 
 




Value of shares 
Test Variables 
Economic determinants 
LTA Size Log of total assets 
ROA Performance Return on assets measured as net income 
divided by total assets 
PBOOK Price-to-Book  Market value of the equity divided by book 
value of the firm’s equity 
STDROA Firm risk The standard deviation of ROA is the 
standard deviation of annual percentage 





Dummy variable, and takes a value of 1 if a 
remuneration committee exists in the firm, 
0 = non existence 
RCQ Remuneration 
committee quality 
Remuneration committee quality, a 
composite score measuring the quality of 
the remuneration committee ranging 
between 0 and 5, with 0 indicating lowest 
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quality and 5 indicating highest quality. 
The score is formed by aggregating the 
composite scores obtained from five 
characteristics of a remuneration 
committee, RCS, RCIND, RCCHAIRIND, 
RCEXP, and RCMEET. 
RCS Remuneration 
committee size 
Dummy variable, and a value of 1 is given 
if the number of members in the committee 




Dummy variable, and a value of 1 is given 
if the proportion of independent members 
on the committee is greater than the median 




Dummy variable, and a value of 1 is given 
if the chairperson of the remuneration 




Dummy variable, and a value of 1 is given 




Dummy variable, and a value of 1 is given 
if the number of board meetings is greater 
than the median value, 0 otherwise. 
Ownership determinants 
CEOOWN CEO’S shareholdings Number of CEO’s shares divided by total 
number of shares on issue. 
INDOWN Independent directors 
shareholding 
Number of independent directors’ shares 
divided by total number of shares on issue. 
Top 20 Top 20 shareholders Total ownership of the top 20 shareholders. 
Control Variables 
PBIND Proportion of 
independent directors on 
the board 
Number of independent directors on the 
board divided by board size. 
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BS Board size Number of directors on the board. 
BM Board meeting Number of board meetings held during the 
year. 
DEBT Debt Total liabilities to total assets. 
CEOTENURE CEO tenure Continuous variable which shows how 
many years the CEO has served the 
particular company. 
CEOMOVE CEO movement Dummy variable, value of 1 if the new 
CEO is appointed, 0 otherwise. 
CEOONREMC CEO on remuneration 
committee 
Dummy variable, value of 1 if the CEO is 
on the remuneration committee, 0 
otherwise. 
PREGFCD Pre-GFC period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period 
between 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2008, 0 
otherwise. 
GFCD GFC period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period 
between 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009, 0 
otherwise. 
POSTGFCD Post-GFC period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period 




6.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in both of the models is the natural log of total CEO 
compensation (Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou 2006; Schultz, Tian and Twite 
2013). The total CEO compensation is the sum of short-term employment benefit, 
long-term employment benefit, post-employment benefit and share-based payment. 
Share options are not included in this calculation for the following reasons: CEO total 
compensation is expressed in dollar terms, which makes it difficult to include share 
options because of incomplete and vague reporting and because its dollar value also 
varies depending on when the share option has or will be exercised (Cybinski and 
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Windsor 2013). If the share options are not traded, there is no observed market 
valuation that can be included in the executive pay (Hutchinson and Gul 2004). The 
features of managerial options have little resemblance to options or securities traded 
in general. As a result, it is difficult to value this option using Black and Scholes' 
(1973) option valuation model. 
 
6.4.2.2 Independent variables: Test Variables 
 
The first test variable of interest is the existence of a remuneration committee, which 
is a dichotomous variable and takes a value of 1 to denote the existence of a 
remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise. It is important to note that although the 2007 
ASX Corporate Governance Council formally recommends that boards establish a 
remuneration committee, its formation by firms is somewhat voluntary for the sample 
period.  
 
The second main variable of interest in this study is remuneration committee quality. 
This is a composite measure which includes: (a) the size of the remuneration 
committee (RCS); (b) whether the majority of the remuneration committee members 
are independent (RCIND); (c) the number of remuneration committee meetings 
(RCMEET); (d) the financial expertise of remuneration committee members 
(RCEXP); and (e) whether the remuneration committee is chaired by an independent 
director (RCCHAIRIND). The remuneration committee quality is constructed by 
aggregating the governance quality scores of all five of these scores. The quality score 
of an individual measure is coded 1 if the firm satisfies the corporate governance 
recommendations (1, 2 and 5), or, if the firm’s value of the measure is greater than the 
median (meeting) of that measure, it is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. 
164 
 
6.4.2.3 Control Variables 
 
In testing the hypotheses, consistent with prior empirical work (Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon 2006; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999), this study includes economic 
determinants of CEO compensation (firm size, return on assets) and ownership 
determinants of CEO compensation (CEO shareholding, non-executive independent 
directors’ shareholding and top 20 shareholding). In addition to these control variables, 
this study also controls for board characteristics, CEO movement, CEO’s presence on 
the remuneration committee, CEO tenure debt ratio, price-to-book ratio, standard 
deviation of ROA, industry and year. 
 
Corporate executive compensation is a function of organisation size. Murphy (1998) 
argues that size is a proxy for managerial skills requirements, job complexity and span 
of control. The operational complexity of larger firms demands higher quality 
executives with correspondingly higher compensation (Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon 
2006). The Australian Government Productivity Commission (2009) concluded that 
the size of the firm influences executive pay, as larger companies appear to be prepared 
to pay more to attract quality executives. A number of firm-size measures have been 
described in the literature, including total assets (Skinner 1994), sales (Core and Guay 
1999) and log of total assets (Reynolds, Deis and Francis 2004). In line with Chalmers, 
Koh and Stapledon (2006), this chapter uses log of total assets as a proxy for firm size. 
 
The agency model suggests the level of pay is an increasing function of firm 
performance. The literature documenting the evidence on CEO compensation and 
company performance is mixed. Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou (2006) and 
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) found a positive relationship between CEO 
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compensation and the firm’s financial performance. Other studies, meanwhile, found 
no association between compensation and firm performance (e.g., Fleming and Stellios 
2002; Izan, Sidhu and Taylor 1998). This study also includes the measure of firm risk 
in the model. The relevant proxy for firm risk is the standard deviation of ROA over 
the previous five years (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). 
 
Agency theory regards ownership structure as a potentially important determinant of 
CEO pay (Hart 1995). It is also argued in the literature that share ownership plays an 
important role in motivating top executives (Core and Guay 1999; Jensen and Murphy 
1990). This chapter employs two measures for the ownership structure of the firm. The 
first is the ratio of CEO shares to the firm’s total share outstanding (Chalmers, Koh 
and Stapledon 2006; Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou 2006), and the second is the 
ratio of independent non-executive directors’ shareholding to the firm’s total share 
outstanding. Previous studies have used the percentage of outside director 
shareholding to the firm’s total shareholding and found an insignificant relationship 
with CEO total compensation (Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon 2006; Mangel and Singh 
1993). 
 
This study controls for three board characteristics: board size, board meetings and 
independent board directors. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) found that larger 
board sizes are positively related to CEO compensation. Crystal (1991) argues that the 
board of directors is ineffective in setting an appropriate level of compensation for 




The following CEO characteristics are also controlled for in this study: CEO tenure, 
CEO presence on the remuneration committee, and CEO movement. Core and Guay 
(1999) found a positive relationship between CEO tenure and sensitivity of both pay 
and firm performance. CEO movement is controlled for by including a dummy 
variable that equals 0 if the same CEO is at the start and end of the reporting period, 
and 1 otherwise (Anderson and Bizjak 2003). The CEO’s presence on the 
remuneration committee is controlled for by including a dummy variable that equals 0 
if the CEO is not on the remuneration committee, and 1 otherwise. 
 
Finally, like most prior studies (e.g., Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon 2006; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker 1999), this study controls for industry and year effects in the 
model. 
 
6.5 Empirical Results and Analysis 
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
From the descriptive statistics reported in Table 6.3, the average (median) 
compensation of CEOs is $3,556,278 ($2,754,395). The mean (median) CEO 
compensation package of the sample is comprised of salaries of $1,287,241 
($1,225,739), a bonus of $906,267 ($606,450), a short-term employment benefit of 
$2,283,538 ($606,450), a long-term employment benefit of $392,974 ($14,124) and 
$384,435 ($0) in shares granted. The average compensation is higher in the pre-crisis 
period than during the crisis and post-crisis periods. The attention of the media and 
regulators led to many companies freezing remuneration during the GFC to avoid 
damage to their reputation and image. It is also interesting to note the salaries of CEOs 
decreased during the crisis period, but that share-based payment was higher during the 
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GFC than immediately before or after it. This trend suggests that the decrease in 
salaries was offset to a certain extent by increased share-based payment during the 
GFC. 
 
The mean relating to the existence and quality of the remuneration committee has 
increased from 0.90 and 3.52 to 0.96 and 3.94 from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis 
period, respectively. The frequency of remuneration committee meetings has increased 
from 3.58 in the pre-crisis period to 3.98 in the post-crisis period. This suggests that 
remuneration committees became more active during the crisis and post-crisis periods 
than they were before the crisis. The means for the other four remuneration committee 
characteristics (remuneration committee size, the number of independent directors on 
the remuneration committee, whether the chairman of the remuneration committee is 
independent, and the financial expertise of the remuneration committees) have 
increased from the pre-crisis to the post crisis-period. This underlines the importance 
of corporate governance characteristics in a remuneration committee in recommending 
the CEO compensation to the board of directors. 
 
Summary statistics for board attributes associated with corporate governance practices 
show that board size ranges from 3 to 14, with a median size of 8. The maximum 
(minimum) number of independent directors on the board is 11 (0), with a median size 
of 5. The maximum (minimum) number of board meetings is 48 (0), with a median of 
11. In terms of ownership attributes, the mean (median) percentage of shares held by 
CEO and non-executive independent directors, expressed as a percentage of total 
shares on issue, is 2% (0). As expected, the CEO movement shows the highest mean 
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value of 0.19 during the GFC period, as compared with 0.10 in the pre-crisis and 0.14 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   






















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.4 presents the Spearman correlation matrix with total CEO compensation, 
governance attributes and control variables. There is no multicollinearity problem with 
other independent variables as correlations are all below 0.8 (Hill, Griffiths and Judge 
2001). All the remuneration committee characteristics (board size and board 
independence) show a positive significant correlation with total CEO compensation. 
The proportion of CEO and independent director shareholdings shows a negative 
significant correlation with total CEO compensation. The size variable (LTA) has a 
significant and positive correlation with total CEO compensation, which demonstrates 
that larger firms will pay more to their CEOs. Finally, the standard deviation of ROA 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.5.3 Multivariate Results 
Table 6.5 presents the main findings from a total of four estimations. All four 
estimations relate to OLS regressions using the natural logarithm of total CEO 
compensation (LntTCEOREM) as the dependent variable (Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan 
and Zhou 2006; Schultz, Tian and Twite 2013). The first estimation was carried out to 
test H1, with remuneration committees’ existence (RCX) being the variable of interest. 
Estimation 2 tests the other main variable of interest: remuneration committee quality 
(RCQ). Finally, the last two estimations (3 and 4) test H2a to H2e jointly, with test 
variables being the five individual dimensions of RCQ (size, independence, 
chairperson independence, financial expertise and diligence). Estimation 3 takes the 
dummy variable into consideration as to whether it satisfies the recommendations for 
remuneration committees (size, independence, chairperson independence). The fourth 
variable is remuneration committee meetings. This is coded 1 if the value is higher 
than the median value (diligence). The final variable is financial expertise. This is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the remuneration committee consists of at 
least one financial expert, or 0 otherwise. The only difference in Estimation 4 is the 
remuneration committee size; the remuneration committee independence and 
remuneration committee meetings (diligence) are considered as a continuous variable. 
The Log likelihood and F-statistics for each of the estimations is significant at the 1% 
level, and the adjusted R2 for each of the four estimations ranges from 46% to 48%. 
The adjusted R2 appears quite comparable to prior CEO compensation studies (e.g., 




6.5.3.1 Remuneration committee existence (RCX) 
Table 6.5, Estimation 1, shows the results for the first hypothesis, which examines the 
association between remuneration committee existence and total CEO compensation. 
The results show that the coefficient for the variable of interest, existence of a 
remuneration committee (RCX), is positive and insignificant which implies that the 
existence of a remuneration committee is not a significant factor in determining total 
CEO compensation. The existence of a remuneration committee itself does not 
indicate its effectiveness.  Further, this study considers the top 200 ASX-listed 
companies and finds that 93% of the sample has a remuneration committee in their 
structure. This finding is consistent with Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) who 
also fail to find an association between total CEO total compensation and remuneration 
committees in the Australian context.16 
 
6.5.3.2 Remuneration committee quality (RCQ) 
The second hypothesis uses Estimation 2 in Table 6.5, which captures the effect of the 
remuneration committee quality (a composite measure) on total CEO compensation. 
The variable of interest, RCQ, is positive and significantly associated with total CEO 
compensation (at the p<0.05 level), thus providing support to the second hypothesis. 
The results suggest that firms with greater remuneration committee quality tend to pay 
more to CEOs to minimise agency conflict. This result is similar to Sun and Cahan 
(2009) who find that CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with 
accounting earnings when firms have high compensation quality. Collectively, the 
                                                 
16 Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) examine the remuneration committee effect on CEO compensation 
by taking compensation?the remuneration? committee as an indicator variable where 0 = no 
compensation committee; 1 = less than 50% outside directors; 2 = greater than 50% outside directors; 
and 3 = all members of the compensation committee is outside directors.  
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implications are that remuneration committee composition plays a significant role in 
making decisions or recommendations to the board in terms of CEO compensation.  
6.5.3.3 Remuneration committee components 
The sub-hypotheses of Hypothesis 2 use Estimations 3 and 4 of Table 6.5 to test the 
effects of each of the remuneration committee variables - size (RCS), independence 
(RCIND), whether the remuneration committee is chaired by an independent director 
(RCCHAIRIND), expertise (RCEXP), and diligence (RCMEET) - which were used to 
derive the composite measure, RCQ, on total CEO compensation. The results reported 
in Estimation 3 (each of the remuneration committee variables is an indicator variable) 
and Estimation 4 (RCS, RCIND and RCMEET are continuous variables, while 
RCCHAIRIND, RCEXP are indicator variables) show that only two of the five 
remuneration committee variables are significant. Specifically, for Estimations 3 and 
4, the results show remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET) and financial 
expertise (RCEXP) of remuneration committee members are positive and significant 
at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. RCS is not affecting the total compensation of 
CEOs as large remuneration committees may have difficulties in reaching consensus 
on important decisions about CEO pay (Golden and Zajack, 2001). 85% of the firm 
year observations reveal the remuneration committee is chaired by an independent 
director and the results show that RCCHAIRIND does not affect total remuneration of 
CEOs. Thus, this study finds support for H2d and H2e, but not for H2a, H2b and H2c. 
The results imply that if a remuneration committee has financial expertise, and as 
remuneration committee diligence increases, firms are more likely to pay their CEOs 
more in order to retain their CEOs. 
 
Generally, in all estimations, the results show that firm size (Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon 2006; Matolcsy, Shan and Seethamraju 2012), debt ratio (Schultz, Tian and 
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Twite 2013), CEO tenure (Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker 2006), board 
independence (Bugeja, Fohn and Matolcsy 2014), and top 20 shareholding (Matolcsy, 
Shan and Seethamraju 2012) are significantly related to total CEO compensation. The 
percentage shareholding of independent directors (Gregory-Smith 2012) and 
percentage shareholding of CEOs (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999) negatively 


























This table presents OLS regression of total lag CEO compensation on remuneration committee 
existence (estimation1); remuneration committee quality (estimation 2); remuneration 
committee characteristics (estimation 3 = indicator variable; estimation 4 = continuous 
variables). All variables are defined in Table 6.2. The superscripts***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Due to heteroskedasticity, the 
reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. Reported are the coefficient and, in 
parentheses, the standard error. 
Table 6.5: Regression Results 
Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
 
RCX 0.045    
 (0.131)    
RCQ  0.054**   
  (0.023)   
RCS   -0.136 -0.018 
   (0.090) (0.046) 
RCIND   -0.094 -0.042 
   (0.145) (0.055) 
RCMEET   0.286*** 0.047*** 
   (0.069) (0.016) 
RCCHAIRIND   0.009 -0.016 
   (0.141) (0.121) 
RCEXP   0.149** 0.151** 
   (0.067) (0.064) 
LTA 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.223*** 0.230*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
PBOOK -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 0.265 0.215 0.272 0.257 
 (0.466) (0.474) (0.444) (0.453) 
STDROA 0.841 0.784 0.912 0.898 
 (0.716) (0.722) (0.719) (0.718) 
DEBT RATIO 0.540*** 0.509*** 0.513*** 0.479*** 
 (0.149) (0.158) (0.149) (0.148) 
PCEOSH -0.015* -0.014* -0.014* -0.014* 
 (0.804) (0.809) (0.736) (0.768) 
PINDSH -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.123) (0.126) (0.121) (0.125) 
TOP 20 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEOONREMC -0.029 -0.039 -0.041 -0.040 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.159) (0.163) 
CEOTENURE 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEOMOVE -0.111 -0.103 -0.110 -0.109) 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080) 
BS 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.003 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
BIND 0.100*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.110*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) 
BM 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 8.233*** 8.180 8.692*** 8.478*** 
 (0.670) (0.648) (0.694) (0.703) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.464 0.471 0.487 0.480 
F statistics 18.344 18.778 17.597 17.135 
N 561 561 561 561 
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6.6 Further Analysis 
6.6.1 Impact of macroeconomic conditions 
Several additional tests are carried out in this chapter to check the robustness of the 
primary results. The first test examines whether the associations between remuneration 
committee existence, quality and total CEO compensation differ across different 
macroeconomic conditions. As discussed in the introduction, the GFC attracted huge 
debate and scrutiny of top executive compensation. In turn, this was expected to 
increase investment and reputational risk, not only at the investor level but also at the 
firm and the individual level (CEOs). In performing this test, this study includes the 
macroeconomic periods of PREGFC, GFC and POSTGFC. The findings are reported 
in Table 6.6, Panel A. The results show that remuneration committee existence (RCX) 
and quality (RCQ) are positively significant for total CEO compensation during the 
GFC period, at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The RCX shows a negative 
coefficient in the pre- and post-crisis periods, while RCQ shows a positive coefficient 
in the same period. 
 
Next, in line with the previous chapters, this chapter has also re-estimated 
remuneration committee quality in Table 6.6, Panel A, by including remuneration 
committee characteristics in Table 6.6, Panel B. The results differ slightly from the 
main findings, in that in the sample relating to the pre-GFC period, the results show 
that remuneration committee size (RCS) negatively influences total CEO 
compensation during the pre-GFC and GFC periods at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively. The finding related to remuneration committee meetings (diligence) is 
consistent in the pre-GFC but not significant in the GFC and post-GFC period. The 
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remuneration committee financial expertise is only showing as a positive influence on 
total CEO compensation during the pre-crisis period. 
 
Matolcsy (2000) provided evidence on the relationship between management cash 
compensation and publicly available measures of corporate performance during 
different economic cycles during 1987 to 1995, based on 100 Australian firms. He 
found a positive relationship between cash compensation and measures of corporate 
performance during economic growth, and a zero relationship during economic 
downturns. The findings of this chapter are in line with Matolcsy (2000) in that, during 
2009 (during the GFC period), there was a negative but comparatively high coefficient 


















This table presents OLS regression of total lag CEO compensation on remuneration committee existence (estimation1); 
remuneration committee effectiveness (estimation 2) for full sample and sub samples of pre-crisis, gfc and post-crisis 
periods. All variables are defined in Table 6.2. The superscripts***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. 
Reported are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
 
 
Table 6.6: Further Analysis: Economic Period (pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC) 
Panel A 
 Full Sample Pre GFC GFC Post GFC 
 E1 E2 E1 E 2 E1 E2 E1 E2 
RCX 0.045  -0.070  0.502*  -0.135  
 (0.131)  (0.171)  (0.292)  (0.166)  
RCQ  0.054**  0.053  0.113**  0.015 
  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.052)  (0.035) 
         
LTA 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.220*** 0.226** 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.221*** 0.217*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.051) (0.049) (0.083) (0.084) (0.038) (0.039) 
PBOOK -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 0.026* (0.025) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA 0.265 0.215 0.356 0.165 1.741 1.533* -0.228 -0.230 
 (0.466) (0.474) (0.687) (0.694) (0.904) (0.859) (0.686) (0.687) 
STDROA 0.841 0.784 1.241 1.235 -1.298 -1.358 0.800 0.810 
 (0.716) (0.722) (1.058) (1.042) (1.532) (1.488) (1.187)** (1.199) 
DEBT 0.540*** 0.509*** 0.589** 0.572** 0.699** 0.613* 0.518 0.517** 
 (0.149) (0.158) (0.254) (0.254) (0.341) (0.351) (0.209) (0.210) 
PCEOSH -0.015* -0.014* -0.016 -0.016 0.026 -0.024 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.804) (0.809) (1.188) (1.228) (2.299) (2.298) (1.007) (0.956) 
PINDSH 0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** - 0.009 0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.123) (0.126) (0.120) (0.125) (1.493) (1.340) (0.645) (0.655) 
TOP 20 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003 0.003 0.011** 0.011** 0.008*** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEOONR -0.029 -0.039 -0.182 -0.158 -0.190 -0.240 0.187 0.187 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.393) (0.395) (0.334) (0.323) (0.193) (0.193) 
CEOTEN 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.021* 0.020* 0.025** 0.024* 0.007 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
CEOMO -0.111 -0.103 -0.154 -0.112 -0.188 -0.190 -0.078 -0.075 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.119) (0.120) (0.198) (0.198) (0.118) (0.118) 
BS 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.049 0.059 0.018 0.016 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.036) (0.035) (0.047) (0.048) (0.036) (0.036) 
BIND 0.100*** 0.090*** 0.073** 0.060* 0.129** 0.102** 0.114*** 0.114** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.036) (0.036) (0.048) (0.046) (0.033) (0.033) 
BM 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 8.233*** 8.180*** 9.068*** 0.823** 6.897*** 6.898*** 8.334*** 8.240 
 (0.670) (0.648) (1.078) (1.039) (1.644) (1.651) (0.86) (0.835) 
Year Included Included Included Included Excluded Excluded Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.464 0.471 0.426 0.432 0.481 0.488 0.475 0.474 
F statistics 18.344 18.778 7.373 7.528 5.525 5.650 9.170 9.147 




The table presents OLS regression of total lag CEO compensation on remuneration committee characteristics (estimation 
1 = indicator variable; estimation 2 = continuous variables) for full sample and sub-samples of pre-crisis, gfc and post-
crisis periods. All variables are defined in Table 6.2. The superscripts***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. 
Reported are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
  
Table 6.6 Panel B 
Variable Full sample Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
 E1 E2 E1 E2 E1 E2 E1 E2 
         
RCS -0.136 -0.018 -0.265* -0.110 -0.194*** -0.141* -0.099 0.093 
 (0.090) (0.046) (0.146) (0.068) (0.208) (0.085) (0.139) (0.063) 
RCIND -0.094 -0.042 -0.100 0.070 0.088 0.076 -0.271 -0.198** 
 (0.145) (0.055) (0.236) (0.087) (0.297) (0.101) (0.346) (0.091) 
RCMEET 0.286*** 0.047*** 0.423*** 0.115*** 0.252 -0.004 0.168 0.027 
 (0.069) (0.016) (0.115) (0.025) (0.190) (0.050) (0.091) (0.020) 
RCCHAIR 0.009 -0.016 -0.064 -0.300 0.288 0.421 0.090 0.079 
 (0.141) (0.121) (0.243) (0.203) (0.295) (0.269) (0.323) (0.181) 
RCEXP 0.149** 0.151** 0.195* 0.176 0.121 0.145 0.099 0.097 
 (0.067) (0.064) (0.116) (0.110) (0.138) (0.133) (0.110) (0.108) 
LTA 0.223*** 0.230*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.203** 0.251*** 0.205*** 0.204*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.047) (0.100) (0.092) (0.038) (0.040) 
PBOOK -0.002 -0.002 -0.012* -0.011 -0.008 -0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA 0.272 0.257 0.356 0.144 1.437 1.468 - 0.034 
 (0.444) (0.453) (0.587) (0.571) (0.839) (0.856) (0.674) (0.686) 
STDROA 0.912 0.898 1.651*** 1.475 -1.870 -1.883 0.842 1.150 
 (0.719) (0.718) (0.954) (0.970) (1.637) (1.632) (1.228) (1.255) 
DEBT 0.513*** 0.479*** 0.559** 0.515** 0.676* 0.658** 0.500** 0.519** 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.257) (0.258) (0.365) (0.321 (0.209) (1.255) 
PCEOSH -0.014* -0.014* -0.014 -0.013 -0.020 -0.027 -0.837 -0.007 
 (0.736) (0.768) (1.043) (0.987) (2.283) (2.325) (0.927) (0.995) 
PINDSH - -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.006 0.009 -0.790 -0.010* 
 (0.121) (0.125) (0.131) (0.120) (1.296) (1.296) (0.604) (0.583) 
TOP 20 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.002 0.011** 0.011** 0.009** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEOONR -0.041 -0.040 -0.35 -0.141 -0.220 -0.104 0.144 0.097 
 (0.159) (0.163) (0.346) (0.366) (0.339) (0.356) (0.187) (0.177) 
CEOTEN 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.024** 0.020* 0.023* 0.020 0.007 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) 
CEOMOV -0.110 -0.109) -0.118 -0.065 -0.196 -0.241 -0.090 -0.122 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.117) (0.131) (0.184) (0.202) (0.120) (0.115) 
BS 0.008 0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.075 0.095* 0.018 -0.010 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.035) (0.036) (0.047) (0.048) (0.038) (0.042) 
BIND 0.094*** 0.110*** 0.071** 0.049 0.098** 0.088 0.115** 0.165*** 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.037) (0.044) (0.047) (0.054) (0.038) (0.047) 
BM 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 8.692*** 8.478*** 9.410*** 9.376 7.541 6.593*** 8.703 8.521*** 
 (0.694) (0.703) (1.019) (1.001) (2.059) (1.898) (0.831) (0.843) 
Year Included Included Included Included Excluded Exclude Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.487 0.480 0.467 0.483 0.478 0.476 0.477 0.487 
F statistics 17.597 17.135 7.571 7.927 4.832 4.793 8.112 8.398 
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6.6.2 Components of total CEO compensation 
The second additional test relates to the dependent variable measure of total CEO 
compensation. Specifically, this study re-estimated both models by substituting the 
broad dependent variable of total CEO compensation with a finer dependent variable, 
which is based on the main components of total CEO compensation such as salaries, 
bonus, short-term employment benefits, long-term employment benefits and share-
based payments. 
 
From Table 6.7, Panel A (Estimations 1a and 3a), the results show that the variable, 
remuneration committee existence (RCX), is positive and significant (p<0.05) in the 
CEO salary and short-term employment benefit, and significant at the 10% level for 
CEO bonus. Estimations 4a and 5a show that remuneration committee existence 
(RCX) does not affect the long-term employment benefit and share-based payment. 
Estimations 1b, 2b and 3b show that variable remuneration committee quality (RCQ) 
is positive and significant at the 1% level for salaries, bonus and short-term 
employment benefit.  
 
In terms of testing the effects of each of the remuneration committee variables (size 
(RCS), independence (RCIND, RCCHAIRIND), expertise (RCEXP) and diligence 
(RCMEET)), which were used to derive the composite measure RCQ, the results differ 
slightly from the main findings, as reported in Table 6.7, Panel B. The remuneration 
committee meeting is significant for the determination for salaries, and short- and 
long-term employment benefit, and this result is consistent with the main finding from 
Table 6.5. However, the significance of remuneration committee financial expertise 
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(RCEXP) disappears in the compensation component analysis. The control variables 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.6.3 Which firms pay equity compensation to CEOs? 
To provide some basic evidence on the characteristics of firms who choose to pay 
equity-based compensation in the form of shares and/or options, this analysis uses a 
logit regression with the dependent variable coded as 1 if the firm pays equity to the 
CEO, or 0 otherwise. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics show that 78% of the 
sample companies include one of the equity components in the CEO’s compensation. 
The results in Appendix B, Table B.1, show that the main test variable RCQ and RCX 
are now insignificant. The positive coefficient for the year 2009 suggests that during 
the financial crisis the companies issued more equity-based compensation than any 
other year except 2011. Firm performance (ROA) is positive and significant. This 
suggests that firms performing well are more likely to pay equity-based compensation 
to their CEOs. The percentage shareholdings of CEOs and top 20 shareholders is 
negatively associated with the equity-based compensation of the CEOs, suggesting a 
monitoring role of the top 20 shareholders as well as cautious actions of CEOs. 
 
6.6.4 Difference across industry 
In all these regressions the industry fixed effect is controlled through the indicator 
variable, as per the GICS17 structure. This chapter re-runs the analysis for total CEO 
compensation after grouping firms into the two main categories of finance and non-
finance industries. Since the period of study includes the critical macroeconomic 
period of the GFC, and finance firms were under more scrutiny than other firms by 
policymakers, regulators and the general public, the results confirm that the association 
between finance firms and CEO total remuneration is significantly negative in the two 
main models. The results confirm that firms in the finance industry froze or decreased 
                                                 
17 GICS: Global Industry Classification Standard. 
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CEO compensation during the GFC to manage the increasing concern from regulators 
and the general public on CEO compensation. The results are reported in Appendix B, 
Table B.2. The influence of other variables on CEO remuneration remains mostly 
unchanged except that the ROA is no longer a significant variable. 
 
6.6.5 Monitoring by auditors 
To assess the monitoring role of auditors on CEOs’ compensation, this analysis adds 
an additional indicator variable for auditors. The variable takes a value of 1 if the firm 
uses one of the ‘big four’ as an auditor, or 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the auditor 
is significant, as it suggests that the big four auditors understand the need to reward 
the CEOs and do not carry the monitoring role of CEO remuneration. Other variables 
remain unchanged. The results are reported in Appendix B, Table B.3. 
 
6.6.6 Endogeneity 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of remuneration committee 
existence and quality on CEO remuneration. The approach adopted in this chapter to 
address the endogeneity issue is the use of lagged variables in the CEO remuneration 
equation which is used in the main model. This inclusion of lagged test variables and 
control variables reduces the extent of endogeneity (Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary 
2007; Bugeja, Fohn and Matolcsy 2014). 
 
The additional measure to address the endogeneity is the use of the fixed-effect model 
to address the possible relationship between dependent and independent variables due 
to unobserved firm heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 6.8 and are broadly 
consistent with the main findings. 
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Table 6.8: Regression Results: Fixed Effect 
Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
RCX -0.022    
 (0.127)    
RCQ  0.043*   
  (0.024)   
RCS   -0.160 -0.019 
   (0.110) (0.045) 
RCIND   -0.117 -0.008 
   (0.155) (0.053) 
RCMEET   0.290*** 0.050*** 
   (0.073) (0.016) 
RCCHAIRIND   -0.053 -0.170 
   (0.154) (0.118) 
RCEXP   0.169 0.160** 
   (0.071) (0.070) 
LTA 0.245*** 0.244*** 0.224*** 0.230*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
PBOOK -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA 0.157 0.099 0.136 0.090 
 (0.357) 0.356 (0.350) (0.352) 
STDROA 0.291 0.228 0.388 0.310 
 (0.534) (0.533) (0.527) (0.533) 
DEBT RATIO 0.572*** 0.543*** 0.561*** 0.530*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.160) (0.161) 
PCEOSH -1.537*** -1.474*** -1.500*** -1.413*** 
 (0.493) (0.492) (0.483) (0.488) 
PINDSH -0.629** -0.601** -0.635** -0.606** 
 (0.306) (0.305) (0.300) (0.302) 
TOP 20 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEOONREMC -0.162 -0.165 -0.174 -0.173 
 (0.151) (0.150) (0.148) (0.151) 
CEOTENURE 0.016* 0.015** 0.017*** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
CEOMOVE -0.112 -0.100 -0.108 -0.100 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) 
BS -0.004 0.004 -0.010 -0.016 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
BIND 0.114*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.122*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) 
BM 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 8.005*** 7.878*** 8.538*** 8.367*** 
 (0.622) (0.612) (0.629) (0.631) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.451 0.455 0.476 0.467 
F statistics 4.291 4.344 4.534 4.409 
N 561 561 561 561 
Variables are defined in Table 6.2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.1 using one-tailed 
test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-adjusted t-statistics. 




As a final measure to address the endogeneity the two-stage least-squares method is 
employed and the results are reported in Table 6.9. The main challenge in carrying 
these out is to find suitable instruments for remuneration committee characteristics. 

















































Variables are defined in Table 6.2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.1 
using one-tailed test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on 
white-adjusted t-statistics. Reported are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the 
standard error. 
Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
     
RCX 0.122    
 (0.357)    
RCQ  0.150**   
  (0.061)   
RCS   -0.383 -0.029 
   (0.252) (0.121) 
RCIND   -1.118 -0.079 
   (1.076) (0.150) 
RCMEET   0.848*** 0.116*** 
   (0.247) (0.042) 
RCCHAIRIND   0.760 -0.346 
   (1.128) (0.442) 
RCEXP   0.300 0.442** 
   (0.190) (0.185) 
LTA 0.240*** 0.232*** 0.163*** 0.202*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.042) (0.038) 
PBOOK -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.03) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 0.239 0.063 0.209 0.175 
 (0.471) 0.488 (0.421) (0.433) 
STDROA 0.841 0.770 0.725 0.726 
 (0.721) (0.741) (0.695) (0.672) 
DEBT RATIO 0.537*** 0.443*** 0.356* 0.410*** 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.215) (0.158) 
PCEOSH -1.462* -1.360* -0.669 -0.976 
 (0.804) (0.785) (0.691) (0.704) 
PINDSH -0.464*** -0.500*** -0.478** -0.400*** 
 (0.125) (0.118) (0.199) (0.125) 
TOP 20 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
CEOONREMC -0.030 -0.046 -0.020 -0.018 
 (0.167) (0.164) (0.152) (0.159) 
CEOTENURE 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
CEOMOVE -0.107 -0.114 -0.224** -0.097 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.089) (0.086) 
BS 0.011 0.016 0.040 -0.013 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.035) (0.034) 
BIND 0.099*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.128*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.029) (0.040) 
BM 0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 8.159*** 7.931*** 10.032*** 9.189*** 
 (0.768) (20.669) (1.028) (0.915) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.466 0.475 0.334 0.403 
F statistics 18.388 18.951 13.566 14.922 
N 561 561 561 561 
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6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This essay examines the existence and quality of remuneration committees on total 
CEO compensation. The findings show that remuneration committees serve as an 
important corporate governance mechanism. In addition, the potential risks to their 
own reputation and the risks of litigation faced by remuneration committee members 
make them work effectively to influence the determination of total CEO compensation 
when making recommendations to the main board about total CEO compensation. It 
is expected that the existence of a remuneration committee will influence total CEO 
compensation and that effective remuneration committees are more likely to influence 
total CEO compensation than ineffective ones. This thesis has examined these two 
propositions in this chapter and finds support for remuneration committee quality 
(RCQ). In terms of the existence of a remuneration committee (RCX), this chapter did 
not find any significant result in the main analysis, but in the additional analysis (as 
reported in Table 6, Panel A) it does find support during the GFC period. It also shows 
support for RCX for CEO compensation components of salaries, bonus and short-term 
employment benefit. 
 
The results also provide evidence of remuneration committee existence (RCX) having 
a positive effect on total CEO compensation. The remuneration committee’s quality is 
also very significant for the whole sample period and in relation to different 
components of total CEO compensation (salaries, bonus and short-term employment 
benefits). During the GFC period the RCQ significantly influences (at the 5% level) 
total CEO compensation. Further analysis suggests that the diligence of remuneration 
committees and financial expertise are driving forces behind remuneration committee 
quality. The number of independent members on the main board is also significant, 
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except in the compensation components of the bonus. It is also interesting to note that 
the finance industry was under intense scrutiny for excessive CEO compensation. 
 
This chapter has extended the limited research on remuneration committee quality. 
While prior US studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Vafeas 2003) focus on 
remuneration committee quality and CEO pay, Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) focus 
on the relationship between future firm performance and the CEO stock option grants. 
Remuneration committee quality is measured by using six committee characteristics 
and future firm performance was found to be more positively associated with stock 
option grants as the remuneration committee quality increases. In the Australian 
context, no study has examined the influence of a remuneration committee quality 
measure by an index based on corporate governance recommendation and recent 
literature on CEO compensation. This thesis thus extends the current literature on CEO 
compensation and finds that the quality of the remuneration committee has a 
significant association with total CEO compensation. Furthermore, the number of 
remuneration committee meetings and the financial expertise in the remuneration 
committee are positively associated with total CEO compensation. 
 
The findings of this study provide critical information on the effect of remuneration 
committee existence and quality on total CEO compensation in the Australian context 
from a unique macroeconomic setting; that is, before, during and after the GFC. This 
study, in turn, has implications for various stakeholders, including auditors, the 
standards-setters and regulatory bodies for their decision-making in relation to 
policymaking and implementation. This study argues that the Australian Securities 
Exchange should broaden its recommendations for effective operation of a 
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remuneration committee in an organisational setting by including diligence and 




Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion 
In concluding this thesis, this chapter is presented as follows. Section 7.1 presents the 
summary of the research objectives along with the study’s general research and 
investigative questions. Conclusions drawn from the study’s empirical analysis of 
three main chapters of the research are presented in Section 7.2, while Section 7.3 
presents contributions of the research. Policy implications are discussed in Section 7.4. 
The suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 7.5, followed by a 
discussion on limitations in Section 7.6. Finally, a summary is presented in Section 
7.7. 
7.1 Summary of the Research 
The research reported in this thesis was structured to provide insight into the existence 
and quality of remuneration committees on voluntary narrative disclosure of executive 
remuneration, attribution of remuneration action and CEO remuneration. Vigorous 
debate on executive remuneration arose in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. 
A number of formal inquiries and reviews were commissioned and reports were 
prepared in several countries. These actions have resulted in considerable and 
substantiative amendment to the legislative and professional rules and guidelines 
aimed at improving executive remuneration practices. The ultimate aim of these 
improvements has been to ensure the confidence of all stakeholders, regulators and the 
general public in executive remuneration practices. 
 
While the board of directors is ultimately responsible for the oversight of executive 
remuneration, the remuneration committee is seen as an efficient corporate governance 
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mechanism to assist the board in ensuring effective and responsible remuneration 
practices (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003). 
 
In general, this thesis examines the influence of remuneration committees on executive 
remuneration, narrative disclosure and its attribution. From the general research 
question, three specific main research questions were addressed in an essay format. 
The first essay (presented in Chapter 4) examined the association between the 
existence and quality of a remuneration committee on narrative voluntary executive 
remuneration disclosure. The second essay (presented in Chapter 5) examined the 
relationship between remuneration committee characteristics and the reasons given for 
the executive remuneration change. The final essay (Chapter 6) examined the 
association between the existence and quality of a remuneration committee on CEO 
compensation. 
 
The objective of the research was to examine the influence of remuneration 
committees on narrative disclosure, attribution and CEO remuneration. The influence 
of remuneration committees was examined by considering the existence of a 
remuneration committee and its quality. The quality of the remuneration committee 
was measured by using an index not previously applied in the extant literature in this 
area. The index is a composite measure of five characteristics of remuneration 
committees: the size of the remuneration committee (RCS), the independence of 
remuneration committee members (RCIND), the independence of the remuneration 
committee chairperson (RCCHAIRIND), the diligence (frequency of meetings) of the 
remuneration committee (RCMEET), and the financial expertise of the remuneration 




Data from the top 200 listed companies in Australia from 2007 to 2011 were used for 
the testing of hypotheses. Australia is seen as an appropriate context for this thesis as 
executive remuneration was a highly debated topic in many countries during this study 
period, and Australia was no exception. However, Australia, in general, technically 
managed to avoid the recession during this period whereas most developed countries 
suffered from the financial crisis. Research on remuneration committee existence and 
quality in the Australian setting (where having a remuneration committee is voluntary) 
provides insight into how good corporate governance practices are used in narrative 
voluntary disclosure, its attribution and CEO remuneration. 
 
7.2 Summary of the Key Findings 
The results of this study show that remuneration committee existence and quality 
influence the decision and extent of narrative disclosure of remuneration action and 
CEO remuneration in the annual report. The decision to attribute reasons varies with 
different macroeconomic conditions, and the remuneration committee characteristics 
play a moderating role. A summary of the research findings in relation to each of the 
research hypotheses, based on individual chapters, is presented in Table 7.1. The 




Table 7.1: Research Hypotheses: Summary of Research Findings 
 




Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between the existence of a remuneration committee 
(RCX) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the 
extent of voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
action disclosure (VDER). 
Supported 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between remuneration committee quality (RCQ) and 
(a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent of 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure (VDER). 
Supported 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between the remuneration committee size (RCS) and 
(a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent of 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure (VDER). 
Not supported 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between remuneration committee independence 
(RCIND) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the 
extent of voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
action disclosure (VDER). 
Supported 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 




independent director (RCCHAIRIND) and (a) the 
decision to provide and (b) the extent of voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure 
(VDER). 
H2d: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between remuneration committee financial expertise 
(RCEXP) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the 
extent of voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
action disclosure (VDER). 
Not supported 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between frequency of remuneration committee 
meetings (RCMEET) and (a) the decision to provide 
and (b) the extent of voluntary narrative executive 




The extent of external attribution behaviour will be 
higher in the crisis period than the pre and post 
financial crisis period, and the type of attribution 
strategies adopted by companies will differ across 
these periods. 
Supported 
H2a: The proportion of independent members on the 
remuneration committee will have a moderating effect 
on the attribution strategy of firms in the different 





H2b: The size of the remuneration committee will have a 
moderating effect on the attribution strategy of firms 
in the different reporting periods (pre, during and post 
financial crisis). 
Not supported 
H2c: The number of remuneration committee meetings will 
have a moderating effect on the attribution strategy of 
firms in the different reporting periods (pre, during 




Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between the existence of a compensation committee 
(RCX) and total CEO compensation. 
Not supported 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between the quality of a compensation committee 
(RCQ) and total CEO compensation. 
Supported 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between the remuneration committee size and total 
CEO compensation. 
Not supported 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between the remuneration committee independence 
and total CEO compensation. 
Not supported 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between remuneration committees chaired by an 





7.2.1 Remuneration Committee and Narrative Voluntary Executive 
Remuneration Disclosure 
Chapter 4 investigated two key research questions: (a) Does the remuneration 
committee existence (RCX) have a significant association with the decision and extent 
of Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Remuneration (VDER)? and (b) Does the quality 
of the remuneration committee (RCQ) have a significant impact on the decision and 
extent of VDER? The extent of voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure is measured by considering the contents in the disclosure and by developing 
an index. The disclosure index consists of four remuneration action disclosure items: 
(a) remuneration action reasons; (b) future remuneration action; (c) remuneration-
related accounting ratios; (d) remuneration action quantification (Belal 2001). 
 
This study uses a sample of 673 firm-year observations over a period of five years 
(2007 to 2011) drawn from a sample of the Top 200 ASX companies. The data analysis 
for this study involved two main regression techniques: a logit regression is used to 
examine the decision to make a narrative disclosure in the annual report, and OLS 
regression is used to test the extent of disclosure. A number of analyses addressed the 
endogeneity of remuneration committee characteristics. 
H2d: Ceteris paribus, there is positive relationship between 
number of remuneration committee meetings and total 
CEO compensation. 
Supported 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship 
between remuneration committee financial expertise 




The findings of this study suggest that: 
 Firms with a remuneration committee are more likely to provide information 
relating to voluntary narrative disclosures on executive remuneration actions. 
 Remuneration committee quality is positive and significantly associated with the 
decision to make a voluntary narrative disclosure of executive remuneration 
actions and the extent of such disclosure. The independence and diligence of the 
remuneration committee are the two main determinants of its quality. 
 The extent of influence of remuneration committee existence and quality on 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration disclosure varies based on the type of 
voluntary disclosure as well as the economic conditions. 
These findings suggest the importance of the existence and quality of remuneration 
committees on narrative voluntary executive remuneration disclosure. Furthermore, 
they emphasise the importance of diligence and independence. These results are 
consistent with prior studies such as Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) and Sun and 
Cahan (2009). Overall, the results suggest that firms voluntarily disclose executive 
remuneration action in the annual report in order to manage the perception of various 
stakeholders about executive remuneration. 
7.2.2 Narrative Voluntary Executive Remuneration Disclosure and Attribution 
The second research question was presented in an essay format in Chapter 5. The two 
research questions addressed here were: (a) whether the type of attribution and extent 
of attribution change is different from 2007 to 2011; and (b) whether the moderating 
effect of remuneration committee characteristics, as a corporate governance 




Chapter 5 used 240 firm-year observations of the top 200 listed companies from 2007 
to 2011. The focal research issue was whether the firms give external or internal 
factors as their reasons for executive remuneration change. The analysis involved two 
regression techniques: a logit regression and an OLS regression.  
 
The results of this chapter revealed that: 
 During the GFC, managers attribute remuneration action disclosure to external 
factors; while pre-crisis, internal factors are attributed to remuneration action 
disclosures.  
 The degree of attribution, gauged by an attribution index, suggests that when 
managers attribute external factors for the voluntary remuneration disclosure 
they tend to withhold information. 
 The evidence also suggests the attribution changes based on the type of 
remuneration action disclosure. 
This study is unique when compared with previous studies in the literature. Most of 
the prior studies examined the attribution strategy and organisation performance (Aerts 
2005; Osma and Guillamón-Saorín 2011), while this study examines the use of 
attribution strategy in the context of executive remuneration. 
 
Overall, the findings of Chapter 5 suggest that a firm’s decision to attribute reasons 





7.2.3 Remuneration Committee Existence, Quality and CEO Compensation 
The final essay was presented in Chapter 6. It investigated the influence of the 
existence and quality of a remuneration committee on total CEO compensation and its 
components, in the Australian setting, using 540 firm-year observations from 2007 to 
2011. The two key research questions addressed in this study were: (a) Does the 
remuneration committee existence (RCX) have a significant association with total 
CEO compensation? and (b) Does the quality of the remuneration committee (RCQ) 
have a significant impact on total CEO compensation? The analysis involved two 
regression techniques: an OLS regression and some further analysis (fixed effect, two-
stage-least square regression) to address the endogeneity problem. 
 
The results of the study reveal that: 
 Total CEO compensation is significantly associated with remuneration committee 
quality but not with the existence of a remuneration committee. Remuneration 
committee quality is measured in the same manner as calculated in Chapter 4. 
 The influence of the existence and quality of remuneration committees on CEO 
compensation varies based on the different macroeconomic periods (pre-crisis, 
global financial crisis and post-crisis). 
 The influence of the existence and quality of remuneration committees on CEO 
compensation varies based on the components of CEO compensation (salary, 
bonuses, and share-based payments). 
With the exception of Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker (2006), the research on 
remuneration committee existence and quality on CEO compensation is limited in 
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Australia when compared with international studies (USA: Anderson and Bizjak 2003; 
Sun and Cahan 2009; Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 2009; Vafeas 2003 and UK: Main and 
Johnston 1993). The review of the prior literature reveals that fewer studies have 
directly examined the existence and characteristics of remuneration committees on 
CEO compensation, but no Australian studies have examined the quality of 
remuneration committees as a single quality index. 
 
Findings show that remuneration committees serve as an important corporate 
governance mechanism in determining CEO compensation. In addition, the potential 
risks to their own reputation and the risks of litigation faced by remuneration 
committee members make them work effectively to influence the determination of 
total CEO compensation through making recommendations to the main board. 
 
7.3 Contribution 
7.3.1 Remuneration Committee and Voluntary Narrative Executive 
Remuneration Disclosure 
The first empirical study extends and contributes to the prior literature in a number of 
ways. First, while studies on executive compensation are plentiful, prior literature on 
compensation committees is relatively limited (Hermanson, Tompkins, Veliyath and 
Ye 2012). A more in-depth understanding of the impact of compensation committees 
on the extent of disclosure levels is critical for identifying how board sub-committees 
work to affect governance outcomes such as voluntary disclosures. In addition, 
although prior archival studies relating to remuneration committee characteristics have 
investigated a number of remuneration-related outcomes such as remuneration 
disclosure, CEO/executive remuneration and stock options (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 
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2003; Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer 2010; Collins, Gong and Li 2009; Conyon and 
Lerong 2004; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton 1998; Laksmana 2008; Nelson, 
Gallery and Percy 2010; Sapp 2008; Sun and Cahan 2009; Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 
2009), none of these studies has investigated the critical issue of narrative disclosure 
of executive remuneration action. 
 
Second, with the exception of Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) and Sun and Cahan 
(2009), most of the prior research on remuneration committee quality variables has 
been tested in isolation with reference to firm performance or to a specific 
remuneration disclosure (see, Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary 2007; Nelson, 
Gallery and Percy 2010). In this study, remuneration committee quality was examined 
based on a composite measure of five characteristics of remuneration committees, 
which are mainly based on corporate governance guidelines. It has been argued (by 
Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa 2011) that the interaction of these characteristics is likely 
to have the most impact on effective corporate governance practices. 
 
7.3.2 Voluntary Narrative Executive Remuneration Disclosure and Attribution 
All previous studies examined the different impression management practices adopted 
by firms in different states of organisational performance. The only exception is Osma 
and Guillamón-Saorín (2011), who researched narrative disclosure in annual result 
press releases, and found strong governance lowers the incidence of both qualitative 
and quantitative impression management. The research question of Chapter 5 
examined the narrative disclosure of executive remuneration change in annual reports 





This study also adds to the existing literature on impression management techniques 
in narrative disclosure and corporate governance. There is no prior work on the 
attribution of executive remuneration change disclosure in accounting narratives in 
Australia. In addition, this study provides evidence of the role of remuneration 
committee characteristics on attribution and the extent of attribution during different 
economic conditions. This is the first study based on annual reports taken from 2007 
to 2011 in the Australian context, which includes different macroeconomic periods. 
 
7.3.3 Remuneration Committee Existence, Quality and CEO Compensation 
This essay extends the limited research on remuneration committee quality. While 
prior US studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Vafeas 2003) focus on remuneration 
committee quality and CEO pay, Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) focus on the 
relationship between future firm performance and CEO stock option grants. However, 
no study has examined the influence of remuneration committee quality measured by 
an index based on corporate governance recommendations and recent literature on 
CEO compensation in the Australian context. This study extends the current literature 
on the quality of remuneration committees and found it has a significant association 
with total CEO compensation. Furthermore, this essay found that the number of 
remuneration committee meetings and the financial expertise on the remuneration 
committee are positively associated with total CEO compensation. 
 
7.4 Policy Implications and Future Research 
This thesis presents a number of policy implications. Drawing on ASX Corporate 
Governance Recommendations (2007, 2010), the remuneration committee must at 
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least exhibit the following three characteristics. First, the majority of the members 
should be independent non-executive directors. Second, a minimum size of three 
remuneration committee members is required for the remuneration committee to 
function effectively. Third, the remuneration committee chairman should be an 
independent director. Based on the findings of this thesis, the Australian Securities 
Exchange should consider broadening their recommendations for effective operation 
of a remuneration committee in an organisational setting, by including diligence and 
financial expertise in addition to their existing recommendations (remuneration 
committee size, independent remuneration committee chairman and that the majority 
of the remuneration committee members should be independent). 
 
The findings of this study provide critical information on the effect of remuneration 
committee existence and quality on total CEO compensation, in the Australian context, 
in a unique macroeconomic setting before, during and after the GFC. This 
understanding, in turn, has implications for various stakeholders, including auditors, 
the standards-setters and regulatory bodies for their decision-making in relation to 
policymaking and the implementation of remuneration committee operations in the 
voluntary reporting environment. 
 
7.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research could focus on the complementary roles of other sub-committees, such 
as audit and nomination committees, on voluntary narrative executive remuneration 




Future research could also consider the proportion of financial expertise on the 
remuneration committee as an improved measure. This would challenge the 
researcher, however, as some companies will not provide detailed information about 
the qualifications and expertise of their directors. 
 
Other disclosure documents (such as corporate websites, press releases and company 
announcements on ASX) could be integrated into a study to provide more 
comprehensive information about disclosure behaviour and CEO compensation. 
 
Future research could also be carried out by comparing the findings of this study with 
countries with different institutional settings. Some countries have more regulations 
than Australia and some have much less; it would be useful to compare the Australian 
regulatory framework with both. This would give greater insight into the importance 
of remuneration committee (existence and quality) in different institutional settings. 
 
7.6 Limitations 
The findings of this study have limitations. First, this study only examines firms in the 
top 200 listed firms in Australia; therefore, these findings may not be applicable to all 
listed firms or non-listed firms. Any generalisations of the findings to other countries 
would require careful evaluation of contextual differences. As the focus of the study 
was on remuneration committee quality, this study’s findings are limited by 
calculation of remuneration committee quality. 
This study identifies five remuneration committee characteristics based on the 
Corporate Governance Council’s recommendations and on the literature to calculate 
remuneration committee quality. The question of whether these five remuneration 
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committee characteristics can accurately reflect the corporate governance quality of 
remuneration committees is still open. This thesis used a dichotomous measure of 
financial expertise, which is coded 1 if at least one member of the remuneration 
committee has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise. Future research could consider the 




This chapter has provided an overview of the three main research questions outlined 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It has also discussed possible contributions and policy 
implications. Finally, it acknowledges its limitations. 
 
Overall, this thesis provides critical information about CEO compensation, which has 
been a widely-debated issue in recent times. As such, this thesis raises awareness of 
the importance and influence of remuneration committees as a corporate governance 
mechanism in executive compensation disclosure, its attribution and total CEO 
compensation during 2007 to 2011, a period which includes the Global Financial 
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Variables are defined in Table 6.2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.01 
using one-tailed test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-
adjusted t-statistics. Reported are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
 
Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
     
RCX -0.276    
 (0.552)    
RCQ  0.113   
  (0.089)   
RCS   0.408 0.091 
   (0.358) (0.165) 
RCIND   -0.663 -0.286 
   (0.527) (0.198) 
RCMEET   0.413 0.129* 
   (0.263) (0.068) 
RCCHAIRIND   -0.003 -0.075 
   (0.546) (0.0.466) 
RCEXP   0.440* 0.417 
   (0.262) (0.260) 
LTA 0.043 0.039 0.013 0.006 
 (0.174) (0.131) (0.180) (0.184) 
PBOOK 0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
ROA 3.340* 3.160** 3.158* 3.424** 
 (1.716) (1.384) (1.731) (1.717) 
STDROA 5.852 5.851** 6.518 6.455 
 (6.473) (2.826) (6.787) (6.696) 
DEBT RATIO 1.996*** 1.977*** 1.781*** 1.877*** 
 (0.655) (0.679) (0.637) (0.657) 
PCEOSH -12.670*** -13.084*** -12.266*** -12.462*** 
 (2.728) (2.809) (2.652) (2.792) 
PINDSH 4.136** 3.855 3.997** 3.921** 
 (1.863) (2.594) (1.799) (1.934) 
TOP 20 -0.017* -0.017** -0.015** -0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) 
CEOONREMC 0.067 0.048 -0.083 -0.052 
 (0.477) (0.504) (0.496) (0.507) 
CEOTENURE 0.025 0.021 0.027*** 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) 
CEOMOVE -0.032 -0.006 -0.005 -0.023 
 (0.371) (0.352) (0.363) (0.360) 
BS 0.039 0.037 -0.009 -0.024 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.095) 
BIND 0.112 0.086*** 0.143*** 0.120* 
 (0.091) (0.086) (0.097) (0.111) 
BM 0.012 0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Constant -0. 828 -1.208 -0.393*** -0.275 
 (3.713) (2.558) (3.814) (3.841) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.172 0.183 0.184 
F statistics -251.134 -250.489 -247.129 -246.8223 
N 561 561 561 561 
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Variables are defined in Table 6.2 *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.01 using 
one-tailed test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on white-
adjusted t-statistics. Reported are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
RCX 0.026    
 (0.127)    
RCQ  0.052**   
  (0.022)   
RCS   -0.154* -0.015* 
   (0.092) (0.046) 
RCIND   -0.091 -0.041 
   (0.136) (0.055) 
RCMEET   0.301*** 0.051** 
   (0.069) (0.016) 
RCCHAIRIND   -0.010 -0.047 
   (0.129) (0.112) 
RCEXP   0.154** 0.158** 
   (0.065) (0.063) 
LTA 0.234*** 0.232 0.214*** 0.225*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) 
PBOOK -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
ROA 0.302 0.235 0.290 0.266 
 (0.450 (0.456) (0.425) (0.435) 
STDROA 1.032 1.005 1.133 1.131 
 (0.732) (0.743) (0.735) (0.737) 
DEBT RATIO 0.487*** 0.448*** 0.461*** 0.419*** 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.144) (0.141) 
PCEOSH -1.500* -1.405* -1.391* -1.360 
 (0.805) (0.810) (0.719) (0.755) 
PINDSH -0.504*** -0.487*** -0.475*** -0.500*** 
 (0.120) (0.129) (0.131) (0.132) 
TOP 20 0.006**** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEOONREMC 0.039 0.026 0.010 0.015 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.156) (0.163) 
CEOTENURE 0.0185*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEOMOVE -0.114 -0.104 -0.111 -0.109 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.079) 
BS 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) 
BIND 0.104*** 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.114*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) 
BM 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
FDV -0.389*** -0.384*** -0.370*** -0.400*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080) 
Constant 8.366*** 8.318*** 8.857*** 8.610*** 
 (0.663) (0.641) (0.685) (0.686) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseduo R2 0.453 0.459 0.479 0.184 
F statistics 24.213 -24.766 22.468 -246.8223 
N 561 561 561 561 
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Variables are defined in Table 6.2 *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05,* p-value 0.01 using one-
tailed test. Due to heteroskedasticity, the reported p-values are based on White-adjusted t-
statistics. Reported are the coefficient and, in parentheses, the standard error. 
Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
     
RCX 0.092    
 (0.131)    
RCQ  0.055**   
  (0.023)   
RCS   -0.139 -0.013 
   (0.093) (0.044) 
RCIND   -0.039 -0.048 
   (0.143) (0.053) 
RCMEET   0.247*** 0.043*** 
   (0.064) (0.016) 
RCCHAIRIND   0.003 -0.022 
   (0.141) (0.121) 
RCEXP   0.146** 0.147** 
   (0.065) (0.061) 
LTA 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.219*** 0.222*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) 
PBOOK -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 0.023 -0.015 0.071 0.042 
 (0.471) (0.479) (0.451) (0.460) 
STDROA 0.905 0.855 0.940 0.936 
 (0.750) (0.758) (0.757) (0.745) 
DEBT RATIO 0.459*** 0.428*** 0.444** 0.405** 
 (0.146) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147) 
PCEOSH -1.260 -1.227 -1.225* -1.184 
 (0.786) (0.789) (0.728) (0.757) 
PINDSH -0.453*** -0.427*** -0.412*** -0.429*** 
 (0.130) (0.123) (0.120) (0.124) 
TOP 20 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEOONREMC -0.025 -0.036 -0.033 -0.038 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.149) (0.152) 
CEOTENURE 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEOMOVE -0.125* -0.117 -0.122 -0.128/8 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) 
BS 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) 
BIND 0.092*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.027) 
BM 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
ADV 0.531*** 0.523*** 0.457** 0.506*** 
 (0.197) (0.197) (0.187) (0.187) 
Constant 7.957*** 7.935*** 8.392*** 8.222*** 
 (0.645) (0.625) (0.668) (0.670) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.484 0.490 0.501 0.536 
     
F statistics 19.109 19.530 18.015 18.346 
N 561 561 561 561 
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This paper investigates the impact of the effectiveness of remuneration committees on 
narrative voluntary disclosure of information on remuneration. We develop a 
composite measure as a proxy for remuneration committee effectiveness by 
incorporating remuneration committee size, remuneration committee independence, 
remuneration committee chairman’s independence, expertise and diligence.  We find 
that both the existence and quality of a remuneration committee play a significant role 
in the decision to provide voluntary disclosure of remuneration actions and in the 
extent of this disclosure. Further analysis suggests that remuneration committee 
independence and diligence enhance the quality of remuneration committees. The 
results have policy implications for remuneration committees as an effective corporate 
governance mechanism. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, global financial crisis, independence, remuneration 





 Agency theory argues that effective corporate governance mechanisms must 
be present to minimize information asymmetry and related agency costs through 
increased disclosure. For example, board sub-committees work to monitor managers 
to act in the best interests of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One important 
board sub-committee is the remuneration committee, whose role is to support and 
advise the board on matters relating to remuneration (e.g., the level and composition 
of remuneration, disclosure of remuneration policies, and the process for setting 
remuneration and assessing performance). As part of its role, the committee 
periodically makes recommendations to the board on any specific decisions or actions 
and disclosures that the board should consider in relation to director remuneration. 
Thus, the communication of remuneration decisions and actions to shareholders is 
important in demonstrating the alignment among shareholders’ interests, performance 
and remuneration. Furthermore, a recent opinion survey by PWC (2014) highlights an 
increasing expectation that directors take greater responsibility in communicating to 
shareholders on matters pertaining to governance issues, thus indicating calls for 
greater information transparency. In this paper, we examine how corporate boards via 
the remuneration committee respond to investor demand for enhanced communication 
about remuneration matters.  Specifically, we examine the association between 
remuneration committee effectiveness/quality (remuneration committee existence and 
certain remuneration committee characteristics) and the voluntary disclosure of 
information, in narrative format, relating to executive remuneration actions. 
 Examining the reporting of executive remuneration matters provides a natural 
setting to examine the effectiveness of remuneration committee practices.  Section 
300A of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act) provides a list of 
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remuneration-related items that listed firms are required to publish annually in the 
‘remuneration report’ section of the annual report (i.e., within the directors’ report). 
One item that the report does not require is information about decisions relating to 
remuneration change actions (increase/decrease/freeze), making such disclosures 
voluntary18 in nature. Furthermore, narrative voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
shapes the way investors and shareholders “know/feel” about the firm (Neu et al., 
1998), thus assisting in reducing information asymmetry and related agency costs. The 
disclosure of remuneration change actions is arguably important, as such disclosure 
explicitly informs investors and shareholders about a firm’s seriousness in aligning 
performance (and risk) with its remuneration strategies. For example during periods 
of financial crisis, a firm faces considerable uncertainty about its future cash flows, 
thus reducing investor confidence regarding financial risk. Committed boards and their 
sub committees that address and voluntarily disclose such financial risk issues (e.g., 
by reducing or freezing remuneration) are seen positively and, in turn, are expected to 
improve investors’ confidence (e.g., Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003).19 Hence, in 
this paper, we utilize such voluntary remuneration change actions disclosure as an 
outcome of effective remuneration committee practices. 
 The remuneration committee is an important board sub-committee. While prior 
studies examine the effectiveness of boards and various sub-committees, empirical 
evidence is limited on the impact of remuneration committees on executive 
                                                 
18 In general, voluntary disclosure refers to the voluntary release of financial and non-financial 
information that is over and above the mandatory requirements with respect to company law, 
professional accounting standards or other relevant regulatory requirements (Barako et al., 2006). Such 
disclosures may occur through the annual report or by other means, such as the company website. 
19 In a similar vein, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) develop a model of managers’ equilibrium 
strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about their firm’s risk. They demonstrate that a firm 
that discloses risk has a higher share price than one that does not; however, relative to a voluntary 




remuneration voluntary disclosure practices. Although prior archival studies relating 
to remuneration committee characteristics investigate a number of remuneration-
related outcomes, such as remuneration disclosure, CEO/executive remuneration and 
stock options (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2010; Collins et al., 
2009; Conyon and He, 2004; Daily et al., 1998; Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; 
Sapp, 2008; Sun and Cahan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009), none of these studies examine the 
critical issue of voluntary narrative disclosure of executive remuneration action and 
the implications of such disclosures.  
 The disclosure of information provides a platform for management to 
communicate their firm’s performance and governance to its current and future 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In terms of executive remuneration, disclosure of 
remuneration is argued to reduce agency problems (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Morse 
et al., 2011).  However, the effectiveness of such disclosure is argued to be dependent 
on whether it is mandatory/regulated or voluntary disclosure. While regulated 
disclosures are said to facilitate reduced information asymmetry, it is also argued that 
it may be inadequate to render such a mechanism to be effective as executives, being 
insiders, are always in the position of having superior information compared to 
outsiders (Sheu et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2004).  Thus, any information above 
mandatory disclosure provides an additional governance mechanism (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Balachandran and Faff (2015) also highlight the need for more 
extensive research on the linkage between corporate governance and executive 
remuneration. To date, most of the prior remuneration related studies focus on the 
mandatory aspect of executive remuneration disclosure with very few studies on 
voluntary remuneration disclosure.  This study takes a further step by not only 
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investigating a voluntary aspect of remuneration disclosure, but also the narrative 
aspect of this remuneration action voluntary disclosure.  
Our paper is further motivated by the attention focused on executive 
remuneration during the recent global financial crisis (GFC) and the development of 
the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Code of Corporate Governance, the latter 
of which provides guidance and recommendations relating to both boards of directors 
and remuneration committees. The unprecedented level of global economic 
uncertainty during the GFC and reduced firm profits due to the financial crisis resulted 
in concerns from various parties about excessive payments to executives. In addressing 
these concerns, firms (via their boards) are likely to adopt and communicate their 
remuneration realignment strategies (which may or may not be opportunistic) to 
influence shareholder perceptions favorably and to gain/retain their confidence. 
It is important to note that the remuneration committee composition specified 
in the ASX recommendations is only a suggestion; hence, the requirement of ‘if not, 
why not’ does not apply.20 In this paper, we argue that improved narrative disclosures 
on remuneration action are affected by the existence of a remuneration committee as 
well as by the quality of such a committee. The rationale for this argument is that a 
firm’s good corporate governance practice is reflected in the quality of the 
remuneration committee. Sun et al. (2009, p. 1507) argue that high-quality 
                                                 
20 Some of the relevant Australian disclosure requirements pertaining to executive remuneration are as 
follows:  
• Section 300(A)(1) was introduced to the Corporations Law in 1998 and required disclosure of the 
board policy for determining the nature and amount of emoluments of board members and senior 
executives and discussion of the relationship between the remuneration policy and company 
performance. 
• The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Guidelines were initially released 
in 2003 and suggested that disclosures should be provided in relation to management remuneration 
policies. 
• The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
(CLERP 9 Act) introduced the requirement for a non-binding vote by shareholders in relation to their 
acceptance or non-acceptance of proposed management remuneration. 
• AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures was released in 2004 (the equivalent of IAS 24) but only requires 
limited disclosures in relation to executive remuneration. 
 252 
remuneration committees ‘are capable of designing and implementing remuneration 
arrangements that will lead to stronger incentives for subsequent performance, and 
reduce the capacity of CEOs to extract rents’. A remuneration committee can be a 
more efficient mechanism than a full board for focusing the company on appropriate 
remuneration policies designed to meet the needs of the company in enhancing 
corporate and individual performance. The existence of a remuneration committee 
should not be seen as a implying a fragmentation or diminution of the responsibilities 
of the board as a whole (Corporate Governance Recommendation 8, ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2010). Thus, in this paper we argue that voluntary remuneration 
action disclosures, and the extent of such disclosures, are contingent on the 
effectiveness of the remuneration committee as a key corporate governance 
mechanism established by the board. 
Drawing on the ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2007, 2010), we argue that for remuneration 
committees to be effective they must at least exhibit three characteristics. First, the 
majority of the members should be independent non-executive directors. Second, a 
minimum size of three remuneration committee members is required for the 
remuneration committee to function effectively. Third, the remuneration committee 
chair should be an independent director. Based on recent literature (Zaman et al., 
2011),21 we include two more characteristics: first, the number of remuneration 
committee meetings held in a year (diligence) and, second, the requirement that 
                                                 
21 They examined the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE) a proxy for governance quality 
on audit fees and non-audit fees. The audit committee effectiveness is a composite measure comprising 
audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. They believed the interactions of these 
variables are likely to impact audit quality. They find that an effective audit committee results in higher 
audit fees and, for larger clients, there is a positive and significant association between ACE and non-
audit service fees. 
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membership of the committee must include at least one director with relevant financial 
expertise. We combine these five variables to form a composite construct called 
remuneration committee quality (RCQ). 
Prior literature finds the importance of the remuneration committee for firm 
performance. The use of narrative disclosures in annual reports represent an important 
medium of communication which plays a key role in company annual reports 
(Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). In particular, Chung et al. (2015) argue that 
improvements in financial transparency by enhanced communications via voluntary 
disclosure can reduce agency conflicts, which in turn influences top managers to 
improve firm value.  In the context of executive remuneration, enhanced 
communication through narrative remuneration voluntary disclosure (above and 
beyond mandatory disclosure) is not only an indicator of enhanced firm transparency 
but also of effective governance and in particular of the remuneration committee.  We 
extend the prior literature to the board governance and narrative disclosure by showing 
that firms with an effective remuneration committee exhibit enhanced voluntary 
narrative remuneration disclosure. 
Using a sample of Top 200 ASX firms over a period of five years (2007 to 
2011), we find our results are generally consistent with our expectations.  Specifically, 
our results show that both the existence and quality of a remuneration committee play 
an important role in the decision to provide voluntary disclosure of remuneration 
actions and in the extent of this disclosure. Additional analyses also suggest that 
remuneration committee independence and diligence are two key attributes that 
enhance the quality of remuneration committees. Further, we find that the influence of 
the remuneration committee existence and quality vary by the type of disclosure and 
across different macroeconomic periods. 
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While studies on executive compensation are plentiful, prior literature on 
compensation committees is relatively limited (Hermanson et al., 2012). A more in-
depth understanding of the impact of compensation committees on the extent of 
disclosure is critical for identifying how board sub-committees work to affect 
governance outcomes, such as voluntary remuneration action disclosures, an aspect 
which prior literature ignored in the past.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that contributes to both the existing corporate governance literature in terms of 
the existence and quality of the remuneration committee and of voluntary disclosure 
in terms of narrative remuneration change action decisions in annual reports in the 
Australian environment. 
Further, with the exception of  Sun et al. (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009), 
most prior studies focus on remuneration committee independence only, which does 
not capture other important dimensions of the committee.  In addition, although other 
researchers have used a mix of remuneration committee characteristics, these were 
tested in isolation without reference to firm performance or to a specific remuneration 
disclosure (see, Doucouliagos et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2010).  Our study thus 
contributes to the remuneration committee literature by utilizing a composite measure 
of five characteristics of remuneration committees (size, independence, chairperson 
independence, expertise and activity). These characteristics are based mainly on 
corporate governance guidelines to measure overall remuneration committee quality. 
Zaman et al. (2011) argue that the interaction of these characteristics is likely to 
influence the effectiveness of corporate governance practices.  Utilizing a composite 
score is attractive as it captures the overall governance of remuneration committees by 
taking the orthogonal effects between monitoring mechanisms characterized by each 
of the five remuneration committee characteristics (Sun et al., 2009).  Collectively, our 
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results also suggest that studies that attempt to link board governance, particularly with 
respect to the remuneration committee, to firm performance and voluntary disclosure 
could benefit by developing a broader and richer measure of remuneration committee 
quality. This is especially the case as this board subcommittee plays a major role in 
matters relating to executive remuneration, with executive remuneration being critical 
in aligning managers and shareholder interests. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature and outlines development of the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
study’s sample collection and model development, while Section 4 presents the study’s 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a brief summary. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
(i) Remuneration committee existence (RCX) and voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration             disclosure. 
Boards can conduct their work either through the full board or delegate their 
authority to a sub-committee reporting to the board (Brown et al., 2011). These board 
sub-committees meet separately from the board and are composed of subsets of board 
members. The literature acknowledges and provides evidence that sub-committees 
play an important role in enhancing a firm’s corporate governance (Spira and Bender, 
2004). Sub-committees are usually formed to undertake specific tasks and undertake 
detailed reviews of operational matters, and they are typically made up of members 
with greater mastery of complex information. Having a remuneration committee is 
consistent with agency theory, which suggests that management should be separated 
from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
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 Jensen (1993) notes that the “job of the board is to hire and fire and compensate 
the CEO and to provide high-level counsel”. Deliberation about, and the determination 
of top management pay, however, is often delegated to a board sub-committee such as 
the remuneration or compensation committee. Nelson et al. (2010) provide evidence 
that the existence of a compensation committee influences Executive Stock Option 
(ESO) disclosure. Sing and Harianto (1989) emphasize that the most important means 
of facilitating the decision-making process of the board is the creation of various 
committees, such as an executive compensation committee. Conyon and Gregg (1995) 
and Main and Johnston (1993) state that the role of the remuneration committee is not 
simply to reduce the pay of supposedly self-serving management, but, more generally, 
economic and agency theories would suggest that they are the forums within which 
directors determine the appropriate design of reward structures for management and 
align management and shareholder interests. The theoretical importance of a 
remuneration committee is clear; without one, the opportunity exists for senior 
executives to award themselves pay increases that are not congruent with shareholder 
interests (Conyon and Peck, 1998).  Hence, we argue that the existence of a 
remuneration committee plays an important positive role in the exercise of board 
control and will influence the decision on voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
action disclosure and the extent of such disclosure in the annual report. Thus, our first 
research hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the existence of a 
remuneration committee (RCX) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent 
of voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
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(ii) Remuneration committee quality (RCQ) and voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosure. 
Empirical findings to date show little agreement on the effect of different 
governance factors on executive compensation. For example, Newman and Mozes 
(1999) examine the relationship between the compensation committee, inside directors 
and CEO compensation, and find no evidence to support the claim that CEO 
compensation is higher when more inside directors are on the compensation 
committee. Similar findings were found by Daily et al. (1998). Conyon and Peck 
(1998) also investigate the link between compensation committee composition and top 
management compensation for 94 UK firms over the period 1991 to 1994. 
Interestingly, their results indicate that the percentage of outside directors on the 
compensation committee is positively related to top management pay. O'Reilly III et 
al. (1988) examine 105 Fortune 500 firms and find a positive association between CEO 
remuneration and the remuneration levels of outside directors serving on the 
remuneration committee. In a similar study, Newman and Mozes (1999) find that the 
level of CEO pay is significantly higher, and the pay-performance relationship 
significantly lower, when the compensation committee contains at least one insider. 
Daily et al. (1998) examine the relationship between the composition of the 
compensation committee and the CEO’s compensation, and find no evidence of 
changes in compensation when the compensation board composition varies in the firm. 
Main et al. (1995) find that CEO compensation is higher when a CEO’s tenure is 
greater than that of the chair of the compensation committee. Anderson and Bizjak 
(2003), on the other hand, find little evidence to support the claim that CEO 
participation on the compensation committee is detrimental to the shareholders of 50 
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firms with CEO participation in the compensation committee, and without CEO 
participation on the compensation committee, from 1985 to 1994. 
These studies, in general, used single or multiple remuneration characteristics, 
which may not capture the quality of the remuneration committee. Although a small 
number of recent studies in the corporate governance literature attempt to measure 
corporate governance quality, to date only two studies in the US context (Sun and 
Cahan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009) measure remuneration committee governance quality 
by utilizing a composite index. For instance, Sun and Cahan (2009) examine the 
association between remuneration committee quality, CEO cash remuneration and 
company performance in 812 US firms.  The authors find that the association between 
remuneration committee quality and pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO cash 
remuneration varies between firms, in that, 1) for firms with a high quality remuneration 
committee, the cash remuneration awarded to the CEO reflects stronger pay-for-
performance sensitivity; and 2) conversely, in high growth firms and loss-making firms, 
remuneration committee quality is associated with weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity 
in cash remuneration.  
Subsequently, Sun et al. (2009) extend their earlier study by examining whether 
the association between future firm performance and CEO stock option grants is 
affected by the quality of the remuneration committee. In findings similar to those of 
the earlier study, they show that as the quality of the remuneration committee 
increases, the firm’s future performance is related positively to stock option grants. 
Both Sun and Cahan (2009) and Sun et al. (2009) use six remuneration committee 
attributes to measure the quality of the remuneration committee: the proportion of 
directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO, the proportion of 
directors with at least ten years’ board service, the proportion of directors who are 
CEOs at other companies, the aggregate shareholding of directors on the remuneration 
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committee, the proportion of directors with three or more additional board seats, and 
the size of the committee. 
Using a similar argument, we utilize a composite measure to calculate 
remuneration committee quality by incorporating the size of the remuneration 
committee (RCS), the independence of remuneration committee members (RCIND), 
the independence of the remuneration committee chairperson (RCCHAIRIND), the 
diligence (frequency of meetings) of the remuneration committee (RCMEET), and the 
financial expertise of the remuneration committee members (RCEXP).  A 
remuneration committee with high governance quality can be expected to mitigate 
agency problems and thus aligns the incentives of the managers to the owners of the 
firm. Because remuneration committee quality will result in better design of executive 
remuneration arrangements and, ultimately, lead to better firm performance, in 
discharging their responsibilities the committee will communicate their actions to 
shareholders, investors and other stakeholders at large. Thus, we expect firms that 
voluntarily disclose changes in their remuneration plans (such as an ‘increase’, a 
‘freeze’ or a ‘decrease’) will be associated with remuneration committee quality. 
Hence, our second research hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration committee 
quality (RCQ) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent of voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
Remuneration committee size (RCS) and voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
disclosure  
A line of the literature argues that larger boards provide better monitoring (e.g., 
Pfeffer, 1972; Anderson et al., 2004). For example, larger firms tend to be complex 
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and thus in such situations having larger boards can overcome the difficulty of the 
monitoring tasks (see Baker and Gompers, 2003; Coles et al., 2008). Likewise, 
Bushman et al. (2004) argue that larger boards have the advantage of more advisors to 
monitor management. In the context of a remuneration committee, it is possible for the 
remuneration committee to exert influence on the board concerning the voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration disclosure in the annual report. A larger 
remuneration committee has more resources to construct, evaluate and monitor 
compensation and ensure its alignment with the goals of the shareholders and the 
performance of the company (Nelson et al., 2010). Thus, we expect that a larger 
remuneration committee is more likely to exert influence on the board concerning the 
extent of remuneration related disclosure. Based on this argument, we hypothesize the 
following: 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the remuneration 
committee size (RCS) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent of 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
Remuneration committee independence (RCIND) and voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosure  
The prior literature suggests that independent directors are more effective in 
reducing agency problems and managerial opportunism as the risk of collusion with 
top management is reduced (Lefwich, 1981 and Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti (2007) find that involvement of independent directors on a board-
appointed committee, rather than representation on a board, leads to a better corporate 
governance system. The theoretical importance of a remuneration committee is clear; 
in its absence, the opportunity exists for senior executives to award themselves pay 
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increases that are not congruent with shareholder interests (Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
Abeysekera (2012) find that independent directors on a remuneration committee 
increases narrative human capital disclosure in the Sri Lankan context. Nelson et al. 
(2010) argue and provide evidence in the Australian context that compensation 
committee independence and compensation committee quality (size and meetings) 
contribute to improved ESO disclosure. They argue that having more independent 
members on the committee will make it less aligned with management and, hence, 
likely to encourage more transparent disclosures.  
 We argue that ASX best practice corporate governance guidelines also require 
a remuneration committee to make recommendations to the board on the content to be 
included in the annual report regarding remuneration decisions. Greater involvement 
of independent directors on the remuneration committee increases the influence of the 
board concerning remuneration disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize the relationship 
as follows: 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration committee 
independence (RCIND) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent of 
voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
Remuneration committee independent chair (RCCHAIRIND) and voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration disclosure  
The ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends (Principle 8.2) that an 
independent director chair the remuneration committee. This approach is also 
consistent with the approaches in the UK and the US. Board independence (i.e., an 
independent chairperson and a majority of independent directors on the board) is 
almost universally viewed as a desirable corporate governance practice (Nelson et al., 
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2010). Hence, we believe a remuneration committee chaired by an independent 
director will influence the board on the voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
disclosure in the annual report. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between a remuneration 
committee chaired by an independent director (RCCHAIRIND) and (a) the 
decision to provide and (b) the extent of voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
 
Remuneration committee financial expertise (RCEXP) and voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration disclosure  
For a remuneration committee to be effective, the membership needs to include 
at least one member with relevant financial expertise. Financial knowledge is 
important for the members’ oversight roles in relation to financial reporting (Davidson 
et al., 2004). Zaman et al. (2011) argue that for an audit committee to be effective, its 
membership needs to include at least one member with relevant financial expertise. 
Sapp (2008) argues that a decrease in the level of financial expertise may decrease the 
committee’s ability to assess the compensation packages. We expect a remuneration 
committee with at least one member with financial expertise would be more concerned 
about the voluntary narrative disclosure of remuneration action in the annual report 
and would influence the board. Hence, our hypothesis is: 
H2d: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between remuneration committee 
financial expertise (RCEXP) and (a) the decision to provide and (b) the extent 
of voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
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Remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET) and voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosure  
 For a remuneration committee to be effective, it must be active. Vafeas (1999) 
finds board activity, measured by board meeting frequency, to be an important 
dimension of board operations. Zaman et al. (2011) find audit committee diligence to 
be significantly related to audit fees. Nelson et al. (2010) argue, and provide evidence 
in the Australian context, that the frequency of remuneration committee meetings 
contributes to improved ESO disclosure. We believe active remuneration committees 
are more likely to exert a positive influence on the board concerning the voluntary 
narrative disclosure on remuneration change decisions in the annual report. Therefore, 
we hypothesize the relationship as follows: 
H2e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between frequency of 
remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET) and (a) the decision to provide 
and (b) the extent of voluntary narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure (VDER). 
 
3. Research Design 
(i) Data Collection 
Our initial sample consists of the Top 200 Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) listed firms, based on market capitalization for each of the years ending 30 June 
2007 to 2011 (Chalmers et al., 2006). The choice for this segment of the market is due 
to two main reasons.  First, the Top 200 firms account for more than 70 percent of the 
entire stock market and these larger firms signify a large concentration of economic 
power (Child et al., 2003) and thus are also far more likely to attract media coverage 
(Miller, 2006). It is also noted that recent corporate governance studies in the 
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Australian environment examine the Top 200 companies (Henry, 2011; Pham et al., 
2011).22 The period 2007 to 2011 is chosen as it covers a period comprising different 
macroeconomic conditions (i.e., pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC). We obtain our 
research data from the Connect4, Boardroom and FinAnalysis databases and corporate 
websites. Critical to our study is voluntary narrative remuneration disclosure, which 
we obtain from annual reports via the Connect4 database. All remuneration committee 
governance variables were hand collected from the directors’ and corporate 
governance reports that form part of the company annual reports. Finally, the financial-
related variables were extracted from the FinAnalysis database. 
From the initial sample, we delete a number of observations due to: (1) annual 
reports being presented in a foreign currency, thus reducing comparability (Rankin, 
2010); and (2) missing annual reports and the non-availability of data from the various 
sources used in the data collection process. The screening process results in a final 
sample consisting of 673 observations across the sample period.23 Table 1, Panel A, 
shows the distribution of the sample for each year in the sample period, while Panel B 
outlines the final sample by industry sectors. The financial sector represents 24.96 
percent of the sample size, followed by consumer discretionary (13.37 percent) and 
materials (17.53 percent). The smallest sectors include telecommunication services 
(1.19 percent) and information technology (1.748 percent). All other sectors range 
from 5 percent to 12 percent. 
                                                 
22 Henry (2011) argues the reason for focusing on a random sample of 120 companies out of the largest 
300 companies is due to the largest firms being more likely to attract institutional and corporate 
shareholders when examining the existence of ownership-based dividend clienteles in the Australian 
environment from 1992 to 2008. Pham et al. (2011) used a sample of the top Australian 150 firms by 
market capitalization over the period of 1994 to 2003 when they studied the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance. 
 
23 In addition, we also re-estimated our main model by including additional firms that produce annual 
reports in foreign currency (if annual reports are available). As a result our sample size increase to 784 
firm year observations. Our results for the main hypotheses remain broadly similar.  
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Table 1 insert here 
 
(ii) Model Specification and Variables Description 
Our main hypotheses on the associations between remuneration committee 
(existence and quality) and the decision on voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
action disclosure (VDER) are tested by utilizing the following specified logit 
regression models. The associations between remuneration committee (existence and 
quality) and the extent of disclosure are tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression models. Both sets of regressions are subject to possible endogeneity bias. 
To address this issue, we lag all remuneration committee characteristics and existence 
variables by one year. This lag allows for the effect of any change in remuneration 
committee existence and quality to show up on decision and the extent of disclosure 
(Cornett et al., 2008).  
 
Model 1 – VDER and Remuneration Committee Existence 
VDER = α + β1RCX + β2PBIND + β3ROA + β4LTA + β5DEBT+ β6PBOOK + 
β7TOP20 + β8INDUSTRY + β9YEAR + ε 
 
Model 2 – VDER and Remuneration Committee Quality 
VDER = α + β1RCQ + β2PBIND + β3ROA + β4LTA + β5DEBT+ β6PBOOK + 
β7TOP20 + β8INDUSTRY + β9YEAR + ε 
 
where the variables are defined in Table 2. 




(a) Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in both models is voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure (VDER), measured in two ways: 1) the decision to 
provide voluntary narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (DVDER), 
measured as a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm decides to 
disclose and discusses the type of change in their executive remuneration arrangement 
in the annual report (e.g., firms where executives experience a freeze, decrease or 
increase in their remuneration) and 0 otherwise;24 and 2) the extent of voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (EVDER) that is measured using a 
disclosure index. Using the search facility in the Connect4 database, a search on each 
annual report was performed using words that suggest a change in executive 
remuneration. Examples of such words are “freeze”, “decrease” and “increase”. Once 
the relevant word was identified, the extent index was coded (Collett and 
Hrasky,200525 and Barako et al., 2006).26 The index is made up of four (4) 
remuneration action disclosure (VDER) items: a) remuneration action reasons, given 
a value of 1 if the reason is related to external factors (e.g., market practice, 
benchmarking), 2 if the reason is related to internal organizational factors (such as 
retain the current executives, increased responsibility), 3 if the reason includes both 
internal and external factors, and 0 otherwise; b) future remuneration action, given a 
value of 1 if future remuneration action is disclosed and 0 otherwise; c) remuneration 
related accounting ratios, given a value of 1 if remuneration action is explained by 
                                                 
24 When we compare the total director remuneration change there are only 37 firm year observations 
reveal there is no change in the total director remuneration. 
 
25 Collett and Hrasky (2005) use the search facility in Connect4 database to find words such as 
“corporate” and “governance” to determine whether the Australian companies voluntarily disclose 
corporate governance practices during 1994. 
26 Barako et al. (2006) use disclosure index to measure the dependent variable by using a content 
analysis and coding whether the entity does or does not include a particular item in the list of disclosure 
index. 
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including some form of performance/accounting measures (financial performance in 
general, EBIT), otherwise 0; and d) remuneration action quantification, given a value 
of 1 if the disclosure includes the amount of, and percentage of change in, executive 
remuneration, otherwise 0 (Belal, 2001). 
(b) Independent Variables – Test Variables 
The first test variable of interest is the existence of a remuneration committee 
(RCX), a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 denoting the existence of a 
remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise. It is important to note that although the 2007 
ASX Corporate Governance Council formally recommends that boards establish a 
remuneration committee, it is somewhat voluntary for the sample period.27 Thus, it is 
interesting to note that more than 90 percent of our sample of Top 200 ASX firms has 
a remuneration committee either as a stand-alone sub-committee or combined with 
another sub-committee. As we can see in Table 3, the existence of remuneration 
committees (RCX) increases over the sample period (pre-crisis 89 percent; crisis 
period 91 percent; and post-crisis 92 percent). 
We now move to our second main variable of interest in this study, RCQ 
(remuneration committee quality). This is a composite measure consisting of five 
characteristics of a remuneration committee: (1) size of the remuneration committee 
(RCS); (2) majority of the remuneration committee members are independent 
(RCIND); (3) independence of the remuneration committee chairman 
(RCCHAIRIND); (4) number of remuneration committee meetings (RCMEET); and 
(5) at least one member in the remuneration committee with financial expertise 
(RCEXP). In our selection and construction of these five RCQ constructs, we referred 
                                                 
27 As of 1/7/2011, ASX Listing Rule 12.8 requires all listed companies in the ASX 300 to establish, at 
the beginning of their financial year, a remuneration committee that is comprised solely of non-
executive directors for the entire year. 
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to the ASX Corporate Governance Remuneration Principles (RCS, RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND) and prior literature (RCMEET, Nelson et al., 2010; Zaman et al., 
2011; Gillan, 2006; and RCEXP, Hermanson et al., 2012; Zaman et al., 2011; Sapp, 
2008). The size of the remuneration committee (RCS) is a dummy variable and takes 
a value of 1 if the number of members in the remuneration committee is greater than 
the variable’s sample median and 0 otherwise. The sample’s remuneration committee 
size mean (and median) is three members. The variable remuneration committee 
independence (RCIND) is a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the proportion 
of independent members is greater than the sample’s median. On average, 76 percent 
of remuneration committee members are independent, while 50 percent of the 
remuneration committees are fully independent. The dummy variable remuneration 
committee chairperson independence, RCCHAIRIND, is coded 1 if the remuneration 
committee chairperson is independent. It is interesting to note that more than 80 
percent of our sample’s remuneration committee chairpersons are independent. In 
terms of frequency of meetings, on average (the median) remuneration committees 
meet four times annually; thus, the variable RCMEET takes a value of 1 if the number 
of remuneration committee meetings is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. The 
fifth variable is remuneration committee financial expertise, RCEXP, which is a 
dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if the remuneration committee consists of at 
least one financial expert, and 0 otherwise. Approximately 66 percent of the firms in 
our sample have at least one financial expert on their remuneration committees, and 
their presence has increased over the sample period (61 percent pre-GFC; 70 percent 
post-GFC). 
Finally, to obtain the overall RCQ score, the scores for each of the five 
constructs (RCS, RCIND, RCCHAIRIND, RCMEET and RCEXP) are added together 
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(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Prawitt et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2009). The values 
for RCQ range from 0 to 5 with a mean and a median of 2.73 and 3, respectively. 
(c) Control Variables 
In testing the hypotheses, and similar to other studies, we include five control 
variables in the regressions which can affect voluntary firm disclosures. The first 
control variable relates to board independence (PBIND), which is the proportion of 
non-executive independent directors on the board. Independent directors are employed 
as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between owners and managers 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, these variables provide incentives to make voluntary 
disclosures in order to minimize legal exposure to risks related to poor management 
and managerial opportunism (Lim et al., 2007). Given that the value of having 
independent directors is dependent on their reputation as experts (Fama and Jensen, 
1983), such directors are more likely to insist on more voluntary disclosure as such 
acts are seen by other stakeholders as being transparent and signaling to the market 
that they are fulfilling their responsibilities and duties (Lim et al., 2007). 
Similar to most prior studies (see Ho and Wong, 2001; Ferguson et al., 2002; 
Gul and Leung, 2004; Abeysekera, 2012), we include firm size, which is measured as 
the natural log of total assets (LTA), for three reasons: (1) larger firms are expected to 
voluntarily disclose more information than smaller firms in order to reduce 
information asymmetry, which becomes more prevalent when firms grow larger 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976); (2) larger firms are usually more sensitive to political 
costs and thus will disclose more information to alleviate public criticism; and (3) 
larger firms are expected to disclose more information as the amount of damage arising 
from litigation is dependent on the size of the firm (Skinner, 1994). 
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 Several studies use the ratio of profit to total assets (ROA) in predicting 
voluntary disclosure (see, for example, Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Meek et al., 1995; 
Ho and Wong, 2001; Ferguson et al., 2002). In line with those studies, we include 
ROA in our model, as better performing firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
information. 
 In line with prior studies (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2002; Lim et al., 2007), we include 
debt ratio (DEBT), price-to-book ratio (PBOOK) and top 20 shareholders (TOP20) as 
control variables. DEBT ratio is measured as total liabilities to total assets, and it is 
expected that firms with a higher debt ratio are more likely to voluntarily disclose more 
information in order to reduce potential legal risk. The PBOOK ratio compares the 
current market price to its book value and is measured by dividing the closing share 
price on the last day of the company's financial year by shareholder equity per share. 
TOP20 is the ratio of top 20 shareholders’ shareholdings to total shares, and it is 
expected that firms with higher outside ownership with more board representation will 
provide less voluntary disclosure (Lim et al., 2007). 
 Finally, like most prior studies (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Camfferman and 
Cooke, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2002), we control for industry and year effects. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
(i) Descriptive Statistics 
  
From the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3, 41 percent of our total 
sample provides some form of narrative disclosure on actions with respect to executive 
remuneration. In other words, almost half of the firms disclose either an increase, a 
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decrease or a freeze in executive remuneration in their annual reports.28 In terms of the 
direction of the change in remuneration, from the sample, 23 percent report an increase 
(VDERI), 18 percent report a freeze (VDERF), while only 2 percent report a decrease 
in their executive remuneration package. We further investigate remuneration change 
actions by economic periods. As expected, during the pre-GFC crisis period (2007-
2008), the most prevalent remuneration action is an increase in remuneration packages 
(31 percent of the sample). Similar observations are found during the post-crisis period 
(2010-2011), with 26 percent of the sample receiving an increase in their executive 
remuneration package. Although we expected firms to suffer a decrease in their 
executive remuneration during the crisis period (2009), this was not the case, as only 
1 percent of the firms provides such narrative disclosure. However, the most prevalent 
action during the crisis period is disclosure of a freeze or no change in executive 
remuneration, with 38 percent of sample firms reporting such action. The mean of the 
extent index is 1.14, with a minimum score of 0 for those companies that do not 
voluntarily disclose executive remuneration action and a maximum score of 6. 
 The descriptive statistics show that remuneration committee activity in terms 
of the frequency of meetings increase during the post-crisis period compared to pre-
crisis period. This suggests that the remuneration committees became more active 
during the crisis and post-crisis periods. The means for the other four remuneration 
committee characteristics - remuneration committee size, number of independent 
directors on the remuneration committee, whether the chairman of the remuneration 
committee is independent, and the financial expertise of the remuneration committees 
– show an increase from the pre-crisis period to the post crisis-period, which underlines 
                                                 
28 Please note, since all firms disclosure both the total and specific remuneration values of their 
executives and on specific remuneration of their directors and top management, we did not take such 
required monetary disclosures into account. 
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the importance of corporate governance characteristics in a remuneration committee 
on VDER. 
Table 3 insert here 
 
(ii) Correlations 
Table 4 presents the Spearman correlation matrix with voluntary narrative 
executive remuneration action disclosure, governance attributes and control variables. 
There is no multicollinearity problem with other independent variables as correlations 
are all below 0.8. We also obtain the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables 
used in the estimations to test for multicollinearity. The unreported VIFs are less than 
10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem (Neter et al., 1996) as they are all 
within the acceptable limit (less than 10). All of the remuneration committee 
characteristics show a positive significant correlation with VDER. The proportion of 
independent directors on the board also shows a positive significant correlation with 
VDER. The size variable (LTA) is positive and significantly correlated with VDER, 
which indicates that larger firms disclose more about their remuneration actions. 
Table 4 insert here 
 
(iii) Multivariate Results 
Table 5 presents the main findings from a total of eight OLS regression 
estimations.  All estimations were fitted using Huber-White sandwich estimators and 
standard errors were clustered within companies (Petersen, 2009).  Estimations ‘a’ 
relate to logit regressions using decision to disclose (DVDER) as the dependent 
variable while Estimations ‘b’ relate to OLS regressions using extent of disclosure 
(EVDER) as the dependent variable. The first two estimations (1a and 1b) are carried 
out to test H1 with remuneration committees’ existence (RCX) being the variable of 
interest.  Estimations 2a and 2b test H2 and the variable of interest is remuneration 
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quality (RCQ).  Finally, the last two estimations (3a and 3b & 4a and 4b) test H2a to 
H2e jointly with test variables being the five individual dimensions of RCQ (size, 
independence, chairperson independence, financial expertise and diligence).  The Log 
likelihood and F-statistics for each of the estimation is significant at the 1% level and 
the Pseudo R2 (and adjusted R2) for each of the eight estimations ranges between 10% 
and 12%.  Although R2 appears rather low, it is quite comparable to prior voluntary 
disclosure studies (e.g., Laksmana, 2008 and Nelson et al., 2010). 
 
Remuneration Committee Existence (RCX) 
Table 5 (estimation 1a and 1b) shows the results for our first hypothesis, which 
examines the association between remuneration committee existence and VDER. The 
results show that the coefficient for the variable of interest, existence of a remuneration 
committee (RCX), is positive and strongly significant at the p<0.01 level, which 
implies that firms with a remuneration committee are more likely to provide 
information relating to voluntary narrative disclosures on executive remuneration 
actions (for both existence and extent of disclosure). This finding is consistent with 
the findings of Nelson et al. (2010), which shows evidence that the existence of a 
remuneration committee influences executive stock option disclosure. In summary, the 
results imply that the existence of a remuneration committee plays an important role 
on VDER and, thus, supports hypothesis 1.29 
 
Remuneration Committee Quality (RCQ) 
Our second hypothesis uses equation model 2, which captures the effect of the 
remuneration committee quality (a composite measure) on DVDER and the extent of 
                                                 
29 We find a consistent result when we lag our test variable RCX (see Cornett et al., 2008).  
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disclosure index. Specifically, the significance of this effect is shown in Table 5, 
estimation 2a and 2b. The variable of interest, RCQ, is positive and significantly 
associated with the decision to disclose voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
actions and the extent of such disclosure (at the p<0.01 level), thus providing support 
for our second hypothesis.30 The results suggest that firms with increasing 
remuneration committee quality tend to make voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosures and provide greater detailed explanation concerning 
their actions to users of financial statements. Collectively, the implications are that 
remuneration committee composition plays a significant role in making decisions as 
to whether (and the extent to which) a firm decides to provide additional information 
relating to remuneration actions, such as an increase, freeze or decrease in executive 
remuneration. 
 
Remuneration Committee Components 
The sub-hypotheses of hypothesis 2 uses model 2 to test the effects of each of 
the remuneration committee variables (size (RCS), independence (RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND), expertise (RCEXP) and diligence (RCMEET)), which are used to 
derive the composite measure RCQ on decision to disclose and the extent of disclosure. 
The results reported in estimations 3a and 3b (each of the remuneration committee 
variables is an indicator variable) and 4a and 4b (RCIND, RCIND and RCMEET are 
continuous variables while RCCHAIRIND, RCEXP are indicator variables) show that 
only two of the five remuneration committee variables are significant. Specifically, for 
                                                 
30 We find a consistent result when we lag our test variable RCQ by a year (see Cornett et al., 2008). 
We might also lag other main control variables; however, endogeneity concerns are not as significant 
as our main explanatory variables. Results are not reported due to space constraints. However, these 
results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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estimations 3a, 3b and 4a, 4b, we find RCIND and RCMEET are positive and 
significant at the 1 percent to 10 percent levels.  Thus, we find support for H2b and 
H2e, but not for H2a, H2c and H2d, although the coefficients for those variables were 
in the predicted direction.  
Our key results suggest that as the independence and diligence (in terms of 
number of meetings) of the remuneration committee increases, firms are more likely 
to make voluntary narrative remuneration action disclosure and provide greater extent 
of explanation regarding their action.  Our results are consistent with results from prior 
studies such as Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), Abeysekera (2012), Nelson et al. 
(2010) and Zaman et al. (2011). For instance, Abeysekera (2012) in the Sri Lankan 
context find a positive association between remuneration committee independence and 
narrative human capital disclosure.  Nelson et al. (2010) provide evidence, in the 
Australian context, that the independence and frequency of remuneration committee 
meetings contribute to improved ESO disclosure.  
Based on our results and similar to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Vafeas (1999) 
and Zaman et al. (2009), we conclude that independent directors and frequency of 
meetings are important characteristics of a remuneration committee.  Committees with 
directors that are independent are more likely to be better and effective monitors and 
press for more voluntary remuneration disclosure.  Further, for improved decision-
making, sufficient time via frequency of meetings are necessary to deliberate on 
remuneration relation issues and in making decisions about the level of narrative 
remuneration voluntary disclosure. 
Generally, in most estimations, we find that firm-related control variables, firm 
size (LTA) and price-to-book (PBOOK), are significantly related to voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure at the 1 percent and 10 percent 
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levels in the predicted direction. This finding is similar to that of Abeysekera (2012), 
who finds that firm size is positively associated with narrative human capital disclosure 
in the Sri Lankan context. 
Table 5 insert here 
 
(v) Further Analysis 
(a) Type of Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Remuneration  
We conduct several additional tests to check the robustness of our primary 
results. Our first test relates to our dependent variable measure, VDER. Specifically, 
we re-estimate both models by substituting our broad dependent variable, voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER), with a finer dependent 
variable, which is based on the type of executive remuneration action undertaken (i.e., 
whether the disclosure relates to an increase (VDERI) or a freeze (VDERF) in the 
executive remuneration plan). We are unable to rerun the estimations for disclosures, 
which relates to a decrease in the executive remuneration due to the low frequency of 
such disclosed action (only 15 observations). From Table 6 (Estimation 1a, 1b), we 
find that the variable remuneration committee existence (RCX) is positive and 
significant (p <0.01) in the decision on voluntary disclosure of executive remuneration 
increase (VDERI) estimation and the extent of disclosure, but not in the estimation 
relating to a freeze in executive remuneration (VDERF). Next, from estimation 2, we 
find the variable remuneration committee quality (RCQ) is positive and significant in 
regressions relating to VDERI and VDERF on decisions on executive remuneration 
action and the extent of disclosure. In terms of testing the effects of each of the 
remuneration committee variables size (RCS), independence (RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND), expertise (RCEXP) and diligence (RCMEET)), which are used to 
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derive the composite measure RCQ, our results differ slightly from our main findings. 
In the estimations (3a, 4a) relating to voluntary narrative executive remuneration 
increase disclosure, we find weak evidence for two of the five variables, namely, 
remuneration committee chairperson independence (RCCHAIRIND) and 
remuneration committee financial expertise (RCEXP). However, in the estimations (3a 
& b; 4a & b) relating to a freeze in executive remuneration disclosure, the variables 
(remuneration committee independence and diligence) are positive and significant at 
the p<0.01 and p<0.05 levels, which is similar to our findings from our main analyses. 
Table 6 insert here 
(b) Impact of Macro Economic Conditions 
Our second test examines whether the association between remuneration 
committee existence, quality and decision on VDER and extent differs across 
economic conditions. As discussed earlier, the GFC attracted huge debate and scrutiny 
of top executives and their remuneration plans which, in turn, is expected to increase 
investment and reputational risk, not only at the investor level but also at the firm and 
the individual level (top executives). Thus, firms and their top management are 
motivated to reduce their associated risks by increasing their VDER during the GFC 
(2009) and after the financial crisis (2010 and 2011). In performing this test, we 
include variables PREGFC, GFC and POSTGFC in our four models. The findings 
reported in Table 7 (1a) show that the remuneration committee existence (RCX) 
significantly influences the decision to disclose in all three periods (DVDER), but 
remuneration committee existence shows only marginal influence (p<.10) on the 
extent of disclosure during the pre-crisis period (1b). However, remuneration 
committee quality shows significant influence (2a) on the decision to disclose in all 
three periods but remains insignificant (2b) for the extent of disclosure. 
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Although not reported, similar estimations are also undertaken by substituting 
VDER with VDERI and VDERF, and our results remain broadly similar (although the 
results using dependent variable VDERF showed stronger results) to our earlier 
findings using VDER as the dependent variable. 
Next, we re-estimate models 1 and 2 by economic period, and our results are 
shown in Table 7, estimations 3-8. Our results differ slightly from our main findings 
in that in our sample relating to the pre-GFC period, the results show that in terms of 
decision to disclose executive remuneration action disclosure, the existence of a 
remuneration committee is significant in the pre- and post-crisis periods and not in the 
financial crisis period; however, the quality of the remuneration committee remains 
significant in all three periods.  In terms of extent, when a remuneration committee 
exists, companies tend to disclose more in the pre- and post-crisis periods but less in 
the global financial crisis period. This can be due to the actions taken by the companies. 
For example, in the pre-crisis period, when there is an increase in executive 
remuneration, the companies tend to disclose more about the reasons for the increase, 
but in the global financial crisis period, it is mainly due to the external market 
condition. However, it is interesting to note that remuneration committee quality 
significantly influences the extent of disclosure (p <0.1) during the crisis period (6b) 
and remains insignificant in the pre- and post-crisis period. In summary, the results 
suggest that remuneration committee existence and its quality play an important role 
in the decision to provide additional voluntary narrative disclosures on executive 
remuneration actions. 
Table 7 insert here 
 
(C) Firm Fixed effect 
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The final test examines a fixed-effect model to address the possible relationship 
between dependent and independent variables due to unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
The remuneration committee existence and quality remain highly significant at the 1% 
level in the decision to disclose the narrative director remuneration and the extent of 
such disclosure. The results presented in Table 8 are consistent with the main findings. 
Table 8 insert here 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of remuneration committees on the decision 
and extent of narrative voluntary executive remuneration action disclosure (VDER). 
Our findings show that remuneration committees serve as an important corporate 
governance mechanism. In addition, the potential risks to their own reputation and the 
risks of litigation faced by remuneration committee members make them work 
effectively to influence the preparation of annual reports to voluntarily disclose their 
actions on executive remuneration. We expect that the existence of a remuneration 
committee will influence boards to voluntarily disclose more information and that 
effective remuneration committees are more likely to be influential than ineffective 
remuneration committees. We examine these two propositions in this paper and find 
that they are supported. 
 The results also provide evidence of remuneration committee quality (RCQ) 
having a positive effect on narrative voluntary executive remuneration disclosure. The 
remuneration committee’s quality is also highly significant across different economic 
conditions and in relation to different types of voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration disclosures. Our further analysis suggests remuneration committee 
independence and the diligence of remuneration committees are the driving forces 
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behind remuneration committee quality. The proportion of board independence is 
significant, except in the voluntary disclosure of an increase in executive 
remuneration. It is also interesting to note board independence becoming a main 
explanatory variable for the voluntary narrative executive remuneration disclosure 
during the GFC and in the post-GFC periods. 
This paper extends the limited research on remuneration committee quality. 
While prior US studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Vafeas, 2003) focus on 
compensation committee quality and CEO pay, Sun et al. (2009) focus on the 
relationship between future firm performance and CEO stock option grants. In 
Australia, Beekes and Brown (2006) find that better governed firms do make more 
informative disclosures. Nelson et al. (2010) find that board independence, 
compensation committee independence and quality, and audit committee 
independence contribute to compliance with ESO disclosures. Our paper extends the 
literature on narrative executive remuneration voluntary disclosure and finds that the 
existence of a remuneration committee is significantly associated with voluntary 
narrative executive remuneration action disclosure. The study also finds that 
remuneration committee quality is positively associated with narrative voluntary 
executive remuneration disclosure in annual reports. Further, we find that the 
proportion of independent directors, the proportion of remuneration committee 
independence, the number of remuneration committee meetings and firm size are all 
positively associated with narrative voluntary executive remuneration action 
disclosure. 
The study’s findings provide critical information on remuneration committee 
existence and quality, and on organizational voluntary reporting behavior, from a 
unique macroeconomic setting before, during and after the global financial crisis. This 
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understanding, in turn, has implications for various stakeholders, including auditors, 
standards-setters and regulatory bodies for their decision-making in relation to 
policymaking and implementation. 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
In this table, we provide the sample period, number of observations and industry sector 
classifications for each year. 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Starting sample 200 200 200 200 200 1000 
Less:       
Annual reports in foreign 
currency 
21 19 18 25 21 107 
Missing annual reports 13 24 29 26 26 118 
Missing records in Connect4 or 
corporate website 
33 17 17 7 10 84 
Other missing values in control 
variables 
7 4 0 3 4 18 
Final sample 123 136 136 139 139 673 
 
Panel B: Industry Sector Classification 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Freq. Percent 
        
Consumer 
Discretionary 13 16 19 22 20 90 13.37 
Consumer Staples 8 9 7 7 8 39 5.79 
Energy 12 20 19 16 15 82 12.18 
Financials 38 33 33 32 32 168 24.96 
Health Care 8 8 8 8 7 39 5.79 
Industrials 13 17 16 20 21 87 12.93 
Information 
Technology 2 2 3 2 3 12 1.78 
Materials 22 25 23 23 25 118 17.53 
Telecommunication 
Service 1 0 2 3 2 8 1.19 
Utilities 6 6 6 6 6 30 4.46 
        
Total 123 136 136 139 139 673 100 
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Table 2: Variable Description and Measurement 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Dependent variable(s) 
VDER Voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration action disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure on narrative executive remuneration action 
disclosure and is measured in two ways: 1) Dummy variable (DVER) 
and takes a value of 1 if the firm provides a narrative disclosure on 
their “action” on executive remuneration in their annual report (i.e., 
remuneration increase, decrease or freeze); and 0 otherwise; 2) The 
extent index (EVDER) is made up of four (4) remuneration action 
disclosure (VDER) items a) remuneration action reasons and is given 
a value of 1 if the reason is related to external factors, 2 if the reason 
is related to internal organizational factors (such as retain the current 
executives, increased responsibility, 3 if the reason includes both 
internal and external factors; and 0 otherwise; b) future remuneration 
action and a value of 1 is given if future remuneration action is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise; c) remuneration related accounting ratios 
and a value of 1 is given if  remuneration action explained by 
including some form of performance/accounting measures 1 
otherwise 0; and d) remuneration action quantification and a value 
of 1 is given if the disclosure includes amount and percentage of 
change in executive remuneration 1, otherwise 0 . 
VDERI Voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration increase disclosure 
Dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the firm provides a 
narrative disclosure on “increase” in executive remuneration in their 
annual report (i.e., remuneration increase); and 0 otherwise. 
VDERF Voluntary narrative executive 
remuneration freeze disclosure 
Dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the firm provides a 
narrative disclosure on “freeze” in executive remuneration in their 
annual report (i.e., remuneration increase); and 0 otherwise. 
Test Variables   
RCX Remuneration committee 
existence 
Dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if a remuneration committee 
in the firm existence; 0 - non existence 
RCQ Remuneration committee quality Remuneration committee quality, a composite score measuring the 
quality of the remuneration committee ranging between 0 and 5, with 
0 indicating the lowest quality and 5 indicating the highest quality. 
The score is formed by aggregating the composite scores obtained 
from five characteristics of a remuneration committee, RCS, RCIND, 
RCCHAIRIND, RCEXP, RCMEET. 
RCS Remuneration committee size Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if the number of members 
in the committee is greater than the median value; 0 otherwise. 
RCIND Remuneration committee 
independence 
Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if the proportion of 
independent members in the committee is greater than the median 
value; 0 otherwise. 
RCCHAIRIND Remuneration committee 
chairperson independence 
Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if the chairperson of the 
remuneration committee is an independent person; 0 otherwise. 
RCEXP Remuneration committee 
expertise 
Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if at least one of the 
members is a financial expert. 
RCMEET Remuneration committee 
meetings 
Dummy variable and a value of 1 is given if the number of board 
meetings is greater than the median value; 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables 
PBIND Proportion of independent 
directors on the board 
Number of independent directors on the board divided by board size. 
LTA Size Log of total assets. 
DEBT Debt Total liabilities to total assets. 
LIABILITY Liability Total liability includes both current and non-current liabilities. 
ROA Performance Return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets. 
PBOOK Price-to-Book  Price to book ratio is measured as share’s market value divided by 
its book value. 
TOP20 Top 20 shareholders Total ownership of the top 20 shareholders. 
PREGFCD Pre-global financial crisis period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period between July 1, 2006 to  June 
30, 2008; 0 otherwise. 
GFCD Global financial crisis period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period between  July 1, 2008 to  June 
30, 2009; 0 otherwise. 
POSTGFCD Post-global financial crisis period Dummy variable, value of 1 for period between  July 1, 2009 to June 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Regression Result 
This table presents the results the main findings from a total of eight estimations.  Estimations ‘a’ 
relate to logit regressions using DVDER (decision to disclose) as the dependent variable while 
Estimations ‘b’ relate to OLS regressions using EVDER (extent of disclosure) as the dependent 
variable. The first two estimations (1a and 1b) were carried out to test H1 with remuneration 
committees’ existence (RCX) being the variable of interest.  Estimations 2a and 2b tests H2 and 
the variable of interest is remuneration quality (RCQ).  The results reported in estimations 3a and 
3b (each of the remuneration committee variables is an indicator variable) and 4a and 4b (RCIND, 
RCIND and RCMEET are continuous variables while RCCHAIRIND, RCEXP are indicator 
variables). All other variables are defined in Table 2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 
0.10 using one-tailed test. All estimations were fitted using Huber-White sandwich estimators and 
standard errors were clustered within companies (Petersen, 2009). Reported are the coefficient and 
in parentheses, the standard error. 
Variable Estima Estima Estima Estima Estima Estima Estimat Estimati
         
RCX 1.210* 0.593*       
 (0.418 (0.171       
RCQ   0.239* 0.153*     
   (0.079 (0.053     
RCS     0.129 0.059 0.282 0.124 
     (0.185 (0.142 (0.288) (0.198) 
RCIND     0.456* 0.355* 0.972* 0.601* 
     (0.217 (0.159 (0.519) (0.319) 
RCCHAIRIN     0.266 0.295 -0.397 -0.122 
     (0.331 (0.195 (0.415) (0.265) 
RCEXP     0.153 -0.098 0.020 -0.186 
     (0.201 (0.153 (0.194) (0.151) 
RCMEET     0.293* 0.292* 0.431* 0.312**
     (0.192 (0.151 (0.172) (0.118) 
PBIND 0.690 0.498 0.303 0.260 0.065 -0.035 0.125 0.077 
 (0.431 (0.310 (0.435 (0.314 (0.462 (0.317 (0.514) (0.346) 
LTA 0.281* 0.124* 0.257* 0.110* 0.249* 0.095* 0.204* 0.071 
 (0.074 (0.057 (0.073 (0.056 (0.075 (0.057 (0.077) (0.057) 
DEBT -0.043 0.116 -0.166 0.012 -0.132 0.018 -0.156 0.027 
 (0.414 (0.326 (0.408 (0.326 (0.407 (0.314 (0.453) (0.315) 
ROA -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.012 (0.008 (0.012 (0.008 (0.012 (0.007 (0.013) (0.008) 
PBOOK 0.043* 0.011* 0.035* 0.009* 0.031* 0.007 0.035* 0.009* 
 (0.023 (0.005 (0.024 (0.005 (0.024 (0.005 (0.025) (0.005) 
TOP20 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.006 (0.005 (0.006 (0.005 (0.006 (0.004 (0.006) (0.005) 
_cons - -1.940 - - - -0.653 - -0.560 
 (1.750 (1.248 (1.660 (1.247 (1.770 (1.263 (1.790) (1.235) 
Industry Includ Includ Includ Includ Includ Includ Include Included 
Year Includ Includ Includ Includ Includ Includ Include Included 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.099 0.096 0.101 0.099 0.113 0.110 0.120 
Log - 7.71 - 6.60 - 6.09 -405.96 7.91 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Further Analysis – Firm Fixed Effect  
 
This table presents the results the fixed effect estimation for a total of eight estimations. Estimations ‘a’ relate to 
logit regressions using DVDER (decision to disclose) as the dependent variable while Estimations ‘b’ relate to OLS 
regressions using EVDER (extent of disclosure) as the dependent variable. The first two estimations (1a and 1b) 
were carried out to test H1 with remuneration committees’ existence (RCX) being the variable of interest.  
Estimations 2a and 2b tests H2 and the variable of interest is remuneration quality (RCQ).  The results reported in 
estimations 3a and 3b (each of the remuneration committee variables is an indicator variable) and 4a and 4b (RCIND, 
RCIND and RCMEET are continuous variables while RCCHAIRIND, RCEXP are indicator variables). All other 
variables are defined in Table 2. *** p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, * p-value 0.10 using one-tailed test. Reported 
are the coefficient and in parentheses, the standard error. 
 
Variable Estimation Estimation  Estimation Estimation Estimation Estimation Estimation Estimation 
 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
RCX 0.250*** 0.710***       
 (0.073) (0.232)       
RCQ   0.057*** 0.164***     
   (0.015) (0.049)     
RCS     0.042 0.286 -0.007 -0.028 
     (0.075) (0.239) (0.029) (0.093) 
RCIND     0.122 0.258** 0.050 0.184* 
     (0.090) (0.285) (0.035) (0.111) 
RCCHAIRIND     0.016 0.168 -0.009 0.054 
     (0.091) (0.290) (0.080) (0.255) 
RCEXP     -0.004 -0.181 0.007 -0.182 
     (0.048) (0.154) (0.047) (0.150) 
RCMEET     0.119* 0.349 0.036** 0.104*** 
     (0.050) (0.159) (0.010) (0.255) 
PBIND 0.110 0.0.390 0.053 0.222 -0.015 0.073 -0.028 -0.140 
 (0.095) (0.303) (0.098) (0.312) (0.104) (0.330) (0.111) (0.354) 
LTA 0.053*** 0.130*** 0.049*** 0.116** 0.0427*** 0.095* 0.034** 0.072 
 (0.015) (0.049) (0.015) (0.049) (0.016) (0.051) (0.016) (0.051) 
DEBT -0.044 0.009 -0.082 -0.103 -0.0`77 -0.082 -0.071 -0.065 
 (0.096) (0.308) (0.097) (0.311) (0.098) (0.311) (0.097) (0.310) 
ROA 0.002 -0.409 0.015 -0.375 -0.008 -0.387 0.011 -0.362 
 (0.223) (0.712) (0.222) (0.709) (0.223) (0.708) (0.220) (0.701) 
PBOOK 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.008* 0.002* 0.008 0.002* 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) 
TOP20 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
_cons -0.701 -1.106 -0.564 -0.717*** -0.431*** -0.218 0.193** -0.534 
 (0.430) (1.373) (0.428) (1.364) (0.438) (1.393) (0.439) (1.398) 
Industry No  No No No No No No No 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseduo R2 0.086 0.062 0.089 0.065 0.088 0.113 0.103 0.085 
F statistics 1.430 1.298 1.442 1.314 1.426 1.328 1.512 1.411 
N 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 
